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Abstract 
 
This research aims to find the key determinants of the variation of the tax 
revenue capacity in China, and to evaluate China’s tax revenue performance 
at provincial level. The econometric quantitative method is applied in this 
study for these purposes. The data used in this study covers the period 
between 1995 and 2013 on 31 provinces, autonomous or municipal cities 
directly under the control of the Central Government. Differing from the 
previous research, a new dependent variable, the current revenue ratio is 
used in addition to the conventional tax ratio. The current revenue is the sum 
of tax revenue and non-tax soured revenue excludes State Owned 
Enterprises revenues and expenditures. Eleven independent variables falling 
into six categories were selected. These six categories were: The traditional 
tax handles, GDP decomposition, Population factors, Income inequality, 
Governmental factors, and Corruption. 
  
The contributions of this study are: Firstly, for the first time the author 
constructed the current revenue ratio as the second dependent variable to 
represent the broader fiscal revenue and true tax-like revenue performance 
for studying tax effort index in China. Secondly, this study constructed the 
rural-urban income disparity Theil index as one of the explanatory variables in 
the tax effort index models for the first time in China’s tax performance study. 
Thirdly, for the first time in the tax effort index literature, this study used 
country specific data on corruption in a single country tax effort index model.  
 
The main results of this study are: 1) tax revenue capacity is mainly 
determined by the economic factors whereas the current revenue capacity is 
determined by both the economic and social factors; 2) tax revenue 
performance is diluted by the existence of non-tax sourced revenues; 3) the 
current revenue ratio is a better indicator for true tax performance; 4) There 
exists a regional disparity of tax or current revenue capacity among provinces. 
5) tax/current revenue capacities and tax/current revenue efforts are 
mismatched in some provinces.   
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1 Chapter one: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction  
This research has used the econometric quantitative method to investigate the 
key determinants of the tax revenue capacity, and evaluate the tax revenue 
performance at provincial level in China during the period of 1995 to 2013. In 
this chapter, the background and rationale of the study, the research 
objectives, research method, main contribution and the structure of this thesis 
are presented. 
 
1.2  Background and rational of the study 
1.2.1 China’s administrative division system 
Since this study is focused on the regional tax revenue performance in China, 
it is important to understand China’s administrative division system. According 
to the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, the administrative units 
of China include the central government, provinces, autonomous regions, 
municipalities directly under the Central Government, autonomous 
prefectures, counties, autonomous counties, cities, townships, ethnic minority 
townships, and towns, and the administrative division of all units are under a 
three-tier system (The State Council, 2016). The chart 1-1 below illustrates 
the relationship between all units under the three-tier system.  
 
Chart 1-1: The three-tier administrative division system 
 
level one of the 
three-tier system
level two of the 
three-tier system
level three of the 
three-tier system
• provinces
• autonomous regions
• municipalities directly 
under the Central 
Government
• autonomous prefectures
• counties
• autonomous counties
• cities
• townships
• ethnic minority townships
• towns
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Due to the availability of the data, level one of administrative units in mainland 
China are used for this thesis. According to the State Council, currently in 
mainland China, there are 31 level one administrative regions that include 22 
provinces, 5 autonomous regions, and 4 municipalities that are directly under 
the Central Government.  The table 1-1 below lists all 31 level one 
administrative regions that are used in this study. 
 
Table 1-1: 31 Level one administrative regions in China 
Provinces 
Anhui, Fujian, Gansu, Guangdong, 
Guizhou, Hainan, Hebei, Heilongjiang, 
Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, 
Jilin, Liaoning, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Shandong, 
Shanxi, Sichuan, Yunnan,  and Zhejiang 
Autonomous regions 
Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Tibet, 
and Xinjiang 
municipalities Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai, and Tianjin 
 
For the convenience of the reader, all 31 level one administrative provinces, 
autonomous regions, and municipalities that are directly under the Central 
Government are collectively referred to as “provinces” Throughout this thesis. 
 
1.2.2 Taxation, tax capacity, and tax effort 
Taxation, as one of the oldest activities in human history, has been playing a 
key role in civilised societies for thousands of years. Tax can be defined as a 
compulsory levy made by tax authorities on income, expenditure, wealth or 
people, for which nothing is received by the individual tax payer directly or 
specifically in return (James & Nobes, 2012, 2013; Lymer & Oats, 2013, 
2014). 
 
As the basic financial support for the states’ basic functions, tax is a key 
element in the running of a state and regime, especially for developing 
countries like China, and the influence of taxes in economy and society is 
profound (Levi, 1988; Cheibub, 1998; Feger & Asafu-Adjaye, 2014). 
15 
 
 
Government tax revenue performance has drawn the attention of many 
scholars for decades. However, there is still some debate on how to measure 
the tax revenue performance, the potential tax revenue, and how government 
units utilize the tax revenue potential to generate tax revenue.  
  
Starting from the mid-20th century, in order to examine the tax revenue 
performance, numerous scholars have tried to use econometric techniques to 
examine the potential of taxation and the extent to which tax authorities utilize 
their potential. This has led to the emergence of two key concepts in taxation 
studies: the tax capacity and tax effort (Bird, et al., 2006).  
 
Tax capacity is defined as the hypothetical ability of a tax authority to raise tax 
revenue for the purpose of public finance within the existing available tax 
base; and the tax effort is the extent to which an area or government is able to 
collect tax from its taxable capacities (Bahl, 1971, 1972; Akin, 1973; Mertens, 
2003; Wang, Shen, & Zou, 2009; Le, Moreno-Dodson, & Bayraktar, 2012).  
 
1.2.3 Taxation, and tax revenue performance in China 
In parallel, since the establishment of the tax system in China in the early 
1950s, the Chinese tax system has gone through many reforms. Before the 
open door policy in 1978, China was under the planned economy system. The 
government controlled production and allocation of almost all resources, in 
other words, all the economic resources were in the state’s hands rather than 
in private hands (Yueh, 2010), and the role of taxation was relatively small in 
China’s economic activities (Wang, 1984; Easson & Li, 1987; Liu, 2000; Zeng, 
Li, & Li, 2013). It was not until 1978 that the Chinese authorities launched the 
market-oriented economic reform and the Chinese tax system began to be 
recognized as a vital part of the economic reform (Lin, 2000). Subsequently, 
China’s tax system has gone through huge development and expansion 
(Easson & Li, 1987; Liu, 2008; Xu & Cui, 2011). But what laid the foundation 
of the current Chinese tax system was the 1994 tax sharing system reform, 
which fundamentally re-shaped the Chinese tax system and constructed the 
16 
 
revenue relationship between central and local government (Liu, 2008; Shen, 
Jin, & Zou, 2012; Shen, Zhao, & Zou, 2014). 
 
Tax revenue is the main support for government spending in China, hence its 
influence is touching every corner of China’s economy (Lü & Guo, 2012). As a 
result, the studies on China’s tax system and its performance has 
mushroomed in recent decades (Shen, Jin, & Zou, 2012). For decades, a 
number of  researchers have tried to identify the source of tax revenue growth 
and the reasons behind the rise and fall of tax revenue (Liu, 2000; Wong, 
2000; Yang, 2001; Ahmad, Keping, Singh, & Richardson, 2002; Liu, 2008; 
Wong & Bird, 2008; Wang, Shen, & Zou, 2009; Xu & Cui, 2011; Huang, Lo, & 
She, 2012; Lü & Guo, 2012; Shen, Jin, & Zou, 2012; Tong, Li, & Wang, 2013; 
Zeng, Li, & Li, 2013; Shen, Zhao, & Zou, 2014). 
  
1.2.4 The rationale of the study 
This research shows that some issues urgently needed to be resolved 
regarding the analysis of China’s tax revenue performance, including defining 
the tax revenue and its determinants.  
 
Firstly, the existence of the non-tax sourced revenue in the fiscal revenue 
system of China’s local governments is widely ignored, despite the size and 
importance of the non-tax sources, which is so vital in the local government 
fiscal revenue system; it was often referred to as “the second budget” or “half 
the mountain” around the 1990s (Jia & Liu, 2005, p. 24; Guifen, 2007, p. 64).   
 
Although similar, there are differences between the tax revenue and the non-
tax sourced revenue in China  (Wong & Bird, 2008). Tax revenue and its 
usage is well organized and administered by the central government.  
However, the non-tax sourced revenues are collected by the local 
government, which lacks transparency and is often without a legal basis. It 
has been pointed out that since the local governments are granted most of the 
power regarding the establishment, adjustment, and collection of non-tax 
sourced revenue, this has resulted in local government collecting a noticeable 
amount of revenue as a major component of the local fiscal revenue system 
17 
 
(Lin, 2000; Ma, 2005; Wong & Bird, 2008; Shen, 2011; Shen et al., 2012; Tong 
et al., 2013; Zheng & Wang, 2013). 
 
In fact, the issue of non-tax sourced revenue is not unique in China, neither is 
it a new phenomenon in developing countries. Fauvelle-Aymar (1999) argues 
that non-tax sourced revenues are mostly generated from public enterprises in 
developing countries. Even though tax revenue and non-tax sourced revenue 
are inherently different based on their respective definitions, given the 
important position of the public enterprises in developing countries, it is 
possible that the non-tax sourced revenue is similar to the tax revenue in 
political terms (Fauvelle-Aymar, 1999). Bird, Martinez-Vazquez, and Torgler 
(2006) also point out that the misclassification of a state’s revenue between 
tax and non-tax sourced revenues often exists among developing and 
transitional economies (Bird et al., 2006). Some scholars claim that a large 
portion of non-tax sourced revenue in China matches the content of taxes in 
concept (Lin, 2002; Wu, 2002; Jia & Liu, 2005; Lin, 2005).  
 
Secondly, in the literature, finding China’s tax revenue performance 
determinants using tax effort index method, the special social and political 
characteristics of China has been widely ignored.  
 
Since the introduction of the tax effort index model method for the relative tax 
capacity/effort measurements in the early 1960s, the method has been well-
developed in many ways in the analysis of inter-county studies (Ghura & 
Hadjimichael, 1996; Ghura, 1998; Fauvelle-Aymar, 1999; Teera & Hudson, 
2004; Le et al., 2012). The scale of finding of determinants has focused on not 
only the economic conditions, but also on other social and political conditions 
(Bird et al., 2006, 2008). Hence, a great expansion of social, political, and 
cultural variables, such as the cultural differences indicators, variation of 
government efficiencies, education levels, foreign grants, income distribution 
and corruption were adopted in the tax effort index models (Ghura, 1998; 
Piancastelli, 2001; Teera & Hudson, 2004; Bird et al., 2006; Gupta, 2007; Bird 
et al., 2008). 
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The same model can also take in the inner-country analysis. However, 
relevant studies are in the minority in the literature. In addition, when 
conducting the inner-country tax effort analysis, researchers have revealed 
that different countries have their own special features. In other words, each 
country is unique from others in some ways. The same variables in different 
countries reveal a different story. The characteristic variations of countries 
have demonstrated that there is no such thing as the “standard components” 
in the construction of explanatory variables; one must work with each 
country’s particular characteristics when applying the tax effort index model 
(Badu & Li, 1994; Wang et al., 2009; Chaudhry & Munir, 2010; Huang et al., 
2012; Karagöz, 2013; yao & Lin, 2013). 
 
The tax effort index study in the intra-country analysis are very few, and even 
rarer in China. Moreover, the existing few tax effort index studies in China 
have been mainly focused on the economic perspective (Wang et al., 2009). 
The special social and political characteristics of China have been widely 
ignored in the tax literature. 
 
The debate and the ambiguity of the salient feature of non-tax source and the 
tax revenue determinants in China continues, and a gap has clearly grown, 
which is the lack of a holistic and comprehensive inner-country tax effort index 
study in the literature on the tax performance in China. This is why the author 
of this study has chosen this topic in an attempt to close the gap in the 
literature.   
 
1.3 Research aim, questions, objectives and hypotheses  
The aim of this study is to find the key determinants of the variation of the tax 
revenue capacity in China, and to evaluate China’s tax revenue performance 
at provincial level. Therefore, the primary purpose of this study is to seek 
answers to questions regarding the following: 
 
1. What are the key determinants affecting the tax capacity in China at 
provincial level? 
19 
 
2. How did the tax revenue perform in China at provincial level? 
3. Is there any regional variation of tax performance at the provincial 
level? 
4. What policies may be suggested to improve the tax revenue 
performance in China? 
 
Similar to the research questions, the following objectives are set out:  
1. To explore the relationship between the tax capacity and certain economic 
and social factors. 
2. To evaluate the tax revenue performance at provincial level in China 
3. To examine the variation of regional tax revenue performance in China. 
4. To make suggestions for policy makers to improve the tax performance in 
China. 
 
As the outcomes of the literature reviewed, the testable hypotheses in this 
study can be formulated as follows:  
 
H1: The stage of development is positively related to the tax revenue 
performance at provincial level in China. 
 
H2: Development in the industrial sector is positively related to the tax 
revenue performance at provincial level in China. 
 
H3: The development of the service sector is positively related to the tax 
revenue performance at provincial level in China. 
 
H4: The openness level is positively related to the tax revenue performance at 
provincial level in China. 
 
H5: The population growth rate is negatively related to the tax revenue 
performance at provincial level in China. 
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H6: The population density is positively related to the tax revenue 
performance at provincial level in China. 
 
H7: The shrinking of agricultural sector activities is positively related to the tax 
revenue performance at provincial level in China. 
 
H8: The resident income inequality is negatively related to the tax revenue 
performance at provincial level in China. 
 
H9: The external grants received by the local governments is negatively 
related to the tax revenue performance at provincial level in China. 
 
H10: The anti-corruption effort is positively related to the tax revenue 
performance at provincial level in China. 
 
H11: The government capacity is positively related to the tax revenue 
performance at provincial level in China. 
 
 
 
1.4 The research method 
The research aim of this study is to find the key determinants of the variation of 
the tax revenue capacity in China, and to evaluate China’s tax revenue 
performance at provincial level. 
 
The nature of this research is to prove several causal relationships, and the 
researcher believes one reality exists objectively, and knowledge can only 
gained from observation and analysis of the external reality through scientific 
experiments based on a hypothesis. Hence positivism is the underpinning 
paradigm of this research. The variables needed for this research are 
measurable and therefore quantifiable, the quantitative methodology is adopted 
in this research. To achieve the research aim, the statistical analysis methods 
should be compatible and essential for this study. The data used in this study 
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are collected from statistics yearbooks and reports published by the Chinese 
government authorised organizations.  The more detailed philosophy position 
discussion is presented in Chapter 5, section 5.2.  
 
Specifically, the econometric modelling is used in this study. The model 
building, variable selections, and data sources can be described as follows: 
 
Firstly, the author constructed the current revenue capacity along with the 
conventional tax revenue capacity as the two dependent variables in the tax 
effort index model for all 31 provinces. The tax revenue capacity is measured 
as the predicted ratio of tax revenue collection in GDP, also known as the tax 
ratio or tax share in the regression model; and the current revenue capacity is 
measured as the predicted ratio of current revenue collection in GDP, where 
the current revenue is the sum of tax revenue and non-tax sourced revenue 
excludes State Owned Enterprises revenues and expenditures. In this 
research, the term of tax revenue capacity, tax capacity, tax ratio and tax 
share are used interchangeably. The same principle is also applied for terms 
of the current revenue.  
 
Secondly, In terms of the independent variables, eleven variables falling into 
six categories were selected for the purpose of the comprehensive study on 
the determinants of tax capacity. These six categories are: The traditional tax 
handles, GDP decomposition, population factors, income inequality, 
corruption, and governmental factors. The rationale for the six categories and 
selection are discussed in detail in Chapter 5 section 5.6.  
 
Thirdly, the data needed to generate all the variables for all 31 provinces are 
secondary data collected from statistical yearbooks published by China’s 
statistical authorities.   
 
Fourthly, three regression models: pooled OLS, random effect, and fixed 
effect regression model were built and run for both tax revenue ratio and 
current revenue ratio. In order to identify the best appropriate model for this 
study, two tests were also performed:  Breusch-Pagan LM test for the random 
22 
 
effect model against the pooled OLS model, and the Hausman test for the 
fixed effect model against the random effect model. 
 
Finally, according to the regression results from the best appropriate model, 
the determinants of the tax and current revenue capacity are identified and 
discussed. These estimated tax and current revenue capacity are then used 
for calculating the tax effort and the current revenue effort index to evaluate 
China’s tax revenue performance at provincial level. More specifically, the tax 
effort index is calculated as the ratio of actual tax share and predicted tax 
share according to the definition of the tax effort index model. The current 
revenue effort index is calculated using the same approach.  
 
1.5 Contribution of this study 
This section highlights the main contribution of this study to the literature.  
 
The main contribution of this study is that it is the first of its kind that a holistic 
and comprehensive tax effort index study has been undertaken contextualised 
in China at provincial level, taking the consideration of China’s fiscal, 
economic and social salient features.   
 
In the existing literature, most studies have used only the tax revenue as the 
indicator of tax performance with a few exceptions (Fauvelle-Aymar, 1999; 
Bird, et al., 2006). In addition, in the previous studies, the researchers were 
mainly focused on economic factors such as the stage of economic 
development, GDP decomposition and openness level; hardly any studies 
considered the social and political factors. This study has filled this gap by 
constructing a broader tax-like revenue indicator, and also includes a wide 
range of social and political factors such as rural-urban income inequality, 
urbanization, migration, and corruption. 
 
In detail, the specific contributions made in this study are:  
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Firstly, for the first time the author has constructed the current revenue ratio 
as the second dependent variable to represent the broader fiscal revenue and 
true tax-like revenue performance for studying the tax effort index in China.  
 
Secondly, this study has constructed the rural-urban income inequality as one 
of the explanatory variables in the tax revenue and current revenue models for 
China’s tax performance study.  
 
Thirdly, for the first time in the tax effort index literature, this study has used 
country specific data on corruption in a single country’s tax effort index model. 
 
1.6 The structure of this thesis 
This thesis consists of seven chapters.  
 
Following the introduction, which presents the background and rationale, 
research objectives, hypotheses and research methods of this study, the 
literature review is presented in chapter two. In this chapter, firstly, the concept 
of taxation and its classification is discussed. Secondly, three important terms: 
tax capacity, tax effort, and tax effort index, and their theoretical measurements 
are presented. Thirdly, two important empirical measurements of tax capacity 
and tax effort, namely, the Representative Tax System and the regression 
approach of tax effort index are discussed. Fourthly, the empirical studies on 
the tax performance and the use of the regression approach of tax effort index 
are examined. This is followed by the outcomes of the literature reviewed, and 
eleven hypotheses for this study are presented.  
 
Chapter three provides the reader with an evolution of China’s tax system and 
its reforms. Based on the focus and the characteristics of reform, the evolution 
and reforms of the Chinese tax system are divided into five stages in this study. 
The first stage is the establishment of the tax system for the new government 
between 1950 and 1952; the second stage is the taxation simplification 
processes between 1953 and 1977 under the centrally planned economic 
system. The third stage is the development and expansion process of the tax 
system between 1978 and 1993, which was against the background of the 
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market-oriented economic reforms. Stage four commenced in 1994 when a tax-
sharing reform took place, which was viewed as the most important tax reform 
in China. The final stage was after 1995 until the present day, when a series of 
simplification and adjustment processes were carried out.  
 
Chapter Four discusses in detail the fiscal revenue performance and its main 
characteristics of China’s central and local governments, a particular focus is 
placed on the revenue relationship between central and local governments. 
This starts with the explanation of the classification of the fiscal revenue 
categories in China. The concepts and scales of budgetary revenue, off-
budgetary revenue, and extra budgetary revenue in China are explained. 
Subsequently, the development of the central transfer system and the 
performance of tax revenue and non-tax sourced revenue are illustrated and 
discussed. Here the existence, the cause and the main characteristics of the 
off-budgetary revenue and extra-budgetary revenue at provincial government 
level are examined. The discussion on the existence and the contents of the 
non-tax sourced revenue reveal that some items in the non-tax sourced 
revenues in China possibly match the concept and function of taxes.  
 
Chapter five focuses on the chosen methodology and the method that has been 
adopted in this research. Firstly, the philosophical position of this research is 
presented. This is followed by the model structuring and variable selections that 
are used in this study. The rationale of building three alternative models to 
generate the estimates for tax revenue capacity and current revenue capacity 
thus obtaining the tax effort index and the current revenue effort index are 
provided.    
 
Chapter six presents the statistical results and interpretation of these results. It 
begins with a description of the statistics of the data adopted in the models. 
Followed are the data processing and multicollinearity tests. This is followed by 
a comparison of the three regressions used in this study: pooled OLS 
regression, random effect regression, and the fixed effect regression. Along 
with the results of the three regressions, the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian 
Multiplier Test and the Hausman Test are performed in order to identify the best 
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fit regression model for this study. Based on the result, the fixed effect 
regression model is the most appropriate model in this study. After the 
hypotheses testing and regression results, the discussion and interpretation of 
the results of each of the variables used in the regressions is then presented. 
By doing so, the determinants of the tax capacity and revenue capacity in China 
are identified. Based on the regression results, the tax/current revenue capacity 
and tax/current revenue effort indices of each province are computed and 
discussed; hence the tax revenue and current revenue performance in China 
at provincial level governments are evaluated. It is in this chapter that the 
regional disparities of tax performance are found and discussed. 
 
Chapter seven summarises the main findings of this research, highlighting the 
author’s contribution to the knowledge and provides recommendations in the 
conclusion.  
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2 Chapter two: Literature review  
2.1 Introduction 
Since the focus of this study is find the key determinants of the variation of the 
tax revenue capacity in China, and to evaluate China’s tax revenue 
performance at provincial level, it is essential to understand what the nature 
and importance of taxation is; how the tax revenue performance within the 
social and economic context can be measured; and review previous empirical 
studies. 
 
In this chapter, firstly, the concept of taxation and its classification is 
discussed. Secondly, two important terms: tax capacity and tax effort, and 
their theoretical measurements will be represented. Thirdly, two important 
empirical measurements of tax capacity and tax effort, namely, the 
representative tax system and the regression approach of tax effort index will 
be discussed. Fourthly, the previous studies on the use of regression 
approach of tax effort index are examined. The discussion of previous studies 
is divided into two sections: the inter-country comparison of studies on 
international tax effort using the tax effort index regression approach, and the 
intra-country tax effort index regression studies on a single-country basis. 
Finally, as the outcome of the literature reviewed, the hypotheses for this 
study are presented in the final section. 
 
2.2 Taxation and its classification 
2.2.1 The concept and importance of taxation 
Tax can be defined as a compulsory levy enforced by tax authorities on 
income, expenditure, wealth or people, for which nothing is received by the 
taxpayers directly or specifically in return (James & Nobes, 2012, 2013; Lymer 
& Oats, 2013, 2014). Among the many ways that governments can generate 
revenues, tax revenue is recognized as the most important financial source for 
governmental public expenditures (Allan, 1971; James & Nobes, 2013; Lymer 
& Oats, 2013). 
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However, the influence of taxes in economy and society is wide and deep; 
raising taxes sometimes does not benefit the government, but harms the 
economy and society. This is caused by the income effect and substitution 
effect. The income effect means the changes in the taxpayers’ spending 
power due to the influence of taxes and the substitution effect stands for the 
price changes due to taxes that may lead to consumers altering their choices. 
A combination of both the income effect and substitution effect is the well-
known excess burden of taxation (James & Nobes, 2012, 2013). 
 
2.2.2 Tax classification 
According to the specification, final taxpayers, and the level of centralization, 
there are three major classification methods of taxes, namely, the ad valorem 
vs. specific excise taxes, direct vs. indirect taxes, and central vs. local taxes 
(Gruber, 2011).  
 
2.2.2.1 Ad valorem taxes and specific excise taxes 
According to different specification of taxes, different taxes can be classified 
into two categories: ad valorem tax and specific excise tax. Ad valorem tax is  
a fixed percentage of the sales price on a specific commodity, whereas 
specific excise tax stands for a fixed amount of tax on a specific commodity 
(Gruber, 2011). Based on these definitions, the ad valorem tax can be 
calculated as the total price of taxable base multiplied by the ad valorem tax 
rate, and the specific excise tax can be calculated as the total size or weight 
of the taxable base multiplied by the specific excise tax rate. 
 
Therefore, according to the definition and the calculation methods of both 
types of taxes, the main difference between the ad valorem tax and specific 
excise tax is that the ad valorem taxes rely on the total value of the taxable 
base, whereas the specific excise taxes are based on the size or weight of the 
taxable base. Typical examples of ad valorem taxes are turnover taxes and 
income taxes, which are variates according to the price changes.  Specific 
excise taxes can be represented by typical examples such as  resource taxes, 
vehicle and vessel usage taxes, where the tax revenues vary according to the 
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changes in size and weight rather than their prices (Gruber, 2011; Lymer & 
Oats, 2013).  
 
2.2.2.2 Direct taxes and indirect taxes 
Depends on whether tax can be transferred to others; taxes can also be 
categorised into two different types: direct and indirect tax.  
 
Direct taxes are assessed directly on individuals who are intended to bear it, 
and cannot be shifted to others, whereas indirect taxes are taxes on 
transactions, and are not directly assessed on individuals (Gruber, 2011). 
Hence, in the former tax burdens are transferable between individuals or 
groups. On the other hand, indirect tax is the tax levied on the production of 
goods, transactions, and distribution. Therefore, the burden of indirect taxes 
can be shifted to other individuals or groups involved in the process. Typical 
examples for indirect taxes are those acting in the form of consumption taxes, 
such as value-added tax. The tax raised on certain consumption goods is 
shared by both producers and consumers; hence, the tax burden can be 
shifted between these two groups.  Direct taxes are best represented by 
income type taxes, such as taxes on payrolls, incomes and wealth because 
the taxpayers of these types of taxes are the only units responsible, and the 
tax burdens in such cases cannot be shifted to other individuals or groups 
(Lymer & Oats, 2013).  
 
2.2.3 Central taxes and local taxes 
According to the different level or degree of centralization of local and national 
government units, tax revenues can also be categorised into central 
government tax revenues and local government tax revenues (Gruber, 2011). 
The fundamental difference between the central taxes and local taxes is the 
authority given for collection and expenditure. The central government holds 
the authority to collect and spend the central taxes, whereas the collection 
and expenditure power of local taxes is in the hands of local governments 
(Gruber, 2011).  
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2.3 Basic concepts of tax capacity and tax effort 
The aim of this research is to find the key determinants of the variation of the 
tax revenue capacity in China, and to evaluate China’s tax revenue 
performance at provincial level. Hence, it is important to discuss the two 
fundamental concepts in the measurement of tax revenue performance: tax 
capacity and tax effort.  
 
Tax revenue, as the key revenue form in the government’s fiscal budgetary 
revenue system, has drawn the attention of many scholars for decades. In 
terms of the measurement of the tax performance, two questions emerge: 
what is the potential of tax revenue, and how do the government units utilize 
the tax revenue potential to generate tax revenue? Hence, two important 
terms are presented: the tax capacity, which measures the potential tax 
revenues; and the tax effort, which indicates the efficiency of tax collection 
(Le, Moreno-Dodson, & Bayraktar, 2012). 
 
2.3.1 Tax capacity 
To what extent can government raise its tax revenue to achieve a perfect 
balance with economic growth? Answering this question brings us into the 
concept of tax capacity. 
 
Tax capacity is the hypothetical ability of tax authority units to raise revenue 
for the purpose of public finance within the existing available tax base (Bahl, 
1971, 1972; Akin, 1973; Wu, 2002; Teera & Hudson, 2004; Wang et al., 2009; 
Le et al., 2012).  
 
2.3.2 Tax effort 
Given the hypothetical ability to collect tax revenue, how do tax collection 
authority units direct their effort to collect taxes? This question leads to the 
definition of tax effort.  
 
Tax effort refers to  the extent to which an area or governmental body 
generates tax revenue from its tax capacity (Bahl, 1972; Mertens, 2003; Teera 
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& Hudson, 2004; Wang et al., 2009; Le et al., 2012); thus, the expression 
function of tax effort is  
ݐ݁ = ௧௥
௧௖
   
Equation 2-1 
Where: 
ݐ݁ = ݐܽݔ ݂݂݁݋ݎݐ 
ݐݎ = ܽܿݐݑ݈ܽ ݐܽݔ ݎ݁ݒ݁݊ݑ݁ ܿ݋݈݈݁ܿݐ݅݋݊ 
ݐܿ = ݐܽݔ ܿܽ݌ܽܿ݅ݐݕ 
 
2.4 Measurement of tax capacity, tax effort and tax effort index 
2.4.1 Differences of absolute and relative tax capacity 
Tax capacity is recognized by many scholars as one of the most important 
terms in a national economy; it is important because the magnitude of tax 
capacity will provide crucial information to both citizens and policy makers 
(Bahl, 1971). Many researchers have tried various ways of obtaining such 
capacity. However, because calculating the tax capacity is based on 
hypothetical calculations, the estimation of tax capacity is difficult, both 
conceptually and empirically (Akin, 1973; Wang et al., 2009; Le et al., 2012). 
 
On the one hand, tax capacity is the ability of the government to raise 
revenue, but on the other hand, the purpose of raising revenue is to better 
finance public services (Gruber, 2011). As Lewis (1949) and Tanzi and Zee 
(2000) argue, tax capacity should be identified as the ability of the government 
to raise revenue without excessive intervention on economic activities and 
operations (Lewis, 1949; Tanzi & Zee, 2000). 
 
As a theoretical concept, tax capacity is traditionally referred to as the 
absolute tax capacity (Lewis, 1949). The absolute tax capacity can be defined 
as the limit or absolute quantity of taxation which can be imposed on tax 
payers without causing unpleasant effects (Dalton, 2003). However, such a 
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level of taxation is difficult to calculate. As the American Advisory Commission 
on Intergovernmental Relations1 (ACIR) state, the absolute tax capacity is 
probably impossible to calculate in the absolute term without endless specified 
assumptions (ACIR, 1962). Moreover, as Tanzi and Zee (2000) point out, to 
calculate the absolute tax capacity is conceptually equivalent to the 
calculation of optimum government expenditure (Tanzi & Zee, 2000). In 
addition,  the tax system and revenue performance related studies in 
developing countries is “often the art of the possible rather than the pursuit of 
the optimal” (Tanzi & Zee, 2000, p. 300).  
 
Hence, the study on the relative tax capacity is more empirically realistic and 
therefore adopted in this research.  
 
2.4.2 Approaches of relative tax capacity, tax effort measurement 
Since the early 19th century, many scholars have contributed much to the 
study of relative tax capacity, especially on the topic of tax capacity 
calculation. At present, there are two main methods to calculate relative tax 
capacity. Two different approaches are well acknowledged and widely used; 
one is the Representative Tax System (RTS), which was introduced by the 
ACIR in 1962, and the other is the Regression-based Tax Effort Index Model 
(TE/R), which is used in the researches by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) (ACIR, 1962; Bahl, 1972; Akin, 1973; ACIR, 1987; Kim, 2007).  
 
By comparison, the relative tax capacity in the RTS method is defined as “the 
dollar amount of revenue that each state would raise if it applied a nationally 
uniform set of tax rates to a common set of tax bases” (ACIR, 1987, p. 4); and 
in the TE/R method, the relative tax capacity is defined as the estimated tax-
income ratio from the tax effort index model (Tanzi & Zee, 2000).  
 
2.4.2.1 Representative Tax System method 
In the report published in 1962 by ACIR, the Representative Tax System 
(RTS) method was formally introduced as a measurement of tax capacity.  
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The initial inspiration of the RTS method was to follow the idea of constructing 
a tax structure applied uniformly in each of the governmental units, then 
examine and compare tax revenues of different units based on the calculation 
of the fiscal capacity (ACIR, 1962). Using the RTS method, the theoretical 
relative tax capacity is expressed as the equation 2-2 below: 
 
ݐܽݔ ܿܽ݌ܽܿ݅ݐݕ =  ݈݈݁݃ܽ ݐܽݔ ݎܽݐ݁ ∗ ݈݈݁݃ܽ ݐܽݔ ܾܽݏ݁ 
Equation 2-2 
  
Two steps are involved. Firstly, estimation of the tax bases. The second step 
is to define a set of representative tax rates by calculating the total revenue 
collection divided by the estimated aggregate tax base. This results in the 
estimated tax capacity from RTS method in equation 2-3 
 
݁ݏݐ݅݉ܽݐ݁݀ ݐܽݔ ܿܽ݌ܽܿ݅ݐݕ = ݁ݏݐ݅݉ܽݐ݁݀ ݐܽݔ ܾܽݏ݁ ∗ ݎ݁݌ݎ݁ݏ݁݊ݐܽݐ݅ݒ݁ ݐܽݔ ݎܽݐ݁ݏ 
Equation 2-3 
 
In practical use, a single tax system is designed through a selection of 
particular taxes as well as the definition of the tax bases for each of the taxes; 
hence, this single tax system appears as a uniform tax system, which 
represents an average of the existing tax structures in all the governmental 
units. The variation of tax efforts are then acquired by the comparison of the 
actual tax revenue and the averaged “representative” tax revenue (Tanzi, 
1968; Stotsky & WoldeMariam, 1997). 
 
For more than twenty years after the introduction of the RTS method, it has 
been improvised in many ways through the later reports published by the 
ACIR. Many concepts and definitions associated with RTS methods have 
been standardized, and the application of the RTS method has become much 
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clearer over the time (Akin, 1973; Kincaid, 1989; Hy, Boland, Hopper, & Sims, 
1993; Berry & Fording, 1997). 
 
In the 1987 report, tax capacity in the RTS method is defined as “the dollar 
amount of revenue that each state would raise if it applied a nationally uniform 
set of tax rates to a common set of tax bases” (ACIR, 1987, p. 4); and the tax 
effort is the ratio of the state’s actual tax collections and the estimated tax 
capacity (ACIR, 2987).  
 
The practical calculation of the tax capacity and tax effort of tax i in state j is 
presented as equation 2-4 below: 
 
ݐܿ௜௝ = ݐܾ௜௝ ∗ ݑݐݎ௜ 
 
Equation 2-4 
Where: 
ݐܿ = ݁ݏݐ݅݉ܽݐ݁݀ ݐܽݔ ܿܽ݌ܽܿ݅ݐݕ 
ݐܾ = ݐܽݔ ܾܽݏ݁ ݋ݎ ݐܽݔܾ݈ܽ݁ ݌ݎ݋݌݁ݎݐݕ 
ݑݐݎ = ݈ܿܽܿݑ݈ܽݐ݁݀ ݊ܽݐ݅݋݈݊ܽ ݑ݂݊݅݋ݎ݉ ݎ݁݌ݎ݁ݏ݁݊ݐܽݐ݅ݒ݁ ݐܽݔ ݎܽݐ݁ 
݅ = ݐܽݔ݁ݏ 
݆ = ݏݐܽݐ݁ݏ 
 
Then the tax capacity of state j is: 
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ݐ ௝ܿ = ෍ ݐܿ௜௝
௡
௡ୀ௜
∗ ݑݐݎ௜ 
 
Equation 2-5 
 
Then the tax effort of state j can be calculated by the equation 2-6 below: 
 
ݐ ௝݁ =
∑ ݎݐ௜௝௡௡ୀ௜
ݐ ௝ܿ
 
 
Equation 2-6 
Where: 
ݐ݁ = ݐܽݔ ݂݂݁݋ݎݐ 
ݎݐ = ܽܿݐݑ݈ܽ ݐܽݔ ݎ݁ݒ݁݊ݑ݁ ܿ݋݈݈݁ܿݐ݅݋݊ 
ݐܿ = ݁ݏݐ݅݉ܽݐ݁݀ ݐܽݔ ܿܽ݌ܽܿ݅ݐݕ 
݅ = ݐܽݔ݁ݏ 
݆ = ݏݐܽݐ݁ݏ 
 
Since its introduction, the RTS method has been improved in many ways 
through later reports published by the ACIR. Many concepts and definitions 
regarding the RTS method have been increasingly standardized, and the 
application of the RTS method has become much clearer over time The 
importance of this measurement of fiscal capacity has been widely recognized 
and accepted (Akin, 1973; Kincaid, 1989; Hy et al., 1993; Berry & Fording, 
1997). Since the release of the RTS method, the method has been widely 
used for estimating the tax capacity and the tax effort level in the United 
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States and other areas around the world (Ma, 1997; Tannenwald & Cowan, 
1997; Sobarzo, 2004). 
 
However, this is not to say that the RTS method is perfect. Akin (1973) argues 
that what really matters in a regression analysis in measuring fiscal capacity is 
the coefficients of variations between the tax base and total tax revenues, 
whereas the method of RTS is biased to the variation in tax rates as 
individually considered bases vary. The other major problem pointed out by 
Bahl (1972) is the estimating process of the tax base. This is because  one of 
the main components of the RTS method suffers from a certain degree of 
subjective judgment because proxy measures for the tax base are selected on 
subjective grounds (Bahl, 1972). 
 
2.4.2.2 Tax effort index using regression analysis (TE/R) 
The concept of tax effort is tightly coupled with the concept of tax capacity. 
Tax effort can be accurately estimated only under the condition of the ability to 
raise revenue i.e. tax capacity, is known (Akin, 1973). 
 
As described by the ACIR in 1962, the tax effort is calculated by the ratio of 
the unit’s actual tax collection and the estimated tax capacity. The IMF 
researchers adopted the conceptual idea of tax effort, but by using a tax ratio 
regression approach. 
 
The method involves finding a proper proxy variable as the taxable income. A 
widely used proxy variable, for instance, is the Gross Domestic Income, 
mostly the GDP or GNP (Lotz & Morss, 1967; Thorn, 1967; Bahl, 1971; 
Truong & Gash, 1979; Fauvelle-Aymar, 1999; Teera & Hudson, 2004; Kim, 
2007; Pessino & Fenochietto, 2010; Le et al., 2012).  
 
In the equation below  T  is the actual tax revenue, Y denotes the proxy of 
income (GDP, GNP or GRP) and X1, X2,X3 ⋯ Xn are factors affecting tax effort 
or tax capacity, U is the error term; this gives the regression function 
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ܶ
ܻ
= ݂൫ ଵܺ, ܺଶ, ܺଷ, ⋯ ܺ௡, ܷ൯ 
 
Equation 2-7 
 
The choosing of explanatory variables in the early stage of development of the 
tax effort analysis is also known as the constructing of the “tax handles” (Bahl, 
1971). Tax handles are explained as the elements of tax bases that lend 
themselves to taxation (Leuthold, 1991, p. 175; Ghura, 1998), Later, in the 
development of tax effort analysis, other control variables are also introduced 
gradually into the function, such as the macroeconomic policies, and social 
factors (Bird, Martinez-Vazquez, & Torgler, 2008).  
 
Based on the regression estimation analysis, one can obtain the estimated tax 
ratio, which is the estimated tax capacity.  The tax effort index is then 
calculated as the ratio of the actual tax ratio and the estimated tax ratio: 
 
ܶܽݔ ݂݂݁݋ݎݐ ݅݊݀݁ݔ =
ܶ
ܻ
෠ܶ
ܻ
=
ܶ
෠ܶ  
 
Equation 2-8 
 
It is worth noting that the concept of the tax effort index in equation 2-8 is 
different from the tax effort in equation 2-1, which is defined as the ratio of 
actual tax revenue and the tax capacity.  
 
The tax ratio approach, as Bahl (1971) states, is an approach to explain tax 
effort variance. In other words, instead of answering what the tax effort level 
is, the tax ratio approach is an attempt at explaining the differences between 
the observations in the whole sample (Bahl, 1971). Moreover, even though an 
expected level of tax capacity is presented in the regression analysis, it is 
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dangerous to use this to infer the feasibility of the extent of the actual tax 
capacity by absolute value. This is because the tax ratio approach indicates 
the degree of variation of tax effort, and should not be used to reflect the 
optimal taxation (Tanzi & Zee, 2000). 
 
The regression tax ratio approach is based on the purpose of inter-regional 
tax revenue performance comparison, and the nature of the regression 
analysis is to inspect the relationship between the dependent variables and 
independent variables. Linked to this research, the regression approach tax 
effort index model is the most suitable for this study; thus, this is the method 
of this research.  
 
2.5 Tax effort and capacity using regression approach: previous 
studies on international comparison  
The main purpose of this section is to examine previous tax capacity and 
effort research using the regression approach from the perspective of inter-
country comparison. By doing so, it helps to determine the appropriate 
methodologies and variables in this study to achieve the research aim of 
finding the determinants of China’s tax capacity and tax effort.  
 
The international inter-country tax effort study using the tax effort index 
regression approach commenced as early as the 1960s. In fact, the study of 
the relationship between the tax revenue and various factors is a rather 
ancient topic. In 1956, to analyse the patterns of both expenditure and 
sources of revenues between countries that have different levels of economic 
development, Martin and Lewis (1956) used the data from sixteen countries 
and analysed the relationship between income and tax revenue, where the 
income was measured as the gross national product per capita. However, 
even though some statistical analyses were applied in their study, the 
regression approach was not adopted in their study.  
 
In order to determine the relationship between the levels of income or 
development and the share of public expenditure or revenue in gross national 
product in 33 countries, Williamson (1961) followed the study by Martin and 
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Lewis (1956), and applied an additional statistical test by introducing the 
regression approach in the study.   Income, as the explanatory variable in the 
regression function, was measured as the GNP per capita, and the share of 
public revenue in GNP, also known as the tax ratio, was the explained 
variable. In Williamson’s study of 33 developed and developing countries, the 
relationship between the tax ratio and the per capita GNP was significantly 
and positively related to each other. Since this study, Williamson’s regression 
approach on the relationship between the level of income and tax ratio has 
been  recognized as the first research to quantify a systematic relationship 
between tax ratio and stage of income (Bahl, 1971), where the stage of 
income was later referred to as the proxy of the stage of economic 
development (Plasschaert, 1962). 
 
Williamson’s findings provide strong evidence that the tax revenue is largely 
determined by the stage of development in both developed and developing 
countries. A similar result was also arrived at by Plasschaert (1962).  
 
In addition to using the stage of economic development, Plasschaert (1962) 
investigated the relationship between the tax ratio, and the per capita GNP 
and foreign trade share in GNP, from a sample of 20 developing countries. He 
concluded that the per capita income was a good proxy for  the stage of 
economic development as the significant positive relationship between per 
capita GNP and tax ratio was found in his research (Plasschaert, 1962). 
 
A similar result was also found by Hinrichs (1966). Hinrichs addressed the 
relationship between the size and structure of the government revenue 
system and the socio-economic development. In his study, through a multiple-
regression approach of 60 countries, he concluded that the openness level, 
which is defined as the ratio of imports and GNP, was the most significant 
determination of the tax ratio rather than the per capita income for developing 
countries. 
 
More precisely, Hinrichs divided his whole sample into three groups according 
to their stage of development. The countries with per capita income of less 
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than $300 were classified as the less developed group; the transitional group 
was made up of the countries with per capita income between $300 and $750; 
all other countries with per capita income higher than $750 were grouped into 
the developed countries category.  
 
The per capita GNP variables were significantly related to the tax ratio, 
especially in the transitional and developed countries; however, in the less 
developed countries, the stage of development was not the key determinant of 
tax ratio; instead, the openness level played the key role in the raising of tax 
ratio in less developed countries. In addition, the general trend to transform 
the tax structure was also detected. In less developed countries, the 
traditional direct taxes seem to have more power in terms of generating tax 
revenues. However, when development has reached the transitional stage, 
indirect taxes played a key role in the tax structure rather than direct taxes, 
and the openness level also contributed significantly to this process. Once a  
country has transformed from a transitional stage to the developed stage, the 
order of importance between direct and indirect taxes reversed again 
(Hinrichs, 1966; Taylor, 1967).  
 
The findings of Hinrichs’ study (1966) supports his hypothesis that there is  no 
single tax system or structure which suits all countries; no one system would 
suit a single country at all its development stages. Instead, the taxation should 
be adjusted and reformed according to the different stages and special 
characteristics of the country during different periods.  
 
 Hinrichs’s study (1966) also adopts the consideration of the effect of cultural 
differences between countries during the developing of the tax structure, 
though investigation of the cultural  differences between countries lacked 
empirical support (Lotz & Morss, 1970). However, this inspiration was carried 
out in later studies. Typical works that have taken cultural differences into 
consideration of   is the study by Thorn in 1967 and Weiss in 1969.  
 
Focused on the general social and economic factors on the tax ratio in under-
developed countries, Thorn (1967) in his study confirms that the social factors 
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are  also the determinants of the tax ratio. Alongside the finding of the 
significance of per capita income and the openness level as two factors in the 
regression function, Thorn (1967), in his study of 32 countries, also implanted 
several qualitative dummy variables as indicators of the cultural differences 
between countries. The dummy variables adopted in the study are mainly 
composed of four perspectives, namely, the social variances, regional 
differences, political characteristics, and cultural preference. The results 
reveal that the social factors in the process of development are also among 
the most important determinants of the tax ratio. Thorn (1967) further 
concluded from the results that culturally more centralized countries tend to 
have a higher level of tax ratio. 
 
Weiss (1969) took a step forward from the study by Thorn (1967). Weiss 
focused on the government revenue performance in less developed countries, 
and included 66 samples where the actual tax ratio was lower than 16%. In 
his study, to better capture the influences on the tax ratio from the 
socioeconomic factors, in addition to the traditional economic variables such 
as the per capita GNP and the openness level, he constructed four 
socioeconomic variables to indicate the influence from social, political, and 
cultural aspects. The four variables were urbanization, literacy rate of 
population aged fifteen years and over, percentage of employment in the 
agricultural sector, and an indicator of degree of mass communications. 
Alongside the finding of the significant relationship between the tax ratio and 
per capita GNP and openness level, four socioeconomic variables also 
showed expected signs.  
 
Following the previous studies, Shin (1969) acknowledged that the different 
variables  performed  differently in low and high-income countries or groups in 
different periods, especially the per capita GNP and the openness level. 
However, he was more concerned about the reasons for these differences. 
Hence, Shin (1969) constructed the tax ratio regression model to investigate 
the reason behind the different performances of variables in different countries 
and periods. A total of 47 countries were included in his study in which there 
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were 16 high income countries with an average per capita GNP higher than 
$777; the remaining 31 were low income countries.  
 
Shin (1969) selected and constructed five explanatory variables in his 
regression model. These variables are per capita GNP, the size of foreign 
trade measured as the ratio of the sum pf export and import, and the GNP, 
agricultural income ratio measured as the income from the agricultural sector 
divided by GNP, the change rate in the level of consumer prices, and the 
population growth rate.  
 
As Shin (1969) argues, a higher per capita GNP level would raise the tax ratio 
because of the increase in the surplus of the total income where the 
government generates tax revenues. However, this hypothesis is under the 
assumption that a progressive tax system exists, i.e., the marginal tax rate 
rises when the income rises (Shin, 1969). The agricultural income ratio 
indicates the degree of industrialization, urbanization, and commercialization. 
The hypothesis of this is that there is a negative relationship between the 
agricultural sector and private surplus for taxes. Higher consumer prices are a 
sign of a higher inflation rate, which in Shin’s study is positively related to the 
tax ratio if the country is under the progressive tax system; because a higher 
inflation rate would result in a higher tax rate. Shin states that the variable of 
the population growth rate has two different influences depending on the tax 
structure of the country. A higher population growth rate might decrease the 
tax ratio because of the increase in tax exemption. However, if the country’s 
income tax is rather small in its tax system, the increase of the population 
growth rate might have a positive influence on the tax ratio due to the increase 
of consumption and expenditures (Shin, 1969). 
 
The results of Shin’s study (1969) reveals that the per capita GNP has a 
strong positive influence on the tax ratio in the whole sample. In addition, the 
agricultural income ratio was also significantly positive related to the tax ratio. 
Moreover, the result also indicates the significant negative relationship 
between the tax ratio and the population growth rate for the whole sample of 
47 countries, and especially for the 31 low-income countries. Based on this 
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result, Shin (1969) argues that the difference in performance of variables in 
different countries may not only be due to the variation of the stage of 
development and openness of these countries, but also due to the differences 
in the degree of industrialization and population factors. This finding has 
inspired further study by taking into consideration population factors, as well 
as the GDP/GNP decomposition in tax studies.  
 
Lotz and Morss (1967) in their early study analysed 72 developed and 
developing countries.  They considered the stage of development, measured 
as per capita GNP, and the openness level measured as the foreign trade 
share in GNP, which were both included in the regression model. Similar to 
previous studies, the significance of the relationship between both the stage of 
development and the openness level to the tax ratio were found. Lotz and 
Morss (1970) continued their research on 52 countries that have a per capita 
income of less than $800. They included explanatory variables—not only the 
per capita income and foreign trade share, but also the degree of 
monetization measured by the per capita coins and notes, and government 
centralization level, which takes the proxy of the ratio of local tax to total tax.  
 
The assumption behind the adoption  of the monetization degree variable was 
that a country with higher monetization , as one of the dimensions of 
economic development, would positively affect the taxable capacity, hence 
raising the tax ratio (Lotz & Morss, 1970). 
 
In Lotz and Morss’s (1970) study, the inclusion of the political variable was 
rather inspiring. In the study, the authors argued that the overall tax level was 
also highly affected by the relative importance of local governments. Argued 
by the authors, local governments are more efficient on tax collection and 
more responsive to public demands (Lotz & Morss, 1970). Hence, the author 
included the government centralization level as one of the explanatory 
variables in the tax regression model.  
 
The result from Lotz and Morss’s study shows that the decentralization level 
has a direct impact on the tax level In addition, the degree of monetization 
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could be another partial proxy of the stage of development instead of the per 
capita income due to the fact that the degree of monetization shows high 
collinear relationship with per capita income, yet with stronger explanatory 
power to the tax ratio. Finally, the authors conclude that for developing 
countries, the lower tax ratio is mainly caused by the limitation of taxable 
bases whereas for developed countries, the raising of the tax ratio is largely 
determined by the demand for government services (Lotz & Morss, 1970). 
 
Bahl (1971) in his study presents a detailed evaluation of earlier studies, as 
well as the regression approach to the tax effort of 49 less developed 
countries.  
 
Bahl present a detailed discussion of the rather popular explanatory variables 
in the previous tax ratio studies, including the stage of development and the 
size of the foreign trade sector. Bahl acknowledges that the stage of 
development and the degree of foreign trade have been historically the widely 
accepted main factors of the tax effort. The size of the foreign trade was 
expected to positively relate to the tax ratio because a larger export share in 
national economy indicates a greater level of monetization and 
industrialization; and the import activities are rather easier to tax due to 
minimum administrative difficulty (Bahl, 1971). 
 
However, the use of proxies for this stage of development is facing some 
problems. Bahl (1971) points out that the use of per capita income as the 
proxy of the stage of development resulted in different outcomes in various 
previous studies. The per capita income explained satisfactorily the variations 
between developed and less developed countries in terms of tax ratio. 
However, when the study focused on developing countries only, the power of 
the per capita income yields different results. Bahl (1971) argues that this is 
due to the fact that the per capita income might ignore an important sector: 
the non-monetized sector. The other possible reason is that when conducting 
an inter-country tax ratio comparison, the per capita income is usually 
represented in U.S. dollars rather than the local currency to international 
comparison. This has resulted in a problem due to the model inherently taking 
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in the exchange rate as one of the determinants of the taxable capacity (Bahl, 
1971). 
 
Taking into consideration the previous studies and the problems that might 
exist in the model, such as the per capita income being the proxy of the stage 
of development, Bahl (1971) considered the agricultural sector share in the 
GNP as the proxy of the state of the development, and also the other sectoral 
composition of income produced, which was measured as an explanatory 
variable of the mining share. Apart from the finding that both the agricultural 
share and export share are significantly related to the tax ratio but negatively 
and positively correlated respectively, a positive significant relationship 
between the mining share and the tax ratio was also detected through the 
inter-correlation of the mining share and the export ratio.  
 
The contribution of the study of Bahl (1971) is that he pointed out that different 
sections constituting the national income have their own taxable surpluses. 
For example, the mining share in the GNP has a taxable surplus mainly 
generated from industrialization; the agricultural sector has a rather small 
taxable surplus because it is more difficult to tax the agricultural sector. All 
these different sections of the national income together affect the overall 
taxable capacity significantly (Bahl, 1971). 
 
A study by Truong and Gash (1979)  focusing on the impact of economic 
integration is rather interesting. Specifically focused on the tax ratio 
performance in less developed countries, Truong and Gash (1979) highlighted  
the importance of the openness level in the tax ratio model as shown in the 
previous studies by Hinrichs (1966).   The high level of openness also 
appears to be highly related to the amount of international integration.  In 
1968, approximately half of the less developed countries around the world 
were involved in various international economic integration schemes 
(Wionczek, 1969). Truong and Gash (1979) point out the gap in the tax ratio 
study literature that few researchers had  tested the importance of economic 
integration as a factor in the tax ratio model. 
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Truong and Gash (1979) constructed the cross sectional multiple regression 
model of tax ratio for 43 countries with three explanatory variables, namely the 
per capita income, total foreign trade share in GNP, and dummy variables 
indicating the participation of particular economic integration. During the 
regression process, the authors further divided the 43 countries into two 
groups based on their per capita income ranking: group A with 24 countries, 
and group B with 19 countries. The results from both groups indicated a 
negative relationship between the joining of economic integration and 
countries tax effort. The statistical evidence of this conclusion was that in the 
tax ratio regression result, countries with different levels of per capita incomes 
were equally heavily reliant on custom duties. However, joining international 
economic integration  schemes significantly reduced customs duties, hence 
lessening a  country’s taxable capacity (Truong & Gash, 1979).  
 
The empirical contribution from Truong and Gash’s study is that they did not 
limit their analysis to between developed and developing countries, but also 
included the different stages of development within the developing countries. 
This finding supports Hinrichs’s argument in his study in 1966: there is no 
single tax system or structure which suits all countries; no one system will suit 
a single country in all its development stages. In addition, the importance of 
the foreign trade sector as one of the explanatory variables in the tax ratio 
regression model has been extended.  
 
The study carried out by Leuthold (1991) was theoretically and empirically 
inspiring from three aspects. First, Leuthold adopts the combination of welfare 
function and the tax ratio model to yield an optimal tax ratio instead of the 
traditional ratio of actual tax revenue and GDP/GNP. Secondly, Leuthold 
adopts the panel data analysis rather than the traditional popular cross-county 
data. Thirdly, in the choice of variable, other than the traditional factors within 
the country, such as the per capita income, mining share in national income, 
and agricultural share in national income, Leuthold includes the variables that 
indicate the share of foreign grants, loans and domestic borrowing in income 
to detect the influence of external environmental factors in a country’s tax 
ratio.  
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The purpose of constructing the optimal tax ratio in Leuthold’s study (1991) 
was due to many criticisms regarding the tax ratio regression approach. 
Traditionally, if the ratio between the actual tax collection and the estimated 
tax collection is less than one, then the country is recognized as a low tax 
effort country. If the ratio is higher than one, the country is identified as a 
country with a high tax effort (Leuthold, 1991, p. 1). However, the tax effort 
index regression approach is a method of estimating relative tax capacity and 
tax effort and explaining the tax effort variance; it is not appropriate to use this 
to infer the feasibility of the extent of the actual tax revenue by absolute value 
due to the lack of theoretical justification (Bahl, 1971; Bird, 1976). Hence, 
Leuthold took an approach by combining the welfare function and the tax ratio 
model to present a stronger theoretical basis for the optimal tax ratio.  
 
The other criticism is that the data used in the tax ratio model was less 
convincing. . The widely used cross-sectional data in the tax ratio model 
lacked explanatory ability because it did not take into account the changes 
that occurred over time (Bird, 1976). Therefore, in Leuthold’s (1991) study, the 
sample size covered eight African countries during the time period between 
1973 and 1981, and the panel data analysis was applied.  
 
The other main contribution of Leuthold’s (1991) study is the extent of the 
explanatory variable. Following the previous empirical studies, in Leuthold’s 
study, the per capita income, agricultural income share in GNP, and mining 
income share in GNP, and the foreign trade share in GNP are all included in 
the tax ratio model. However, different from all previous studies, Leuthold also 
includes the share of foreign grants, loans, and domestic borrowing in the 
share of GNP to detect the influence from external financial environments on 
the tax ratio.  
 
The results from Leuthold’s study reveal a negative and significant 
relationship between the per capita income and the tax ratio when other 
economic development measurements were included in the model. Bahl 
(1971) points out that as the per capita income as the proxy of the stage of 
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development yields different results from previous literature, particularly 
between less developed countries, the explanatory power of per capita 
income as a variable in the tax ratio model reveals various results, either 
significant or not relevant. The findings from Leuthold’s (1991) study further 
verified this conclusion.  
 
The agricultural share in GNP and foreign trade share in GNP were both 
significantly related to the tax ratio in Leuthold’s study (1991). The agricultural 
share was negatively related and the foreign trade share in GNP was 
positively related. This finding is consistent with previous tax ratio studies, as 
the larger agricultural sector indicates a lower level of tax base, and the higher 
foreign trade sector reflects the wider tax handles (Leuthold, 1991). However, 
different from the previous studies, Leuthold found no relationship between 
the mining share in GNP and tax ratio. Leuthold argued that this might due to 
the fact that mining was not an important industrial sector in the countries 
studied (Leuthold, 1991). 
 
Finally, Leuthold’s results reveal a significantly negative relationship between 
the tax ratio and the variable which measures foreign grants and loans and in 
domestic borrowing. Leuthold concluded this as the displacement effect 
between foreign financial support and tax ratio.  
 
Based on the regression results, Leuthold (1991) constructed the tax effort 
indices for eight African countries and found out that two countries’ tax effort 
indices were statistically greater than one, and two countries’ tax effort indices 
were lower than one. The other four countries’ tax effort indices were 
statistically equal to one. However, Leuthold points out that it is rather 
dangerous to identify “bad guys” and “good guys” from such statistical results 
because there is no guarantee that all variables that influence the tax ratio are 
included in the model. The policy guide from this analysis is still very helpful, 
but only in relative terms: a high tax effort index for a country indicates that 
this country finds it relatively more difficult to raise more revenue through 
taxation for greater government spending compared to other countries and 
vice versa (Leuthold, 1991, pp. 18-19).  
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In the study by Leuthold (1991), the author states that further study should be 
carried out with a wider database and from a longer period, as well as the 
consideration of a better theoretical model compared to the welfare function. 
This recommendation has been taken into account by Ghura in 1998. 
 
Taking into consideration large fiscal deficits among sub-Saharan Africa 
countries in the 1990s, and acknowledging the fact that the tax ratio studies in 
previous literature lacked attention to influences of economic policies and 
corruption on tax revenue, Ghura (1998) presented his study on tax revenue 
performance among 39 countries in sub-Saharan Africa during the period of 
1985 to 1996. In addition, Ghura improved Leuthold’s (1991) model by 
adopting the utility function, which was produced by Heller (1975). By doing 
so, Ghura has structured the reduced form of Leuthold’s desired tax ratio to 
give a stronger theoretical base, and an unbalanced panel data analysis was 
adopted in the study.  
 
One of the main contributions from Ghura’s study is the extension of the 
explanatory variables. Tanzi (1989) in his article “the impact of 
macroeconomic policies on the level of taxation and the fiscal balance in 
developing countries” points  out that to achieve a satisfactory explanation of 
the wide fluctuations of the tax ratios, researchers should not only focus on 
the traditional determinants of tax revenue, but also beyond that. Ghura 
(1998) follows Tanzi’s argument. In his study, not only are the traditional 
explanatory variables, such as per capita income, openness level and 
agricultural share in GDP included, but also other factors that focus on the 
economic policy-related explanatory variables like inflation, percentage 
change in the real effective exchange rate, structural reforms, government 
provision of public services, and the corruption level, which yielded the 
desired results. By doing so, Ghura (1998) was able to question whether 
economic policies and corruption can influence the tax revenue performance.  
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More precisely, the explanatory variables constructed by Ghura (1998) can be 
classified into five major components, namely, the income, tax base, 
macroeconomic policies, corruption, and external environment.  
 
Taking into consideration the previous studies’ findings concerning the 
influence of per capita income on the tax ratio, Ghura (1998) predicted an 
ambiguous influence from the increase of per capita income on the tax ratio. 
As argued by Ghura (1998), the increase of per capita income would result in 
the increase in different categories of tax revenues. More specifically, an 
increase of per capita GDP would raise the revenue of indirect tax categories, 
but lower the trade tax revenues (Ghura, 1998, p. 9). Thus, whether a higher 
stage of development would increase the tax ratio is highly related to the tax 
structure of the country: whether it is indirect tax based or trade tax based.  
 
The tax base in Ghura’s tax ratio model includes the agriculture sector income 
share in GDP, the income share of mining share in GDP, and also the 
openness level, measured as the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to 
GDP. The agricultural sector income share in GDP was expected to be 
negatively related to the tax ratio, as Ghura argued that the agricultural sector 
involves largely informal activities that are difficult to monitor and hence 
difficult to tax. By contrast, the mining share is usually easy to administer and 
tax; hence, the positive sign was expected. The total foreign trade was also 
expected to positively relate to the tax ratio because it is usually well-
organized and monetized (Ghura, 1998).  
 
The macroeconomic policy was measured by the inflation rate, the percentage 
change in the real effective exchange rate, structural reforms, and the 
government’s provision of public services in Ghura’s study.  
 
The inflation rate was expected to be negatively related to the tax ratio for 
three reasons. Firstly, a higher inflation rate might cause a lag effect in tax 
collection; secondly, some excise duties, whose tax rates are based on a 
particular price, might not be adjusted in line with inflation; thirdly, a higher 
inflation rate might affect the behaviour of economic agents. With a higher 
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inflation rate, people might tend to move to assets such as land, jewels and 
foreign capital, and escape the domestic tax net (Ghura, 1998).  
 
The percentage change in the real effective exchange rate was expected to 
be negatively related to the tax ratio. A higher exchange rate would increase 
imports and lower exports, and tax revenues were dependent on the imports 
being greater than exports (Ghura, 1998). 
 
The structural reforms are measured by Ghura (1998) using dummy variables, 
and a positive sign was expected. The theoretical support for this expectation 
was that the structural reforms would improve economic efficiency, external 
competitiveness, and economic productivity, hence widen the tax base and 
increase the tax revenue (Abed, 1998; Ghura, 1998).  
 
Ghura (1998) argues in his study that the higher government expenditure in 
public services, the higher the level of the willingness of taxpayers to pay 
taxes. Hence, the measure of a government’s provision of public services are 
highly correlated to the raising of tax revenues. In Ghura’s study, the 
government’s provision of public services was measured as an index of 
human capital development level.  
 
Ghura (1998) states that the previous literature had tried various determinants 
of the tax revenue performance; however, the study on the relationship 
between the corruption and tax revenue were rather rare, in addition, a wide 
range of literature had proven the strong relationship between corruption and 
other aspects of economic performance (Ghura & Hadjimichael, 1996; 
Bardhan, 1997; Mauro, 1997; Ghura, 1998). Ghura (1998) uses the index of 
corruption provided by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) to proxy 
the corruption level. The corruption index published by the ICRG was the 
index to measure the level of expectation of bribe activities that involved 
governmental officials in relation to tax assessments, trade licenses, and 
exchange controls (Ghura, 1998).  
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Finally, the external financial environment was also adopted in Ghura’s tax 
effort index model. This was measured by the ratio of external grants in GDP 
and the change in the debt stock-GDP ratio.  
 
The result from the Ghura’s tax ratio regression model is consistent with 
previous tax ratio studies. Per capita income, mining share in GDP, and the 
openness level were positively significantly related to the tax ratio, and the 
agricultural sector income share in GDP was negatively significantly related to 
the tax ratio.  
 
Similar to the findings by Leuthold (1991), the significant influence of the 
external financial factors on tax ratio was also detected in Ghura’s study. The 
percentage change in the real effective exchange rate was not relevant to the 
tax ratio in the regression result; however, the external grant was significantly 
negative related to the tax ratio.  
 
Economic policies are also highly related to the tax ratio in Ghura’s regression 
model. In all four explanatory variables, three of them, namely, the inflation 
rate, structural reform dumpy variables, and provision of public services 
measured by the human capital index, were all significantly related to the tax 
ratio. The inflation level was negatively related to the tax ratio, and structural 
reforms and provision of public services were all positively related to the tax 
ratio.  
 
The human capital index variable in the author’s regression model was also 
significant and positive. The statistical result proved that the provision of 
public services by the government, or broadly speaking, the government’s 
expenditure behaviour, is also one of the determinants of a country’s tax 
revenue performance (Ghura, 1998).  
 
Finally, the relatively high statistical significance of the corruption level 
variable in the regression result also revealed that the increase of corruption 
level brings damage to the tax revenue performance. Hence, the author 
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concludes that greater anti-corruption actions would improve tax revenue 
performance significantly.  
 
The strong evidence of the relationship between the tax performance and 
policy-related factors was also given by Fauvelle-Aymar (1999). Under 
theoretical reality, taxation, taxation policy and national economy are all 
deeply connected.  
 
In Fauvelle-Aymar’s tax effort index study of 86 developing countries, 
variables were divided into economic variables and political variables. In the 
economic variables categories, the Fauvelle-Aymar included factors from 
three aspects: the level of national wealth, the sectoral composition of 
domestic product, and the openness of the economy. The per capita GDP is 
used as the proxy of the level of national wealth in his study. The sectoral 
composition of domestic product was measured by the agricultural income 
share in GDP and mining income share in GDP. Lastly, the openness of the 
economy was measured by the share of imports in the GDP.  
 
The main purpose of Fauvelle-Aymar’s study was to detect the relationship 
between tax revenue performance and the government’s legitimacy, efficiency 
and credibility. The author constructed the degree of opposition to the 
government, index of democracy, frequency of coups, and indicator of 
government credibility as the explanatory variables in the function to reflect 
government legitimacy, efficiency, and credibility. Where the degree of 
opposition to the government was measured by the sum of the average 
annual numbers of anti-government demonstrations, general strikes and riots; 
the index of democracy was measured as the Gastil index of democracy; and 
the index of volatility of inflation (VOLA) was used as the proxy of government 
credibility.  
 
The regression result has drawn people’s attention to the effect of government 
political capabilities.  
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One of the most remarkable contributions in Fauvelle-Aymar’s study is that 
instead of using the tax ratio, which is the ratio of tax revenue to GDP, as the 
first dependent variable, the author also included a second measurement, 
which is named the current revenue ratio. The tax revenue in the tax ratio 
includes only tax revenues classified by the IMF, whereas the second 
dependent variable, the current revenue ratio, not only includes the tax 
revenue, but also non-tax revenues except capital revenue and grants and is 
thus the ratio of a broader measurement of the government revenue to GDP. 
 
The reasons for the inclusion of two dependent variables were argued by 
Fauvelle-Aymar (1999) from two aspects. First, the special characteristic of 
industrial and/or commercial public sectors. The second, the size of the non-
tax revenue in developing countries.  
 
Fauvelle-Aymar (1999) argues that conceptually, the tax revenue and the non-
tax revenue are both revenues to the government but inherently different. 
However, in developing countries, they might be empirically not so different 
from each other. This is due to the fact that the public enterprises, which yield 
a huge share in the non-tax revenue, were positioned prominently and have a 
different status in developing countries than in the developed countries. Public 
enterprises have had a strong presence among developing countries. 
Frequently, the public enterprises were the sole provider of some specific 
public goods and services through their monopolistic position. Hence, the non-
tax revenue in developing countries is similar to the political terms of taxation 
(Fauvelle-Aymar, 1999).  
 
The second consideration for constructing the current revenue ratio in the 
author’s study is the size of the non-tax revenue. In the whole study sample of 
86 developing countries, the non-tax revenue accounted for 17% of the 
current revenue, and in some countries, the non-tax revenue was even higher 
than the tax revenue. Hence, to avoid biased measurement, it should not be 
left untouched in the model (Fauvelle-Aymar, 1999). 
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The cross section data in this study are 86 developing countries’ averages for 
the period from 1980 to 1989, and the regression result is displayed in tax 
ratio result and current revenue ratio result, that is, in two parts.  
 
In the tax ratio regression result, the economic variables yield satisfied the 
result consistent with previous studies. The agricultural sector income share in 
GDP was significantly negative related to the tax ratio, and the openness level 
was significantly positive related to the tax ratio. Similar to some previous 
literature regarding the relationship between per capita income and tax ratio, 
Fauvelle-Aymar found that there was no significant relationship between per 
capita GDP and tax ratio, though the positive sign was captured in the result. 
Different from previous studies and as expected, Fauvelle-Aymar found the 
relationship between the mining income share in GDP and the tax ratio was 
not significant.  
 
Satisfactorily, all four political variables that reflect the government’s 
legitimacy, efficiency and credibility were significantly related to the tax ratio. 
Apparently, the inefficiency and the low level of credibility lessen the tax 
revenue performance. The significant and negative sign of the Gastil index of 
democracy indicates that autocratic governments collected more tax revenues 
than democratic countries. The degree of opposition was highly significant 
and negative related to the tax ratio when South Africa and India were 
excluded from the regression. The author believes that it might be because 
these two countries had the highest degree of opposition in the whole sample.  
 
By contrast, the current revenue ratio regression generally yielded the same 
results in Fauvelle-Aymar’s study. However, there are two differences 
compared to the tax ratio regression. Firstly, the mining share appeared 
positive and significantly related to the current revenue ratio, which confirms 
the author’s argument regarding the public enterprises in developing 
countries; and secondly, the degree of opposition lost its significance in the 
function.  
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This study presented by Fauvelle-Aymar (1999) had extended the tax ratio 
literature by explaining the relationship between government’s political 
capacity and tax revenue performance, and the result indicates that the tax 
revenue was also significantly influenced by government’s policy capacity. 
More importantly, the construction of the current revenue, taking into 
consideration the non-tax revenue in developing countries, was very inspiring. 
The tax ratio regression and current revenue regression performed generally 
the same with some minor differences. Moreover, the traditional mining share 
variable, which was positively and significantly related to the tax ratio in most 
of previous literature, appears to be significant only in the current revenue 
ratio. The findings in Fauvelle-Aymar’s study has raised feasible arguments 
regarding similarities between tax and non-tax revenues in developing 
countries.  
 
Focused on the tax revenue performance in Central and Eastern European 
countries, Mertens (2003) structured a panel data tax effort index analysis for 
ten countries over the period of 1992 to 2000. In Mertens’s model, only three 
variables were included. First was the agricultural income share in GDP, 
which reflected the stage of development. Second was the industrial sector 
income share in GDP, used as proxies of tax handles. Different from previous 
studies, Mertens included both mining and manufacturing sectors in the 
industrial sector. Finally, the degree of openness was included, which is 
measured as the imports sector income share in GDP. The agricultural 
income share in GDP was negative and statistically significant related to the 
tax ratio, which has proven the previous literature regarding the agricultural 
sector. However, the industrial sector income in GDP and the import sector 
income share in GDP were both negatively and statistically non-significant 
related to the tax ratio. The author argues that this might be caused by the 
widespread use of tax incentives in Central and Eastern European countries. 
Lastly, the author calculated the tax effort index of each country by dividing 
the actual tax collection by the estimated tax capacity, and reveals that most 
of the Central and eastern European countries experienced a decline of tax 
effort and hence a relatively poor tax revenue performance. Typical examples 
were Poland, Romania, and the Slovak Republic.  
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A study of a wide range of countries’ tax performance and its determinants 
using tax effort index model was carried out by Teera and Hudson (2004). The 
main purpose of their study was to find and test different factors from various 
aspects to the tax performance based on relatively large-scale data. The 
study covered 116 countries around the world during the period between 1975 
and 1998.  
 
The variables in Teera and Hudson’s study were mainly selected from four 
aspects: the stage of development, openness level, economic structure, 
population factor, external financial factors, and the shadow economy. Hence, 
eight explanatory variables were included in the study. These variables are 
Per capita GDP; foreign trade share in GDP reflected by the ratio of total 
exports to GDP; foreign aid ratio to GDP; external debt ratio to GDP; 
population density; agricultural sector income share in GDP; the share from 
manufacturing income in GDP, and the shadow economy measured by the 
shadow variable indicating tax evasion—the first innovation in the literature. 
Acknowledging the fact that countries in different stages of development may 
reveal a different relationship between tax performance and relevant factors, 
Teera and Hudson (2004) further divide the 116 countries into four groups 
according to their stage of economic development. The four groups were: 
high-income OECD group, low-income group, lower middle-income group, 
and upper middle-income group.  
 
Except the negative and significant sign of agricultural share, the positive and 
significant sign of the openness level, and the negative and significant sign of 
the foreign debt, which were both consistent with previous studies, the results 
of the remaining variables in Teera and Hudson’s study appear to  suggest 
some different views compared to previous studies.  
 
Foreign aid appeared as insignificant in all groups; hence, the crowding out 
effects of foreign aid was rejected by this study. The shadow variable, which 
reflects the tax evasion, was significant in both the low income group and high 
income group, but interestingly, with different signs: positive in the low-income 
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group and negative in the high-income group. Teera and Hudson (2004) 
argue that this might be because the shadow economy increased the tax 
evasion in low-income countries but also raised tax revenue somewhere else.  
Another similar situation appeared concerning the variable of population 
density. It revealed that the population density had a positive impact on the 
tax ratio in low-income countries, but a reverse effect on the upper-middle 
income group; however, the impact from the population density was revealed 
as positive in high-income countries. The manufacturing share of GDP shows 
no significance in the whole sample, whereas when repeating the regression 
with interactive terms between GDP and manufacturing, both of them are 
statistically significant. The authors argue that this is because different 
countries are in different stages of development, and some variables, such as 
the manufacturing share, are performing differently. This fact could be further 
simply summarized as “a one size fits all” approach, whichmay not be totally 
appropriate (Teera & Hudson, 2004, p. 797). 
 
Focusing on the tax revenue performance in Latin-American countries, Bird et 
al. (2006) presented cross-country statistical studies on the determinants of 
tax revenue performance from both the traditional tax base and 
societal/political factors. As the authors point out, for developing countries with 
poor tax revenue performance, it would not be of much help to tell them to 
“find oil” or to “rearrange nature’s bounty”, but a more realistic solution would 
be the improvement of their governing institutions (Bird et al., 2006, p. 4). 
 
Following the study purpose, Bird et al. (2006) divided the explanatory 
variables into two aspects: the supply side factors (traditional tax bases), 
which are widely acknowledged throughout the literature, and the demand 
side factors (societal institutions), which have been relatively ignored in the 
previous tax effort studies. On the supply side, the authors included the per 
capita GDP, population growth rate, and openness level, which was measured 
as the sum of total imports and exports divided by the GDP, and non-
agriculture income share in the GDP. On the demand side, explanatory 
variables were categorized into seven aspects. They were:  
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1.The quality of governance index measured by the mean value of six 
governance dimensions through a hundred variables; sub-indexes included 
voice and account, political stability, rule of law, and control of corruption.  
 
2. International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), which is the alternative variable to 
the quality of governance index; sub-indexes include rule of law, bureaucratic 
quality, ethnic tension, and corruption.  
 
3. Regulation of entry, which is measured by the time and number of 
procedures of entry, represents the level of politicians and bureaucrats to 
seek and provide benefits.  
 
4. Tax morale level, which reflects the motivation of the public to pay taxes;  
 
5. Shadow economy, which measures the informal sector and exit option;  
 
6. Income inequality, which represents the household income and wealth 
inequality in the distribution; and finally,  
 
7. The level of fiscal decentralization.  
 
Very importantly, Bird et al. (2006) also includes two measurements as the 
dependent variable: tax effort, measured as the ratio of actual tax collection 
and estimated tax capacity; and revenue effort, which was labelled for the first 
time in the literature, measured as the ratio of actual current revenue 
collection and the estimated current revenue capacity, where the current 
revenue in the study was calculated as the sum of tax revenues and non-
repayable receipts excluding grants. The argument behind the revenue ratio is 
due to the practices and possible mistakes in revenue classification, and 
especially in developing and transitional countries. By including the current 
revenue analysis, a more robust testing of the model could be achieved.  
 
According to the results from the study by Bird et al. (2006), even though the 
traditional tax handles still play a key role in the tax effort model, the per 
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capita GDP in both tax and current revenue models were constantly negative 
relative to the tax/current revenue ratio, but not always significant. The 
population growth rate was similar to the per capita GDP, constantly 
negatively related to tax/current revenue ratio but not always significant. 
Whereas the non-agricultural income share in GDP appeared positively and 
significantly related to the tax/current revenue ratio, and was also the 
strongest explanatory power among all supply side factors. The openness 
level was negatively related to both tax ratio and current revenue ratio, but 
seems statistically significant sometimes in the tax effort regression, but 
statistically non-significant in the current revenue effort regression.  
 
From the demand side, the institutional factors appeared positively and 
significantly related to both tax effort regression and current revenue 
regression. The results identified the critical influence of the institutional 
factors on tax effort as well as current revenue effort. In addition, within the 
institutional sub-variables, it revealed that the corruption and the role of law 
had the most influencing power on the level of tax ratio and current revenue 
ratio. Through the shadow economy, tax morale and inequality variables in the 
regression were less statistically significant than other variables, but the 
authors point out that one should not take the evidence and concluded that 
their influence is small. As the authors stated, such institutional variables have 
a wide influence in the economy and society (Bird et al., 2006).  
 
A recent study of tax revenue performance carried out by Fenochietto and 
Pessino (2013) was statistically advanced and inspiring. Firstly, this study 
adopts the stochastic frontier panel data tax ratio analysis, taking into account 
the special characteristic of each country. Secondly, the sample size was 
sufficiently large with 113 countries. Inspiringly, instead of grouping countries 
according to their stage of development, which is the most common way in the 
previous literature, the study by Fenochietto and Pessino (2013) classified the 
whole sample into two groups according to their special economic structure. 
The first group was 96 of the non-natural resource dependent countries, and 
the second group was 17 resource dependent economic countries. Thirdly, 
the construction of the explanatory variables included some critical social 
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factors. Following the previous studies, Fenochietto and Pessino included the 
per capita GDP as the indictor of the stage of development; sum of imports 
and exports as a percentage of GDP reflecting the openness level; and the 
percentage of agriculture sector income in GDP to reflect the ease of tax 
collection. Other than these three supply factors, the authors also included the 
total public expenditure in education as the indicator of the education level; 
GINI coefficient stands for the degree of income distribution inequality; 
Consumer price index (CPI) measured the inflation level, and finally the 
corruption perception index, which measured the inefficiencies of the 
government.  
 
The results from Fenochietto and Pessino’s 96 non-natural resource 
dependent countries is consistent with previous studies and had some 
relatively important contributions regarding the determinants of tax ratio. All 
variables except the CPI were significant in the model with a positive sign for 
the per capita GDP and education level, and a negative sign for the 
Agricultural sector. The main finding of this part of the study was that the 
corruption and GINI index were both significantly and negatively related to the 
tax ratio. This confirmed the critical influence of income inequality and 
institutional quality on the tax performance of non-resource dependent 
countries. The result from the 17 natural resource dependent countries was 
generally similar to the 96 non-natural resource dependent countries; 
however, the CPI still appeared non-significant, and corruption seems to have 
lost its significance.  
 
The most recent tax capacity and effort inter-country literature in this chapter 
is the study of the relationship between the quality of governance and tax 
revenue performance by Huossain (2014). Apart from the inclusion of 
economic factors, Huossain (2014) focused particularly on the influence of the 
quality of governance on the tax capacity and effort, which from the evidence 
of the previous studies indicates institutional factors as one of the 
determinants of the revenue performance. The author used a data set of 55 
developed and developing countries from the period 2002 to 2012. The quality 
of governance was reflected by the institutional capacity and control of 
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corruption in his study. Both the variables were generated from the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI), which is published by the World Bank.  
 
Hence in Huossain’s tax effort index model, the tax ratio is explained by 6 
variables: institutional capacity, control of corruption, the percentage of 
government expenditure in GDP, ratio of sum imports and exports to GDP, 
share of broad money in percentage of GDP, and urban population rate. As 
argued by Houssain (1014), better institutional capacity and higher control of 
corruption usually reflects a more efficient government and the willingness of 
people to pay taxes. Hence the institutional capacity and control of corruption 
were expected to be positively related to the tax ratio. Huossain (2014) also 
argued that higher rate of government expenditure also indicates a higher 
need of tax collection, hence the sign was expected to be positive between 
the percentage of government expenditure in GDP and tax ratio. The 
openness level has been a widely used and tested variable, and the positive 
sign was expected to be the same as previous studies. The share of broad 
money was used to reflect the level of monetization, and theoretically has a 
positive influence on the indirect taxes, hence a positive sign was expected in 
Huossain’s model. The author also argues that a higher level of urbanization 
often results in higher demands for public goods and services; what is more, 
the more people in the cities, the less agricultural activities in the rural areas 
(Huossain, 2014).  
 
There was only one non-significant variable in Huossain’s study, which is the 
broad money in percentage of GDP. All other variables were statistically 
significant and with the expected signs. The institutional capacity and the 
control of corruption were both statistically significant and positive. This main 
finding of this study revealed that there is a close relationship between tax 
revenue performance and the quality of governance in both developing and 
developed countries. Hence, it is revealed that improving the tax revenue 
performance can be achieved not only by expanding the tax base, but also by 
improving the institutional factors (Huossain, 2014).  
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 Table 2-1 below summarises the typical tax ratio in international country 
comparison studies using tax effort index model, including the author, year, 
and the explanatory variables that were adopted in the model.  
 
Table 2-1: Summary of tax effort index studies on international country comparison 
Author Independent variable 
Williamson (1961) Per capita income 
Plasschaert (1962) Per capita income Ratio of import to GNP 
Hinrichs (1966) Per capita income Openness level 
Thorn (1967) 
Per capita income 
Openness level 
Cultural style dummy variable 
Lotz and Morss (1967) Per capita income Foreign trade share in GNP 
Weiss (1969) 
Per capita income 
Openness level 
Urbanization level 
Literacy rate 
Percentage of employment in agriculture sector 
Index of degree of mass communications 
Shin (1969) 
Per capita GNP 
Foreign trade share in GNP 
Agricultural share in GNP 
Rate of change in prices 
Population growth rate 
Lotz and Morss 1970 
Per capita income 
Openness level 
Degree of monetization 
Degree of centralization 
Bahl (1971) 
Agricultural share in GNP 
Mining share in GNP 
Export share in GNP 
Thuong and Gash (1979) 
Per capita income 
Exports share in GNP 
Imports share in GNP 
Dummy variable of economic integration 
Leuthold (1991) 
Per capita income 
Agriculture share in GNP 
Import and export share in GNP 
Mining share in GNP 
Foreign grants and loans and domestic borrowing 
Ghura (1998) 
Per capita income 
Agriculture share in GDP 
Openness level 
Dummy variable for oil-producing 
Dummy variable for non-oil mining 
Inflation rate 
Percentage change in real effective exchange rate 
Structural reforms 
Human capital index 
Corruption index 
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External grants to GDP ratio 
Change in external debt-GDP ratio 
Percentage change in terms of trade 
Dummy variable for CFA members 
Fauvelle-Aymar (1999) 
Per capita GDP 
Agriculture share in GDP 
Mining share in GDP 
Imports share in GDP 
Degree of opposition 
Index of democracy 
Indicator of government efficiency 
Indicator of government credibility 
Mertens (2003) 
Agriculture share in GDP 
Industry share in GDP 
Import sector share in GDP 
Piancastelli (2001) 
GNP per capita 
Trade share in GNP 
Agriculture share in GNP 
Industrial share in GNP 
Service share in GNP 
Teera & Hudson (2004) 
GDP per capita 
Trade share 
Foreign aid ratio to GDP 
Population density 
Agriculture share in GDP 
Manufacturing share in GDP 
External debt ratio to GDP 
Shadow economy 
Bird, Martinez-Vazquez, 
and Torgler (2006) 
Per capita GDP 
Population growth rate 
Openness level 
Agriculture share in GDP 
Income Inequality index 
Size of shadow economy 
Tax morale index 
Quality of governance index 
ICRG 
Regulation of entry index 
Pession and Fenochietto 
(2013) 
GDP per capita 
Trade share in GDP 
Agriculture share in GDP 
Education expenditure share in GDP 
GINI coefficient 
CPI index 
Corruption index 
Huossain (2014) 
Institutional capacity 
Control of corruption 
Percentage of government expenditure in GDP 
Openness level 
Share of broad money in percentage of GDP  
Urban population rate 
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2.6 Tax effort and capacity using the regression approach: previous 
study on intra-country analysis  
The discussion of the literature above has given a brief summary of 
developing the tax effort model. The same model can also be applied to the 
inner-country analysis, however, the previous studies of single country tax 
revenue performance investigation using the tax effort index model are few.  
 
Concerning the fiscal stress of local governments, a tax effort study of tri-cities 
in the Commonwealth of Virginia, USA was conducted by Badu and Li (1994). 
Badu and Li (1994) were focused on finding determinants of the level of tax 
capacity and effort, especially concerning the relationship between local 
government fiscal stress and tax revenue performance.  
 
In Badu and Li’s model, seven explanatory variables are included, namely 
fiscal stress index (measured by the composite stress index which was 
calculated and published by the Joint Legislative Audit and Review 
Commission (JLARC) of the Commonwealth of Virginia.), annual taxable retail 
sales (1000 dollars), family income (1000 dollars, median adjusted), state aid 
(total funds transferred from the state, 1000 dollars), unemployment rate, per 
capita welfare expenditure, and the combined effect of both the 
unemployment rate and welfare expenditure (unemployment rate multiplied by 
per capita welfare expenditure).  
 
The regression result from Badu and Li’s model was generally productive with 
most of the variables being significant. The fiscal stress index was significantly 
and positively related to the tax ratio, which indicates that the local 
government’s tax revenue performance was positively influenced by higher 
fiscal stress. The total fund transferred from the state was significantly and 
negatively related to the tax ratio. This finding was similar to the finding of the 
relationship between foreign grain and the country’s tax revenue performance 
in the inter-country comparisons, which revealed the same relationship as in 
previous studies. The unemployment rate and the per capita welfare 
expenditure as single variables were statistically non-significant, however, the 
combined variable that reflects the effects of both employment and welfare 
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expenditure turned out statistically positive and highly significant. This finding 
has two important points. Firstly, it reveals that the government expenditure 
activities or behaviours were also one of the determinants of the tax revenue 
performance. Secondly, as the author argues, to improve the tax performance 
in local government, extending the tax base might not be the only way. Better 
taxation performance could also be achieved by a lower unemployment rate 
and welfare expenditure (Badu & Li, 1994). 
 
A study to exploit the local government tax revenue potential in Indonesia was 
carried out by Alfirman (2003). Given the fact that Indonesia had experienced 
a major fiscal decentralization in 2001, and local governments were having 
serious concerns about the lack of revenue caused by the decentralization, 
Alfirman’s study was focused on the tax potential of provincial level 
government units in Indonesia before the decentralization, and he tried to add 
to the explanation and solution of local government’s poor revenue 
performance soon after the decentralization.  
 
Alfirman (2003) developed a tax frontier approach to examine the potential 
maximum tax capacity rather than the variation of tax effort differences. Two 
particular tax categories were relevant in Alfirman’s study: local tax and 
property tax. Hence, two dependent variables were generated: the local tax 
ratio, and the property tax ratio. The education level (number of high school 
students per capita), agricultural share in GDP, level of openness (ratio of 
sum imports and exports and GDP), and labour force participation rate were 
applied as explanatory variables in the regression. A series of dummy 
variables were also included, including the dummy variables that indicate the 
geographical differences, and dummy variables regarding different levels of 
relatively rich and poor provinces.  
 
The openness level was positive and significant in both local tax ratio and 
property tax ratio in Alfirman’s tax effort index model. This had confirmed the 
previous inter-country literatures about the positive influence of openness 
level in developing countries. The agricultural share in GDP appeared as a 
negative sign, but statistically non-significant in relation to the local tax ratio. 
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The education level, however, revealed a rather puzzling result. The 
education level was significantly related to the local tax ratio; however, it lost 
its significance in the property tax ratio analysis, and also unexpectedly, the 
sign became negative. 
 
The result from Alfirman’s study shows that none of the Indonesian local 
governments had met their tax potential. The author further points out that the 
decentralization process would bring a much heavier local expenditure 
responsibility, even though theoretically this might raise the local tax effort due 
to the financial needs. The author further pointed out some important 
government inefficiency related factors that might affect the tax effort 
negatively, especially corruption. However, the study did not provide any 
empirical evidence (Alfirman, 2003).  
 
Another fiscal reform related to provincial tax revenue performance was 
presented by Wang et al. (2009). The study focused not only on the tax 
capacity at the local government level, but also on what extent the local 
governments have exploited the capacity. The authors applied a panel data 
tax capacity and tax effort analysis at a provincial level in China for the period 
of 1986 to 2004. The study was mainly focused on the fiscal reforms that took 
place in the 1980s and early 1990s. Explanatory variables included in the 
research are per capita GDP, agricultural share in GDP, industry share in 
GDP, total foreign trade share in GDP and population density.  
 
The significant positive relationship between the industry share and local tax 
capacity was captured in the tax effort index model constructed by Wang et al. 
(2009). This result matches the fact that China’s fiscal structure was largely 
dependent on the revenues generated from industrial sectors (Wong, 1992). 
The per capita GDP showed a positive sign but was not significant. This result 
was consistent with the literature that the role of per capita GDP in the tax 
ratio function was uncertain in developing countries. The results of the 
agricultural sector variable and the openness level variable were consistent 
with previous tax ratio inter-country studies, with the agricultural sector 
significantly and negatively related to the tax ratio, and the openness level 
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being significant and positive. However, the population density was not 
significant in the function, though a positive sign was detected.  
 
In terms of tax effort analysis of different provinces, Wang et al. (2009) found 
significant geographical disparities. The relatively richer and coastal regions 
showed a higher tax capacity but low tax effort; whereas those less developed 
provinces showed relatively lower tax capacity but higher tax effort. As the 
authors pointed out that the decentralization fiscal reform, which started in 
1980s, had a positive impact on the tax capacity of local government, whereas 
the tax sharing system introduced in the 1994 fiscal reform had a significant 
negative impact on local tax share of GDP.  
 
A newer local provincial tax effort study in relation with the fiscal 
decentralization in China was carried out by Huang et al. (2012). The study 
covered 31 provinces for the period of 1996 and 2006. In order to better 
obtain the tax effort indices, the authors adopted four different estimates as 
the potential tax capacity, namely, personal income (PI), Gross regional 
product (GRP), total taxable resources (TTR) and the representative tax 
system using regression analysis (RTS/R). Hence, the four different 
approaches of tax effort are the ratio of actual tax collection and four different 
estimated tax capacities. The explanatory variables included in the equation 
are fiscal decentralization level, interaction term of fiscal decentralization and 
time trend (FD*T), per capita GRP, industrial share to GRP, and total trade 
share to GRP.  
 
Similar to the finding of Wang et al. (2009), the results from the study by 
Huang et al. (2012) showed that industrial share and trade share to GDP have 
significant positive impact on the local tax effort, whereas the per capita GDP, 
in the case of China, has a negative impact on tax effort. However, in contrast 
to the conclusion of Wang et al. (2009) on the impact of the 1994 tax sharing 
system, this newer study indicates that the tax sharing system reform had 
played a significant positive role in the increasing of the local governments’ 
tax effort in all four different approaches of tax effort.  
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A single country framework tax revenue performance study using a tax effort 
index model was performed by Chaudhry and Munir (2010). The authors 
focused on the issue of low tax to GDP ratio in Pakistan; a time-series 
analysis over the period 1973 to 2009 was adopted in the study. The author 
preformed three steps of regression. The first regression only included 
economic tax handles, such as agricultural share to GDP, manufactoring 
share to GDP, and openness. The second regression added in the economic 
policy included variables such as exchange rate, monetization level, and 
inflation rate. The third regression included external variables like external 
debt and foreign remittances. The result from Chaudhry and Munir’s study 
indicated that the agricultural share and manufacturing share to GDP were 
positively related to the tax ratio; however, the agricultural share is not 
significant, and what is more, the service sector and per capita income in the 
first regression equation showed a negative sign, which is not common in 
most of other studies. The final conclusion indicates that both economic policy 
variables and external variables have a significant impact on the tax ratio; 
however, the traditional tax handles, such as per capita GDP and GDP 
decomposition variables, have no significant impact on the tax ratio.  
 
A very recent regression approach of the tax revenue study in Turkey was 
carried out by Karagöz (2013). In order to contribute to the study on the 
budget deficit problem in Turkey, the author investigated the determinants of 
tax revenue by a time series regression covering the period of 1970 to 2010. 
The result indicates that the tax revenue in Turkey is significantly determined 
by agricultural and industrial sector share in GDP, foreign debt, monetization 
rate, and urbanization level. A negative relationship was found between the 
agricultural sector share in GDP and tax revenue. However the openness 
level, which is measured by the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to 
GDP, has been found as having no significant relationship with the tax 
revenue performance in Turkey.  
 
yao and Lin (2013) estimated the tax capacity and tax effort performance of 
24 provincial level administrative units in Taiwan using the tax effort index 
model for the period of 2001 to 2010. Other than the traditional population 
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factors and the decomposition of GDP, the authors also considered the fiscal 
transfer, public expenditure, and interestingly the non-tax revenue factors. The 
result indicated large disparities in tax capacities among local governments in 
Taiwan, and low tax effort commonly occurred in local governments. 
Moreover, per capita public expenditure, non-tax revenue share as the 
percentage of local fiscal revenue, and the level of dependence on debt were 
observed having a positive and significant impact on the local tax effort. By 
contrast, the centrally-allocated tax revenues, central grants and election 
years showed a negative impact on the local tax efforts.  
 
 Table 2-2 below is the summary of tax effort index studies on intra-country 
studies, including the author, year, and the explanatory variables that were 
adopted in the model.  
 
Table 2-2: Summary of tax effort index studies on intra-country country comparison 
 
Author Independent variable 
Badu and Li (1994) 
Fiscal stress index 
Annual taxable retail sales 
Median adjusted family income 
Unemployment rate 
Per capita welfare expenditure 
Alfirman (2003) 
Education level 
Shares of agricultural sector in GDP 
Labour force participation rate 
Openness level 
Dummy variables for geographic differences 
Dummy variables for rich provinces 
Linear dummy variable for firm and time effects 
Quadratic dummy variable for firm and time   effects 
Wang et al. (2009) 
GDP per capita 
The ratio of industry to GDP 
The ratio of agriculture to GDP 
The ratio of import and export to GDP 
Population density 
Chaudhry and Munir (2010) 
Per capita income 
Share of agriculture in GDP 
Share of manufacturing in GDP 
Share of service sector in GDP 
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Openness level 
Exchange rate 
Money supply 
Inflation rate 
External debt 
Worker’s remittances 
Foreign aid 
Literacy rate 
Urban population share in total population 
Dummy variable for political stability 
Huang, Lo, and She (2012) 
Real per capita GDP 
Industry value of output to GDP 
Total export and import value to GDP 
Degree of fiscal decentralization 
Interaction term of fiscal decentralization and time trend 
Yao and Lin (2013) 
Ratio of centrally-allocated tax revenues to local fiscal 
revenue 
Ratio of central grants to local fiscal revenue 
Election years 
Year of different rule party 
Population density 
Per capita public spending 
Non-tax revenues 
Dependence on debt 
Karagöz (2013) 
Ratio of agricultural value added to GDP 
Ratio of industrial value added to GDP 
Ratio of total foreign debt to GDP 
Ratio of money supply (M2) 
Ratio of urban population to total population 
Openness level 
 
2.7 Summary and the hypothesis in this study 
2.7.1 Taxation and its capacity and effort 
Taxation is recognized as the most import financial source to the 
governmental public expenditure; hence, it plays a key role in the national 
economy (Allan, 1971; James & Nobes, 2013; Lymer & Oats, 2013). 
 
The aim of this research is to find the key determinants of the variation of the 
tax revenue capacity in China, and to evaluate China’s tax revenue 
performance at provincial level. In order to fulfil this aim, to fully understand 
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the concepts and measurements of tax capacity and tax effort are very 
important. 
 
Tax capacity is defined as the hypothetical ability of tax authority units to raise 
revenue for the purpose of public finance within the existing available tax 
bases (Bahl, 1971, 1972; Akin, 1973; Wang et al., 2009). The tax effort is the 
measure of the extent to which an area or governmental unit’s strength of tax 
collection compares with its taxable capacities (Bahl, 1972; Mertens, 2003; 
Wang et al., 2009).  
 
Tax effort is calculated as the ratio between the actual tax collection and the 
tax capacity; hence, the estimating process of the tax capacity is vital in the 
study of tax revenue performance. However, the absolute tax capacity as a 
theoretical concept is very difficult to obtain. Empirical methods to calculate 
the absolute tax capacity are still being debated (Lewis, 1949; Maroun, 
Turner, & Sartorius, 2011). Thus, the relative tax capacity approach seems 
more realistic and practical.  
 
2.7.2 Measurement of tax effort and capacity 
Typical and most widely used measurements of relative tax capacity/effort are 
the Representative Tax System method (RTS), and the Regression-based 
Tax Effort Index model (TE/R) (ACIR, 1962; Bahl, 1972; Akin, 1973; ACIR, 
1987; Kim, 2007). The RTS method in practice relies on the estimated tax 
base and is calculated using representative tax rates. By doing so, a single 
tax system is constructed in the whole sample. By applying this single tax 
system to different samples, the relative tax capacity as well as the tax effort 
can be calculated. In contrast, the TE/R method relies on the construction of 
explanatory variables. Then, through regression techniques, the relative tax 
capacity can be obtained by the estimation of the regression result. Both 
methods aim to obtain the relative tax capacity and tax effort. However, the 
main difference is that the TE/R method is more to do with the estimated 
relative tax capacity and the factors that are included in the regression 
function as the explanatory variables. Since the main purpose of this research 
72 
 
is to find the determinants of tax capacity, the TE/R method is adopted in this 
study. 
 
2.7.3 Previous studies on tax effort and capacity 
Through years of development, the TE/R method has been improved in many 
ways. The scale of choice of explanatory variables has focused on not only 
the economic conditions, but also on other social and political conditions (Bird 
et al., 2006, 2008). The choice of the explanatory variables in the tax effort 
index model has gradually moved from the traditional tax handles/supply side 
to social and political factors/demand side (Ghura & Hadjimichael, 1996; 
Ghura, 1998; Fauvelle-Aymar, 1999; Teera & Hudson, 2004; Le et al., 2012). 
Hence, a great expansion of social, political, and cultural variables, such as 
the cultural differences indicators, variation of government efficiencies, 
education levels, foreign grants, income distribution and corruption  were 
adopted in the tax effort index models (Ghura, 1998; Piancastelli, 2001; Teera 
& Hudson, 2004; Bird et al., 2006; Gupta, 2007; Bird et al., 2008). In addition, 
not only is the right hand side of the function expanding, but the left hand side, 
the dependent variables, are also improving. The traditional models used the 
ratio of actual tax collection and GDP/GNP; some scholars have extended this 
variable to test the fiscal revenue determinants, along with the argument 
whether the tax revenue in the model represents the “true” tax revenue, since 
many developing countries have noticeable amounts of non-tax revenues, 
which might be similar to the concept of taxes in many ways (Fauvelle-Aymar, 
1999; Bird et al., 2006).  
 
The investigation of the determinants of tax revenues and tax effort were well-
developed in the analysis of inter-county comparison of tax effort. The same 
model can be also taking in the inner-country analysis. However, relevant 
studies are in the minority in the literature. This is possibly because of the 
insufficient of data. For instance, in the inter-country tax effort index studies, 
the government quality factors were obtained from international statistical 
organizations in many studies (Fauvelle-Aymar, 1999; Bird et al., 2006; 
Huossain, 2014). However, relevant indicators are difficult to find at a sub-
country level. Nevertheless, various attempts have been made around the 
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world (Badu & Li, 1994; Wang et al., 2009; Chaudhry & Munir, 2010; Huang et 
al., 2012; Karagöz, 2013; yao & Lin, 2013). However, when conducting the 
inner-country tax effort analysis, researchers revealed that different countries 
have their own special features. In other words, each country is unique from 
others in some ways. The same variables in different countries revealed a 
different story. The characteristic variations of countries has demonstrated 
that there is no such thing as the “standard components” in the construction of 
explanatory variables; one must work with each country’s particular 
characteristics when applying of the tax effort index model.  
 
The tax effort index study in the intra-country analysis are very few, and it is 
even rarer in China. Moreover, the existing few tax effort index studies in 
China have been  mainly focused on the supply side factors, i.e., from the 
economic perspective (Wang et al., 2009). The special social and political 
characteristics of China has been widely ignored in the tax literature. In order 
to fulfil this gap, this study offers a comprehensive tax effort index analysis 
with a combination of both supply side factors and demand side factors.  
 
2.7.4 The hypotheses in this study 
This research aims to find the key determinants of the variation of the tax 
revenue capacity in China, and to evaluate China’s tax revenue performance 
at provincial level. Through the literature review of tax effort and capacity 
using regression approach, it can be seen that there are mainly eleven 
economic and social aspects relating to the tax revenue performance. The 
eleven aspects and their related previous studies are listed in the table 2-3 
below. 
 
Table 2-3: The eleven economic and social aspects that relating to the tax revenue 
performance in the literature reviewed 
Main aspects relating to 
the tax revenue 
performance  
Related studies  
Stage of development 
Williamson (1961) Plasschaert (1962) Hinrichs (1966) Thorn 
(1967) Lotz and Morss (1967) Weiss (1969) Shin (1969) Lotz 
and Morss 1970 Thuong and Gash (1979) Leuthold (1991) 
Ghura (1998) Fauvelle-Aymar (1999) Piancastelli (2001) Teera 
& Hudson (2004) Bird, Martinez-Vazquez, and Torgler (2006) 
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Wang et al. (2009) Chaudhry and Munir (2010) Huang, Lo, and 
She (2012) Pession and Fenochietto (2013) 
Development of industrial 
sector 
Bahl (1971) Leuthold (1991) Fauvelle-Aymar (1999) Mertens 
(2003) Piancastelli (2001) Teera & Hudson (2004) Wang et al. 
(2009) Chaudhry and Munir (2010) Huang, Lo, and She (2012) 
Karagöz (2013) 
Openness level 
Plasschaert (1962) Hinrichs (1966) Thorn (1967) Lotz and 
Morss (1967) Weiss (1969) Shin (1969) Lotz and Morss 1970 
Bahl (1971) Thuong and Gash (1979) Leuthold (1991) Ghura 
(1998) Fauvelle-Aymar (1999) Alfirman (2003) Mertens (2003) 
Piancastelli (2001) Teera & Hudson (2004) Bird, Martinez-
Vazquez, and Torgler (2006) Wang et al. (2009) Chaudhry and 
Munir (2010) Huang, Lo, and She (2012) Pession and 
Fenochietto (2013) Huossain (2014) 
Development of service 
sector Piancastelli (2001) Chaudhry and Munir (2010) 
Population growth rate Shin (1969) Bird, Martinez-Vazquez, and Torgler (2006) 
Population density Teera & Hudson (2004) Wang et al. (2009) Yao and Lin (2013) 
Shrinking of agricultural 
sector activities 
Weiss (1969) Shin (1969) Bahl (1971) Leuthold (1991) 
Alfirman (2003) Mertens  (2003) Piancastelli (2001) Teera & 
Hudson (2004) Bird, Martinez-Vazquez, and Torgler (2006) 
Wang et al. (2009) Chaudhry and Munir (2010) Pession and 
Fenochietto (2013) Karagöz (2013) Huossain (2014) 
Resident income inequality Bird, Martinez-Vazquez, and Torgler (2006) Badu and Li (1994) Pession and Fenochietto (2013) 
External grants Leuthold (1991) Ghura (1998) Teera & Hudson (2004) Chaudhry and Munir (2010) Karagöz (2013) Yao and Lin (2013) 
Anti-corruption effort Ghura (1998) Bird, Martinez-Vazquez, and Torgler (2006) Pession and Fenochietto (2013) Huossain (2014) 
government capacity 
Lotz and Morss 1970 Fauvelle-Aymar (1999) Bird, Martinez-
Vazquez, and Torgler (2006) Chaudhry and Munir (2010) 
Huossain (2014) 
 
 
Based on the outcomes of the literature reviewed, the testable hypothesis in 
this study can be formulated as follows:  
 
H1: The stage of development is positively related to the tax revenue 
performance at provincial level in China. 
 
H2: Development in the industrial sector is positively related to the tax 
revenue performance at provincial level in China. 
 
H3: The development of the service sector is positively related to the tax 
revenue performance at provincial level in China. 
 
H4: The openness level is positively related to the tax revenue performance at 
provincial level in China. 
 
H5: The population growth rate is negatively related to the tax revenue 
performance at provincial level in China. 
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H6: The population density is positively related to the tax revenue 
performance at provincial level in China. 
 
H7: The shrinking of agricultural sector activities is positively related to the tax 
revenue performance at provincial level in China. 
 
H8: The resident income inequality is negatively related to the tax revenue 
performance at provincial level in China. 
 
H9: The external grants received by local governments are negatively related 
to the tax revenue performance at provincial level in China. 
 
H10: The anti-corruption effort is positively related to the tax revenue 
performance at provincial level in China. 
 
H11: The government capacity is positively related to the tax revenue 
performance at provincial level in China. 
 
Further detailed rational of each hypotheses will be presented in Chapter 5: 
Research design, methodology and methods. 
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3 Chapter three: The evolution and reform of China’s tax system 
 
3.1 Introduction  
The aim of this research is to find the key determinants of the variation of the 
tax revenue capacity in China, and to evaluate China’s tax revenue 
performance at provincial level. Since the aim of the study involves the tax 
performance in China, it is important to understand the evolution and reforms 
of China’s tax system as an essential background before studying its related 
topics. In this chapter, an outline of historical tax evolution and reforms of the 
Chinese tax system are presented. 
 
Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, China’s 
tax system has experienced five main stages of evolution and reform.  
 
Section 3.2 presents stage one, which was between 1950 and 1952, the first 
two years of the establishment of the new Chinese government. Section 3.3 
illustrates the second stage, which is between 1953 and 1978, when China 
was under the planned economy, and the role of taxation was insignificant in 
the national economic environment. The third stage is the period between 
1978 and 1993, and is discussed in section 3.4. The background of the third 
stage is when China put an end to the planned economy and launched the 
open door policy for the purpose of building a market-oriented economy. In 
section 3.5 stage four tax reform in 1994 is presented, when a fundamental 
tax reform took place. In addition, the introduction of the tax sharing system 
between central and local governments is also presented. Lastly, in section 
3.6, stage five is presented—which is from 1995 until the present day.  
 
3.2 Stage one: 1950-1952 establishment of the new tax system  
In 1950, a year after the establishment of the new government, to restore the 
economy from the years of the anti-Japanese war and the civil war, and also 
to sustain the financial power for the new government, the Chinese 
Communist Government established the “Principal Rules for Implementation 
of the National Tax Administration”, which rolled out the very first tax system 
structure for the PRC (Easson & Li, 1987).  
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Between 1950 and 1952, the new socialist government established the 
taxation system with eighteen taxes for the New People’s Republic of China to 
recover the national economy and sustain the fiscal revenue of the new 
government. Eighteen taxes that constituted the new Chinese tax system 
were: agriculture tax, animal husbandry tax, commodity tax, industrial and 
commercial tax, stamp tax, salt tax, custom duties, transaction tax, slaughter 
tax, house property tax, land tax, special consumption tax, license plate tax, 
interest income tax, salary of remuneration tax, inheritance tax, contracts 
(deed) tax, and tonnage dues. Agriculture tax and animal husbandry tax was 
not unified and legislated at the national level, but managed and collected by 
local government. The salary of remuneration tax and the inheritance tax were 
never implemented (M.O.F., 2000). 
 
3.3 Stage two: 1953 – 1978 simplification of the tax system 
Before 1979, China was under a centrally planned economic system, which 
differed from a market-oriented economy in many ways (Easson & Li, 1987).  
For example, the government controlled production and allocation of 
resources; in other words, all the economic resources were in the state’s 
hands rather than in private hands (Yueh, 2010). The economic goals and 
focus points of the pre 1978 period were to build a socialist economy, and the 
detailed steps were also pre-established by the central government (Yang, 
2001).  
 
The Chinese tax system during this  period was very simple, since the central 
government decided almost everything regarding what people and states 
needed; even the local governments were forbidden the freedom of spending 
local revenues since the provinces’ expenditures were budgeted by the 
central government (Yang, 2001; Shen, Jin, & Zou, 2012). 
 
Following two major movements called “The Socialist Transformation”2 in 
1953, and the “The Great Leap Forward”3 between 1958 and 1961, China’s 
tax system had been through large scale reduction with many important 
industry and profit related taxes simplified and merged into a single tax (Liu, 
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2000; M.O.F. 2000).  This tax system simplification process reached its peak 
when the movement of The Cultural Revolution4 started in 1968. During The 
Cultural Revolution period, almost all private enterprises in China were 
eliminated, and most of the tax categories in the tax system were merged into 
a single industrial and commercial tax. The result was that the single industrial 
and commercial tax became the most important  and  largest tax in terms of 
tax revenue before 1978, and the remaining taxes became less relevant to the 
national economy (Wang, 1984; Easson & Li, 1987; Liu, 2000, 2008). 
 
Table 3-1 shows the major events and main changes of tax categories of 
China during the tax reform period from 1950 to 1978. 
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Table 3-1: Major events and main changes of tax categories of China during the tax reform period from 1950 to 1978 
1950 1951 1953 1958 1973 1978 
*agriculture tax *agriculture tax *agriculture tax 
agriculture tax (unified and 
legislated) 
agriculture tax  
*animal husbandry tax *animal husbandry tax *animal husbandry tax *animal husbandry tax *animal husbandry tax *animal husbandry tax 
commodity tax commodity tax commodity tax 
consolidated industrial and 
commercial tax (merged 
from commodity tax, 
industrial and commercial 
tax, commodity circulation 
tax and stamp tax) 
industrial and commercial tax 
(merged from the parts that 
all state-owned enterprises 
and collectively-owned 
enterprises that used to be 
subjected to the consolidated 
industrial and commercial tax 
and its surtax, urban real 
estate tax, vehicle and vessel 
license plate tax, salt tax and 
slaughter tax in 1973) 
industrial and commercial 
tax 
industrial and 
commercial tax 
industrial and 
commercial tax 
industrial and commercial 
tax 
Consolidated industrial and 
commercial tax 
consolidated industrial and 
commercial tax 
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industrial and commercial 
income tax (the income 
part from the industrial 
and commercial tax before) 
industrial and commercial 
income tax 
industrial and commercial 
income tax 
stamp tax stamp tax stamp tax    
*salt tax *salt tax *salt tax *salt tax   
custom duties custom duties custom duties custom duties custom duties custom duties 
transaction tax transaction tax 
*transaction tax on 
livestock (the remaining 
transaction taxes on 
different goods were 
either discontinued or 
merged to commodity tax 
and commodity 
circulation tax) 
*transaction tax on 
livestock 
*transaction tax on livestock *transaction tax on livestock 
slaughter tax slaughter tax slaughter tax slaughter tax **slaughter tax **slaughter tax 
house property tax combined into an urban 
real estate tax in 1951 
urban real estate tax urban real estate tax **urban real estate tax **urban real estate tax 
land tax 
special consumption tax special consumption tax 
reformed and renamed to 
cultural recreation tax 
cultural recreation tax 
(suspended in 1966) 
  
license plate tax 
vehicle and vessel 
license plate tax (name 
changed as the objective 
of this tax were only 
vehicles and vessels) 
vehicle and vessel license 
plate tax 
vehicle and vessel license 
plate tax 
**vehicle and vessel license 
plate tax 
**vehicle and vessel license 
plate tax 
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interest income tax interest income tax interest income tax 
interest income tax 
(suspended in 1959) 
  
salary of remuneration 
tax (never 
implemented) 
     
inheritance tax (never 
implemented) 
     
  
commodity circulation tax 
(the commodity tax, sales 
tax and its surtax, stamp 
tax on some main 
commodities was 
consolidated into this tax) 
   
*contracts (deed) tax *contracts (deed) tax *contracts (deed) tax *contracts (deed) tax *contracts (deed) tax *contracts (deed) tax 
tonnage dues tonnage dues tonnage dues tonnage dues tonnage dues tonnage dues 
    
bazaar transaction tax 
(introduced in 1962) 
bazaar transaction tax 
* not yet unified and legislated in the national level, managed and collected by local government, approved by the central government. 
**only paid by individuals and foreign residents. 
Source: Adapted from Wang (1984), Easson and Li (1987), Liu (2000), Liu (2008) and M.O.F., (2000)
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By the end of 1978, as the result of a series of tax reforms aimed at further 
simplification of tax system, the number of taxes were further reduced to 13. 
These were: industrial and commercial tax, consolidated industrial and 
commercial tax, industrial and commercial income tax, customs duty, 
transaction tax on livestock, bazaar transaction tax, urban real estate tax, 
vehicle and vessel usage license tax, tonnage dues, slaughter tax, agricultural 
tax, animal husbandry tax, and deed tax (Liu, 2008). 
 
3.4 Stage three: 1979-1993: tax system reforms associated with the 
market oriented economy reform 
Between 1978 and 1993, the major concern for the central government was 
the transformation from a planned economy to a market-orientated economy 
under the background of market-oriented economic reforms started in the late 
1970s. From the taxation perspective, the taxation reform was a vital part of 
the market-oriented economic reforms, and the major taxation reform 
objectives were: constricting foreign-related taxation system; shifting the main 
source of fiscal revenue from SOE profits to SOE taxes; and reforming the 
entire industrial and commercial tax system, so that the tax became an 
important lever of national economy (Liu, 2000).  
 
3.4.1 Constricting foreign-related taxation system 
The mark of the official welcoming of foreign investment was the launch of the 
opening up policy. By encouraging foreign enterprises and individuals to come  
and invest in China, it is obvious that the contribution to the Chinese economy 
by taxes from the foreign investors was expected (Easson & Li, 1987). 
 
Under this background, four taxes were introduced between  1980 to 1991: 
Joint venture income tax and individual income tax in 1980; Foreign enterprise 
income tax in 1981; and Income tax on enterprises with foreign investment, 
and foreign enterprises in 1991 (N.P.C. 1980; 2000). Until then, a basic 
foreign-related tax system was initially formed. 
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3.4.2 Reforming the entire industrial and commercial tax system 
The milestone of China’s economic reform was the year of 1978, but the 
milestones of China’s tax reform were the years 1983 and 1984, when the 
SOEs, which were the major revenue source of government finance, were 
totally subjected to taxes rather than just profits being transferred to the 
central and local government (Otsuka, Liu, & Murakami, 1998). In 1983, China 
had stepped out the very first stage of the revenue reform, called the first step 
of Li gai shui, which means, “replacing profits with taxes” (Xu & Cui, 2011). In 
general, the central government allowed the SOEs to retain their profits after 
“payment of an agreed-upon amount of tax” (Xu & Cui, 2011). In other words, 
the contributing profits of the SOEs became an income tax, and a new 
tax,“Income tax on state owned enterprises,” was introduced. This started the 
first step of “the reform of substituting taxation for handing in profits from the 
state enterprises” (Liu, 2000).  
 
This reform was completed in 1984, when the SOEs were no longer required 
to hand over their profits to the government, but instead, pay various taxes 
(Lin, 2009). These major reforms included the industrial and commercial tax 
being divided into four different taxes according to different objectives of 
taxation. The four taxes were product tax, value added tax, salt tax, and 
business tax.  
 
In the meantime, the collective and private sectors also enjoyed a rapid 
expansion in the economy thanks to the launching of the market oriented 
reform and the open door policy (N.B.S., 1950-1995). Under this situation, in 
order to balance the tax burden between SOEs, collective-owned enterprises 
and individual enterprises, income taxes were introduced to collective, and 
individual units, and private enterprises between  1985 to 1988 (Liu, 2000).   
 
Aside from the tax reforms in the SOEs, collective-owned, and private 
enterprises, some new taxes were also introduced into the industrial and 
commercial tax system between 1984 and 1988, such as resource tax, city 
maintenance and construction tax, real estate tax, city and town land usage 
tax, tax on bonus of state-owned enterprises, and vehicle and vessel usage 
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tax. Meanwhile, the stamp tax, which was abandoned before, was also 
restored according to the interim provisions (Liu, 2000).  
 
3.4.3 Adjustment/orientation taxes and special purpose taxes 
In order to enhance the important role played by taxation in China’s economy, 
other than the tax reforms mentioned in early sections, the Chinese authorities 
also introduced a series of adjustment/orientation taxes in various fields 
during the taxation reform period between 1978 and 1994 (Liu, 2000, 2008). 
These adjustments and orientation taxes are: Individual income adjustment 
tax, adjustment tax on state-owned enterprises, orientation regulation tax on 
fixed assets, adjustment tax on wage of state-owned enterprises, special tax 
on industrial fuel, and special consumption tax (M.O.F., 2000). 
 
3.4.3.1 Individual income adjustment tax 
When the individual income tax was introduced in 1980, it was mainly 
subjected to the growing group of foreign workers, and the purpose of this tax 
was mainly to collect taxes from the increasing number of foreign workers who 
earned income in China (N.P.C., 1980). A few years later, the authorities 
noticed an increasing number  of Chinese citizens who were also receiving 
substantial incomes without paying income tax (Easson & Li, 1987). 
Subsequently, the individual income adjustment tax was introduced in 1986. 
 
3.4.3.2 Adjustment tax on state-owned enterprises 
The adjustment tax on state-owned enterprises was introduced under the 
background of the “replacing profits with taxes” reform, which transformed the 
SOE’s profits into taxes. 
 
3.4.3.3 Orientation regulation tax on fixed assets 
The introduction of orientation regulation tax on fixed assets aimed to 
strengthen the leverage function of the taxation on the investment activities 
and to control the scale of fixed asset investment, due to the rapidly increased 
fixed asset investments after the launch of the market oriented reform (N.B.S., 
1950-1995). 
 
85 
 
3.4.3.4 Adjustment tax on the wage of state-owned enterprises 
Adjustment tax on the wage of state-owned enterprises was introduced in 
1985, and the purpose of this tax was to control and adjust the increasing 
salary level in state-owned enterprises.  
 
3.4.3.5 Special tax on industrial fuel 
In the early 1980s, in order to balance the supply and demand of industrial 
fuel, reducing energy consumption in industry, and encouraging effective use 
of energy resources, industrial units burning crude oil or heavy oil as fuel for 
industry boiler or industrial furnace became subject to the newly introduced 
special tax on industrial fuel. 
 
3.4.3.6 Special consumption tax 
The special consumption tax was introduced in 1987 and aimed to balance 
the market and strengthen market regulatory power on some supply-demand 
imbalance of goods (Liu, 2008).  
 
3.4.4 Agriculture related taxes and other taxes 
Apart from the tax reforms mentioned before, the agriculture related taxes and 
other taxes were also reformed, or introduced.  
 
3.4.4.1 Farmland occupation tax 
Along with the fast pace of economic development, the other significant 
development during this period is the rapid growth of urbanization (Zhou & 
Cao, 1999). Fast expanding cities and townships have resulted in an 
inevitable farmland loss. In order to balance the increase of urbanization and 
the decrease in arable land, the farmland occupation tax was introduced in 
1987.  
 
3.4.4.2 Banquet tax 
The banquet tax was introduced on 22nd September 1988, for the purpose of 
providing guidance on reasonable consumption, to encourage thrift in society 
as well as being an anti-corruption measure to some degree.  
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3.4.4.3 Agriculture tax and animal husbandry tax 
On 31st October 1978, the Ministry of Finance submitted the report from the 
Ministry of Finance on “Reducing the Tax Burden in Rural Areas” to the State 
Council. According to the report, a tax deduction and exemption principle in 
the agriculture tax and animal husbandry tax was confirmed. Since then, the 
effort on tax deduction and exemption was carried on throughout the later 
agriculture tax and animal husbandry tax administration work. (Easson & Li, 
1987). 
 
3.4.4.4 Transaction tax on livestock 
After the opening up policy and economic reforms, the authorities soon 
noticed the fast increase in business activities in livestock transactions in the 
rural and township areas. In order to strengthen the legitimate trade and 
income equality, the transaction tax on livestock was finally unified and 
legislated at the national level in 1982 (Liu, 2000).  
 
3.4.4.5 Custom duties 
Custom duties were introduced in the early 1950s. However, given the 
background that China was a very self-reliant, planned economy and with  
very little external trade, the custom duties were treated as being relatively 
unimportant (Easson & Li, 1987).  
 
After the opening up policy and the construction of the market-oriented 
economy, reform of the customs system was required for the new 
environment. Under this background, a new central department the General 
Administration of Customs of the People’s Republic of China was established 
in 1980, and a national level legally formalized custom system finally 
established.   
 
3.4.5 Summary of taxation reform between 1978 and 1993 
The tax reform between 1979 and 1993 was associated with the main 
background of China’s economic reforms, and the reforms in  taxation ran  
parallel with the economic reforms, and played an important role during the 
transformation of China’s economy from a planned economy to a market 
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oriented economy (Gao, 2008). Through all the changes and reforms, China’s 
taxation had become more formalized, but also a rather complicated tax 
system by the end of 1993 with 37 taxes in total. Listed in Table 3-2 below is 
the timetable of the major taxation reforms and related main laws and 
regulations.  
 
Table 3-2: Major tax reforms between 1979 and 1993 
Major Tax Reforms between 1979 and 1993: Year and Relative Laws and Regulations 
Income Tax on 
Enterprises with 
Foreign Investment 
and Foreign 
Enterprises 
1980: "Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China on 
Chinese-foreign Equity Joint Ventures" 
1981: "Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China for Foreign 
Enterprises" 
1991: "The Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China for 
Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises". A 
new tax was introduced: income tax on enterprises with foreign 
investment and foreign enterprises (replaced the previous "joint 
ventures income tax" and "foreign enterprise income tax") 
Individual income tax 1980: “Individual Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China” 
Individual Income 
Adjustment Tax 
1986: "Provisional Rules of the People's Republic of China on 
Individual Income Adjustment Tax" started to collect "individual 
income adjustment tax" 
Consolidated 
industrial and 
commercial tax 
1981: "Suggestions Regarding the Reform of Industrial and 
Commercial Tax", the new "product tax" partly emerged from this 
tax. The original "consolidated industrial and commercial tax" was 
not abolished, but only subject to foreign enterprises and individuals 
Product Tax 
1984: “The Interim Provisions on the Second Step to Substituting 
Taxation for Handing in Profits in State Enterprises” 
1984: “Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Product tax 
(Draft)” started to collect "product tax" 
Value-added tax 
1984: “the Interim Provisions on the Second Step to Substituting 
Taxation for Handing in Profits in State Enterprises” 
1984: “Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Value Added 
Tax (Draft)” started to collect VAT 
Business tax 
1984: “The Interim Provisions on the Second Step to Substituting 
Taxation for Handing in Profits in State Enterprises” 
1984: “Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Business tax 
(Draft)" started to collect business tax 
Salt Tax 1984: “the Interim Provisions on the Second Step to Substituting Taxation for Handing in Profits in State Enterprises” 
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1984: “Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Salt tax 
(Draft)” started to collect "salt tax" from all units including SOEs 
Income Tax on State-
owned Enterprises 
1983: “the Report of the Working Conference Regarding the National 
Reform of Substituting Taxation for Handing in Profits”, “the 
Tentative Regulations of Replacing Profits with Taxes in the State 
Enterprises”, and "the Interim Provisions of the Ministry of Finance 
of PRC for Collection of Income Tax from State Enterprises" 
1984: "Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Regulations of 
the People's Republic of China on State-Owned Enterprises Income 
Tax (Draft)" 
Adjustment tax on 
state-owned 
enterprises 
1983: "the Tentative Regulations of Replacing Profits with Taxes in 
the State Enterprises"; the adjustment tax on state-owned 
enterprises was introduced in this tentative regulation as one of the 
four ways of handing the after-tax-profit to the government 
1984: "the Regulations of Collecting the Adjustment Tax on State-
owned Enterprises" 
Resource Tax 
1984: “the Interim Provisions on the Second Step to Substituting 
Taxation for Handing in Profits in State Enterprises” 
1984: "Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Resource 
Tax (Draft)" started to collect "resource tax" 
City Maintenance and 
Construction Tax 
1984: “the Interim Provisions on the Second Step to Substituting 
Taxation for Handing in Profits in State Enterprises” 
1985: “Provisional Regulations of the People's Republic of China on 
City Maintenance and Construction Tax” started to collect "city 
maintenance and construction tax" 
Urban real estate tax 
1981: "Suggestions Regarding the Reform of Industrial and 
Commercial Tax". According to the "suggestions", few years later, the 
urban real estate tax was divided into two taxes: real estate tax 
(1986) and cities and towns land usage tax (1988). The original 
urban real estate tax was not abolished, but only subject to foreign 
enterprises and individuals 
Real Estate Tax 
1984: “the Interim Provisions on the Second Step to Substituting 
Taxation for Handing in Profits in State Enterprises” 
1986: "Provisional Regulations of the People's Republic of China on 
Real Estate Tax" started to collect "real estate tax" 
Cities and Towns Land 
Usage Tax 
1984: “The Interim Provisions on the Second Step to Substituting 
Taxation for Handing in Profits in State Enterprises” 
1988: "Provisional Regulations of the People's Republic of China 
Governing Land Use Tax in Cities and Towns" started to collect 
"cities and towns land usage tax" 
Vehicle and vessel 
license plate tax 
1981: "Suggestions Regarding the Reform of Industrial and 
Commercial Tax". According to the "suggestions", a few years later, 
the new "vehicle and vessel usage tax" (1986) emerged from this 
tax, whereas the original "vehicle and vessel license plate tax" was 
not abolished, but only subject to foreign enterprises and individuals 
Vehicle and Vessel 
Usage Tax 
1984: “The Interim Provisions on the Second Step to Substituting 
Taxation for Handing in Profits in State Enterprises” 
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1986: "Provisional Regulations of the People's Republic of China on 
Vehicle and Vessel Usage Tax" started to collect "vehicle and vessel 
usage tax" 
Stamp tax 
1984: “the Interim Provisions on the Second Step to Substituting 
Taxation for Handing in Profits in State Enterprises” 
1988: "Provisional Rules of the People's Republic of China on Stamp 
Duty" restored "stamp tax" 
Income Tax on 
Collective Enterprises 
1985: “The Provisional Regulations of the People's Republic of China 
on collective enterprises income Tax” started to collect "income tax 
on collective enterprises" 
Income tax on 
individual unit of 
industry and 
commerce in cities 
1986: “the Provisional Regulations of the People's Republic of China 
on individual unit of industry and commerce in cities income Tax” 
started to collect "income tax on individual unit of industry and 
commerce in cities" 
Private enterprise 
income tax 
1988: “the Provisional Regulations of the People's Republic of China 
on private enterprise income Tax” started to collect "private 
enterprise income tax" 
Orientation Regulation 
Tax on Fixed Assets 
Investment 
1983: “The Interim Procedures on Construction tax” started to 
collect "construction tax" 
1987: “The Provisional Rules of the People’s Republic of China on 
Construction Tax” 
1991: “the Provisional Regulations of the People’s Republic of China 
of Fixed Assets Investment Orientation Regulation Tax” started to 
collect "orientation regulation tax on fixed assets investment", 
replacing the previous construction tax 
Tax on Bonus of State-
owned Enterprises 
1984: “The Provisional Regulations on the Tax on Bonus of State-
owned Enterprises” started to collect "tax on bonus of state-owned 
enterprises" 
1985: "Detailed Implementation Rules for the Tax on Bonus of State-
owned Enterprises" 
Adjustment Tax on 
Wage of State-owned 
Enterprises 
1985: “The Provisional Regulations on the Adjustment Tax on Wage 
of State-owned Enterprises” started to collect "adjustment tax on the 
wages of state-owned enterprises" 
Tax on Bonus of 
Collective Enterprises 
1985: “The Provisional Regulations on the Tax on Bonus of collective 
Enterprises” started to collect "tax on bonus of collective 
enterprises" 
Tax on Bonus of Public 
Institutions 
1985: “The Provisional Regulations on the Tax on Bonus of public 
institutions” started to collect tax on bonus of public institutions! 
Farmland Occupation 
Tax 
1987: "Interim Regulation of the People's Republic of China on 
Farmland Occupation Tax" started to collect "farmland occupation 
tax" 
Banquet tax 1988: “Provisional Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Banquet tax” started to collect "banquet tax" 
Special Tax on 
Industrial fuel 
1982: “Circular of the State Council Concerning the Pilot Provisions 
of Collecting Special Tax on Industrial fuel” 
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Special Consumption 
Tax 
1987: “Notice on Issues Concerning Collecting Special Consumption 
Tax from Colour Television”; 1987, “Provisions on Issues Concerning 
the Collection of Special Consumption Tax from Saloon Car” started 
to collect special consumption tax on Televisions and saloon cars. 
Agriculture Tax 
1978: “Report of the Ministry of Finance on Reducing the Tax 
Burden in the Rural Areas” 
1979: “Opinions on Strengthening the Administration of Fiscal 
Affairs of the Agricultural Sector”, further reducing the tax burden in 
less developed areas 
1983: “Notice on Ceasing the Implementation of Threshold 
Measurement of the Agriculture Tax”; 1983, “Several Provisions of 
the State Council on Collecting Agriculture Tax from Agricultural and 
Forestry Specialties’ Income” 
Transaction Tax on 
Livestock 
1983: “Provisional Regulations of the Transaction Tax on Livestock” 
issued in 1982, started to collect from 1983. 
Animal Husbandry Tax 
1978: “Report of the Ministry of Finance on Reducing the Tax 
Burden in the Rural Areas” 
1979: “Opinions on Strengthening the Administration of Fiscal 
Affairs of the Agricultural Sector”, further reducing the tax burden in 
less developed areas 
Custom duties 
1980: “Decision of the State Council on Reforming the Customs 
Administrative System”; reform of the custom system and 
adjustment of the tariff 
1982: “The General Customs Administration’s notice on starting to 
levy Export Customs Duties”, further reforming the custom system 
and adjustment in the tariff. Introduced export customs duties 
1987: “Customs Law of the People’s Republic of China”; “Regulations 
on Import and Export Duties of the People’s Republic of China” 
Contracts tax Continued from the past 
Slaughter tax Continued from the past 
Bazaar transaction tax Continued from the past 
Tonnage dues Continued from the past 
Source: Adapted from The Law and Regulations Database (2015), lawinfochina.com. 
 
There is no doubt that the 1978 to 1993 period is extremely important in 
China’s economic history. Not only the rapid economic growth, but also the 
opening-up policy, is still the most fundamental and influential element in the 
economy even today (Sedki, Chao, & Chen, 2014). It was during the opening-
up period that the fiscal revenue system changed from a SOE profit based to 
a taxation based revenue system. The role of taxation in the economy has 
been largely developed and improved. The successful transformation from the 
enterprise profit based fiscal revenue system to the taxation based fiscal 
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revenue system had paved the way for the future tax reforms (Liu, 2000; Gao, 
2008).  
 
3.5 Stage four: 1994 tax reforms and the establishment of the tax 
sharing system 
On 25th December 1993, the State Council issued the “Circular of the State 
Council on the Approval and Transmission of the Application Program for 
Industrial and Commercial Tax System Reform of State Administration of 
Taxation”. This regulatory document points out the major problems and 
imperfections of the then industrial and commercial tax system. The problems 
include the unbalanced tax burden between enterprises, non-uniform 
distributive relations between the State and enterprises, problems in 
demarcation in jurisdiction between the central and local authorities in tax 
revenue and administration, rather weak adjustment and control of taxation in 
the prevalent economic environment, contradictions due to the two different 
sets of tax system to enterprises with domestic or foreign investment, relaxed 
regulations on tax administration and collection, and an incomplete taxation 
legal system.  
 
Among all negative issues, the central government was mostly concerned 
about the decline of both ratios of budgetary revenue as a share of GDP, and 
the budgetary revenue of central government as a share in the total national 
budgetary revenue. This fact was well acknowledged as the term of “the 
decline of the two ratios” (Wong & Bird, 2008). 
 
In 1978, the total percentage share of the budgetary revenue in GDP 
accounted for 31%. However, this figure dropped to 22% in 1985, and 11% in 
1994 (M.O.F., 2000). In the meantime, the percentage share of the central 
government budgetary revenue in the total national budgetary revenue also 
experienced a dramatic decline since the mid-1980s. The central government 
budgetary revenue accounted for 15% of the total national budgetary revenue 
in 1978; since then, the figure grew steadily to 40% in 1984. However, after 
the total reform of the industrial and commercial taxes, this figure fell 
subsequently to 22% in 1993 (M.O.F., 2000). Given the fact that the fiscal 
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revenue plays a key role in the government functions in the market-oriented 
economy, and especially the revenue of the central government in China, 
which is a one-party government country, the decline of the central 
government revenue brings thereat to the political stability and political power 
of the central government (Wong & Bird, 2008).  
 
Against the background of the great achievement of economic development 
and the need to fit the newer economic environment, as well as facing the 
serious problem of the decline of the two ratios, Chinese authorities launched 
another major tax reform starting in the early 1990s. These reforms aimed to 
increase the budgetary revenue by adopting various tax reforms, and 
strengthen the central government revenue through the rebuilding of central-
local revenue relationships (Lin, 2009).  
 
3.5.1  Income tax reform 
3.5.1.1 Enterprise income tax reform 
The major reform in the enterprise income tax was the unification of 
enterprises with domestic investment. Income tax on enterprises with 
domestic or foreign investment was to be unified in the next step.  
 
On 13th of December 1993, the State Council issued the administrative 
regulation named the “Provisional Regulations of the People’s Republic of 
China on Enterprise Income Tax”; since then, the new unified income tax on 
enterprises with domestic investment was introduced. According to the 
regulation, the taxpayers are all enterprises within the PRC, other than foreign 
investment enterprises and foreign enterprises, including state-owned 
enterprises, collective enterprises, private enterprises, joint venture 
enterprises, joint stock enterprises, and any other types of organizations 
gaining income from production and business. Since then, all domestic 
investment enterprises’ tax, the income tax on state-owned enterprises, 
income tax on collective enterprises, income tax on private enterprises and 
the adjustment tax on state-owned enterprises, were all unified into a single 
enterprise income tax according to the new regulations. 
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3.5.1.2 Individual income tax reform 
On 31st October 1993, the “Decision of the Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress on Amending the Individual Income Tax Law of 
the People’s Republic of China” was issued by the Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress. The new individual income tax law was to enter 
into force from 1st January 1994. 
 
The new amended individual income tax law indicates that taxpayers are 
individuals who have resided in the country for one year or more, with or 
without domiciles in the PRC, and gain income within or outside China; 
individuals who have no domiciles and do not reside in China, or who have no 
domiciles but have resided in China for less than one year, shall pay the 
individual income tax on gains within China (M.O.F. 2000). Compared to the 
previous individual income tax adopted in 1980, the taxable income categories 
had increased from 6 to 11, and some changes on the tax rates were also 
made to cover a wider tax base (Liu, 2000). 
 
3.5.2 Turnover tax reform 
To address the problem of the decline of the budgetary revenue in the GDP, it 
was a rational choice to focus on the turnover tax reform. Since the Li Gai 
Shui reform from the early 1980s until 1993, the turnover taxes played a key 
role in the tax revenue system. Three iconic turnover taxes in China during the 
1978 to 1993, are product tax, value-added tax, and business tax. In 1993, 
these three represented nearly 70% of the total tax revenue (M.O.F., 2000). 
 
Therefore, the second major tax reform took place in the turnover tax 
category, and mainly focused on three important taxes: Value-added tax, 
consumption tax, business tax.  
 
3.5.2.1 The merging of value-added tax and product tax 
On 13th December 1993, the “Provisional Regulations of the People’s 
Republic of China on Value-added Tax” was issued. A flat tax rate of 17% was 
applied to the taxpayers and a flat rate of 13% was applied to taxpayers who 
were selling or importing particular goods that were listed in the regulation. 
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Hence, the old value added tax and the product tax were merged into a single 
value added tax (M.O.F., 2000). 
 
3.5.2.2 The extension of consumption tax 
When the consumption tax was introduced in 1980s, it was listed in one of the 
“special tax” categories, and it was only applied to colour televisions and 
saloon cars. The new consumption tax law was introduced in the “Provisional 
Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Consumption Tax”, which 
increased the taxable consumer goods to 11 categories, including tobacco, 
alcoholic drinks and alcohol, cosmetics, skin-care and hair-care products, 
precious jewellery precious jade and stones, firecrackers and fireworks, 
gasoline, diesel oil, motor vehicle tyres, motorcycles and motor cars. Tax 
rates are from to 3% to 35% according to different goods listed in the 
regulation (M.O.F., 2000).  
 
3.5.2.3 The improved business tax 
The new business tax regulation was introduced in the “Provisional 
Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Business Tax”; tax payers 
are all units and individuals engaged in the provision of services listed in the 
regulation. There are nine taxable categories, namely, transportation and 
communication, construction, finance and insurance, post and 
telecommunications, culture and sports, entertainment, servicing, transfer in 
intangible, and sales of immovable. The tax rate is a flat rate from 3% to 5%, 
except for entertainment, which is from 5% to 20% (M.O.F., 2000).  
 
3.5.2.4 The introduction of land value-added taxes 
During the 1994 tax reform, a new tax, land value-added tax, was introduced 
in the “Provisional Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Land 
Value-added taxes” issued by the State Council. The taxpayers are all units 
and individuals who gain income from the transference of use rights of State-
owned land and property rights of buildings and attached installations therein. 
The tax rate is a four-level progressive rate from 30% to 60 (M.O.F., 2000).  
 
95 
 
3.5.3 Other tax adjustments 
Other than the major reforms regarding taxes that contributed to the majority 
share in the total tax revenue, adjustments and amendments were also 
applied on other small taxes.  
 
The resource tax was introduced in the “Regulations of the People’s Republic 
of China on Resource Tax (draft)” issued in 1984, and the taxpayers were all 
units and individuals engaged in the exploitation of natural resources listed in 
the regulation. This tax was further reformed and amended in 1994. On 25th 
December 1993, the State council had issued the “Provisional Regulations of 
the People’s Republic of China on Resource Tax”. The new regulation 
increased the taxable natural resource item number from 5 to 7, including 
crude oil, natural gas, coal, other non-metal ores, ferrous metal ores, 
nonferrous metal ores, and also salt. Since then, the resource tax and the salt 
tax has merged into a single resource tax.  
 
The “Notice of the State Council on Matters Concerning to Abolish Bazaar 
Transaction tax, transaction tax on livestock, the special tax on industrial fuel, 
tax on the bonus of enterprises and adjustment tax on wages, and Delegate 
the authority of Administration of Slaughter Tax and Banquets Tax to local 
Governments” was issued on 23rd January 1994 by the State Council. 
According to the notice, all taxes mentioned above, except slaughter tax and 
banquet tax, were all abolished on 1st January 1994.  
 
On 29th December 1993, the “Decision on the Use of Interim Regulation 
Concerning Value-added taxes, Consumption Taxes and Business Taxes on 
Foreign-funded Enterprises and Foreign Enterprises” was issued, and came 
into force on 1st January 1994. According to the decision, the consolidated 
industrial and commercial tax, which was only levied on Foreign-funded 
enterprises (FFEs) and foreign enterprises, was abolished. Instead, the FFEs 
and foreign enterprises became subjected to value-added tax, consumption 
tax and business tax. A more detailed and standardized document was issued  
the following year: the “Circular on Questions Related to Provisional 
Regulations Concerning Taxations Including Value-added Tax, Consumption 
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Tax and Business Tax Applicable to Enterprises with Foreign Investment and 
Foreign Enterprises”, which was issued by the State Council on 22nd 
February 1994. According to this document, the FFEs and foreign enterprises 
are subject to a total of 11 taxes, including value-added tax, consumption tax, 
business tax, income tax on enterprises with foreign investment and foreign 
enterprises, land value-added tax, resources tax, stamp tax, slaughter tax, 
urban real estate tax, vehicle and vessel license plate tax, and contract tax.  
 
3.5.4 The tax sharing system in 1994 
Decentralization is the process of the assignment of fiscal, political, and 
administrative responsibilities to lower levels of government in a variety of 
forms and dimensions (Litvack, Ahmad, & Bird, 1998, p. 4). Fiscal 
decentralization is an important process in many reforms of former socialist 
countries, especially in the case of China, which made a great effort to break 
down the previous highly centralized fiscal system to establish a more 
decentralized fiscal system to suit the needs of the market economy (Shen et 
al., 2014).  
 
The most important component in the fiscal decentralization process, from the 
aspect of revenue system reforms, is the division and restructuring of tax 
revenues. The tax revenue decentralization process in China began in the 
1980s. On 5th September 1981, the State Council issued the “Suggestions 
Regarding the Reform of Industrial and Commercial Tax”, and in the 
“suggestions” the initial concept of a tax revenue sharing system; hence, 
many revenue sharing system reforms were applied (Shen et al., 2014).  
 
Before 1994, the tax revenue sharing scheme between central and local 
governments was mainly based on case-by-case negotiations. Local 
governments started to share some parts of the tax revenues, and acquired 
more powers for financing their needs (Zuo, 2008; Huang, Lo, & She, 2012).  
 
Even though many sharing schemes were tried, the uneven balance in the 
distribution of revenue percentage, an improper tax sharing structure, and the 
rather complex application of the negotiated contract method of tax sharing 
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between central and local government led the fiscal performance of China to a 
situation of waning fiscal position of the overall government, rather weak 
macroeconomic adjustment power as well as the problem of the “two 
declines”5. (Zuo, 2008; Shen et al., 2014). Against this background and to 
deal with the problem of the “two declines”, the fundamental fiscal reform, 
named the Tax Sharing System (TSS), was introduced in 1994.  
 
On 15th December 1993, the State Council issued the “decision on the 
implementation of the tax sharing system in the fiscal administration system”; 
hence, a detailed and standardized rule of sharing the tax revenue between 
central and local government was formally introduced.  
 
After the decision, the tax administrations were divided into national tax 
services and local tax services. Tax revenues were also divided into three 
parts with clear formula: central taxes, local taxes, and central-local shared 
taxes (Chou, 2009). Central taxes are classified as taxes that are essential for 
maintaining national objectives; local taxes are those taxes that are more 
suitable to be managed and collected by local governments; taxes that could 
be interpreted as more relevant to economic development were classified as 
central-local shared taxes (Shen et al., 2014). 
 
According to the “decision”, the detailed division of taxes are listed in the table 
3-3. 
 
Table 3-3: The classification of central, local, and central-local shared taxes according to the 
tax sharing system 
Central 
government 
taxes 
Customs duty 
Import related VAT and consumption tax 
Consumption tax 
Enterprise income tax from central government owned enterprises 
Enterprise income tax from local banks, foreign banks and other financial 
institutions 
Business tax, enterprise income tax, profits and city maintenance and 
construction tax from railroads, bank and insurance company headquarters 
Profits from central government-owned enterprises. 
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Local 
government 
taxes 
Business tax excluding the central tax share 
Enterprise income tax from local enterprises excluding the central tax share 
City maintenance and construction tax excluding the central tax share 
Local enterprise profit 
Individual income tax 
Cities and towns land usage tax 
Orientation regulation tax on fixed assets investment 
Real estate tax 
Urban real estate tax 
Vehicle and vessel usage tax 
Vehicle and vessel usage tax license plate tax 
Stamp tax 
Slaughter tax 
Agriculture tax 
Animal husbandry tax 
Farmland occupation tax 
Contracts tax 
Land value-added tax 
Central-
local 
government 
shared 
taxes 
Value added tax excluding central tax share (central 75% - local 25%) 
Resource tax (resource tax from marine oil exploitation belongs to the central 
government, all the rest belongs to the local government) 
Stamp tax from stock transactions (central 50% - local 50%) 
Source: the State Council (1993) decision on the implementation of the tax sharing system in the 
fiscal administration system. 
 
Since then, a complete tax sharing system was established, and this financial 
structure between central and local governments has become the 
fundamental tax revenue system in China today (Sun & Zhou, 2013). 
 
3.5.5 Summary of the 1994 tax reform 
By the end of 1994, the Chinese tax reform was almost completed. After the 
reform, there were a total of 23 taxes, which are: income tax on enterprises 
with foreign investment and foreign enterprises, individual income tax, 
enterprise income tax, resource tax, value added tax, business tax, 
consumption tax, city maintenance and construction tax, urban real estate tax, 
real estate tax, cities and towns land usage tax, vehicle and vessel license 
plate tax, vehicle and vessel usage tax, stamp tax, orientation regulation tax 
on fixed assets investment, farmland occupation tax, land value-added tax, 
banquet tax, contract tax, slaughter tax, agriculture tax, animal husbandry tax, 
customs duties, and tonnage dues (Liu, 2008). 
 
The 1994 tax reforms, especially the establishment of the tax sharing system, 
has been a great influence on the China taxation system even until now 
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(Xiulin & Feizhou, 2013). The enterprises and individual income taxes were 
unified, the tax bases of the turnover taxes were extended to capture even 
more revenues, and other specific excise taxes were also further adjusted 
(Ahmad, Gao & Tanzi, 1995). Among the various reforms, the most influential 
one was the establishment of the tax sharing system. Since the tax sharing 
system, government tax revenues have been divided into central, local, and 
central-local shared taxes according to their function-based roles. (Litvack et 
al., 1998; Liu, 2000, 2008) 
 
Some major reforms and related laws and regulations on taxes in 1994 are 
listed in the table 3-4.  
 
Table 3-4: Major tax reforms and related laws and regulations in 1994 
Taxes Laws and regulations  Actions  
Bazaar transaction tax 
“Notice of the State Council on matters concerning  
the abolition of bazaar transaction tax, transaction 
tax on livestock, special tax on burning oil, tax on 
bonus of enterprises and adjustment tax on wages, 
and delegate the authority of administration of 
slaughter tax and banquet tax to local 
governments”  
abolished 
Transaction tax on 
livestock 
Special tax on burning 
oil 
Tax on bonus of state-
owned enterprises 
Tax on bonus of 
collective enterprises 
Tax on bonus of public 
institutions 
Adjustment tax on 
wages of state-owned 
enterprises 
Consolidated industrial 
and commercial tax 
“Decision on the Use of Interim Regulation 
Concerning Value-added taxes, Consumption 
Taxes and Business Taxes on Foreign-funded 
Enterprises and Foreign Enterprises” 
Value added tax 
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Product tax 
“Provisional Regulations of the People’s Republic 
of China on Value-added Tax” (1993) 
Merged 
into value 
added tax 
Individual income tax 
“Decision of the Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress on Amending the 
Individual Income Tax Law of the People’s 
Republic of China” (1993) 
Merged 
into 
individual 
income tax 
Individual income 
adjustment tax 
Income tax on 
individual unit of 
industry and commerce 
in cities 
Income tax on state-
owned enterprises 
“Provisional Regulations of the People’s Republic 
of China on Enterprises Income Tax” (1993) 
Merged 
into 
enterprise 
income tax 
Income tax on 
collective enterprises 
Private enterprise 
income tax 
Adjustment tax on 
state-owned 
enterprises 
Resource tax 
“Provisional Regulations of the People’s Republic 
of China on Resource Tax” (1993) 
Merged 
into 
resource 
tax 
Salt tax 
Land value-added tax 
“Provisional Regulations of the People’s Republic 
of China on Land Value-added Taxes” (1994) 
New tax 
introduced: 
Land value-
added tax 
  Source: Adapted from The Law and Regulations Database (2015), lawinfochina.com. 
 
 
3.6 Stage five: The simplification process of the China tax system after 
1994 
The 1994 tax reform shaped the main tax structure that has lasted until the 
present day. Since 1994, the main taxation system has not changed in its 
basic scale, but further adjustments and simplifications were made after 1994. 
Further tax reforms between 1995 and present day are listed in the table 3-5 
below. 
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Table 3-5: Major tax reforms and related laws and regulations after 1995 
Taxes Laws and regulations Actions 
Vehicle Purchase 
tax 
“Interim Regulation of the People’s 
Republic of China on Vehicle Purchase 
Taxes” (2000) 
Newly introduced 
Agriculture 
specialty related 
taxes 
“Notice of the Ministry of Finance and 
State Administration of Taxation on 
Abolishing Agriculture Specialty Tax 
Issues Excluding Tobacco Leaf” (2004) 
The agriculture specialty tax was 
only collected on tobacco leaves 
Agriculture tax “the Decision of the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s 
Congress on Abolishing the Regulation 
of the People’s Republic of China on 
Agriculture Tax” (2005) 
Abolished Animal 
husbandry tax 
Agriculture tax 
on agricultural 
and forestry 
specialties 
“Order No. 459 [2006] of the State 
Council—Abolishing the Provisions of 
the State Council Concerning 
Imposition of Agricultural Tax on 
Agricultural Specialty Income and the 
Provisional Regulations on Animal 
Slaughter Tax” (2006) 
All agriculture related taxes 
were abolished except on 
tobacco leaves 
Slaughter tax 
Tobacco leaf tax 
“Notice of the Ministry of Finance and 
State Administration of Taxation on 
Abolishing Agriculture Specialty Tax 
Issues Excluding Tobacco Leaf” (2004) 
Left from the abolishment 
agriculture related taxes, and 
formally named as the “tobacco 
leaf tax” “Interim Regulation of the People’s Republic of China on Tobacco Leaf 
Tax” (2006) 
Enterprise 
income tax 
“Enterprise Income tax Law of the 
People’s Republic of China” (2007) 
Unified the enterprise income 
tax on both enterprises with 
domestic investment and 
enterprises with foreign 
investment. The income tax on 
enterprises with foreign 
investment and foreign 
enterprises, and the enterprise 
income tax has merged into a 
single unified enterprise income 
tax 
House property 
tax 
“Order No. 546 of the State Council of 
the People’s Republic of China on 
abolishing the Interim Regulation on 
Urban Real Estate Tax” (2009) 
Merged the real estate tax and 
the urban real estate tax. 
Banquet tax 
“Decision of the State Council on 
Abolishing Some Administrative 
Regulations” (2008) 
Abolished 
Vessel tonnage 
tax 
“Interim Regulation of the People’s 
Republic of China on Vessel Tonnage 
Tax” (2011) 
Replaced the old tonnage due 
regulations issued in 1952 with 
more formalized and 
standardized regulations, also 
higher tax rates. 
Orientation 
regulation tax on 
fixed assets 
investment 
“Decision of the State Council on 
Amending and Repealing Some 
Administrative Regulations” (2013) 
Abolished 
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3.6.1 Summary of the post 1994 tax adjustments 
Until 2014, the current Chinese tax system was complete with 18 taxes by 
2013. According to the State Administration of Taxation of The People’s 
Republic of China, China now has 18 tax categories: (1) Value Added Tax, (2) 
Consumption Tax, (3) Business Tax, (4) Enterprise Income Tax, (5) Individual 
Income Tax, (6) Resource Tax, (7) Urban and Township Land Use Tax, (8) 
House Property Tax, (9) City Maintenance and Construction Tax, (10) Tax on 
the Use of Arable Land, (11) Land Appreciation Tax, (12) Vehicle Purchase 
Tax, (13) Vehicle and Vessel Tax, (14) Stamp Tax, (15) Deed Tax, (16) 
Tobacco Leaf Tax, (17) Customs Duty, and (18) Tonnage Dues. The first 16 
tax categories are collected by tax authorities. Customs duty, Tonnage Dues, 
along with the import VAT and import consumption tax are collected by 
customs (M.O.F., 2014).   
 
The post 1994 tax reforms were mostly adjustments and amendments to the 
taxation details; the basic structure has not changed until today. The turnover 
taxes continue to  play a dominant role in the taxation revenue system, and 
the tax sharing system is still the fundamental structure between the central 
and local tax revenue relationship (Shen et al., 2012; Shen et al., 2014).  
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4 Chapter four: China’s central and local fiscal revenue performance and 
its main characteristics 
4.1 Introduction  
The market-oriented economic system reform, which was launched in the late 
1970s, was a milestone in  China’s economic development (Brean, 2013). 
Accompanied by  fast paced GDP growth, China’s central and local fiscal 
revenue performance  also experienced many changes; in particular the 
establishment of the Tax Sharing System in 1994, which reshaped the 
revenue relationship between the central and local governments (Chou, 2009; 
Sun & Zhou, 2013).  
 
In this Chapter, the main purpose is to evaluate the main characteristics of 
China’s fiscal revenue and its performance, especially the relationship 
between central and local governments. A detailed fiscal revenue 
classification in China is discussed in section 4.2, particularly focused on the 
concepts and the scale of tax revenue, non-tax revenue, non-tax sourced 
revenue, budgetary revenue, off-budgetary revenue and extra-budgetary 
revenue. The development of the central transfer system from central 
government to local governments are presented in Section 4.3 due to the fact 
that the government transfer system is a key component in the country’s fiscal 
system, and also a key link between the central and local government 
revenues. Section 4.4 provides a brief outline of the budgetary revenue 
performance and its main characteristics before the market oriented reforms. 
Section 4.5 is mainly focused on the decline of the two ratios during the period 
between 1978 and 1993. The two ratios stand for the ratio of total budgetary 
revenue to the GDP, and the ratio of central government budgetary revenue to 
the total government budgetary revenue. In section 4.6, the budgetary 
revenue performance after the establishment of the tax sharing system in 
1994 is discussed.  Section 4.7 is focused on the non-tax sourced revenue 
performance and characteristics in China. Both the extra-budgetary revenue 
and off-budgetary revenue are discussed at both central and local government 
levels. Finally, a summary of this chapter is presented in section 4.8.  
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4.2 China’s fiscal revenue categories 
According to the Government Finance Statistics Manual (GFSM) published by 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), by the classification of the source of 
revenue, the fiscal revenue is mainly composed of two main sources, namely, 
the tax revenue, with revenues from tax collections, and non-tax revenues 
such as grants, property income, sale of goods and services, and social 
contributions (IMF, 2001, pp. 47-48). 
 
However, in China, the term  “non-tax revenue” had never been clearly 
defined in terms of its concepts and measurements until the early 21st century 
(Gao, 2010). Before the official definition of “non-tax revenue”, the definition 
and calculation of non-tax sourced revenues were rather blurry in official 
statistical documents. This is due to the reality that in the statistical yearbook, 
instead of using the term of tax revenue and non-tax revenue, fiscal revenue 
in China’s official documents was more often represented by budgetary 
revenue and extra-budgetary revenue before 2010.  
 
Thus, when studying the Chinese fiscal revenue performance, distinguishing 
between the budgetary revenue and the extra-budgetary revenue is the 
essential early step.  
 
It is clear that by the classification of the revenue sources, government 
revenue can be divided into tax revenue and non-tax revenue parts (IMF, 
2001). However, in contrast, according to the different style and level of 
administrations in China, government revenues can also be classified into 
budgetary revenues and extra-budgetary revenues, where budgetary 
revenues are government organs, agencies, institutions and social group 
organizations (in general terms: public units), lawfully gained revenues that 
are under the national budgetary management, whereas extra-budgetary 
revenues are defined as the lawfully gained revenues that are collected and 
managed by individual public units (The State Council, 1996).  
 
The definition of budgetary revenue and extra budgetary revenue reveals that 
the main difference between the budgetary revenue and the extra-budgetary 
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revenue is their level of administration. The budgetary revenue is the fiscal 
revenue that is under the central budgetary administration and management, 
whereas the authority for collecting, spending and re-allocating extra 
budgetary revenue remain in the individual units that receive extra budgetary 
revenue (Tong et al., 2013). The extra budgetary revenues include, for 
example, various fees and fines, revenue from public service institutions, 
villages and towns self-raised funds or pooled funds  (Lin, 2000). Tax 
revenue, therefore, is classified as a component of budgetary revenue, 
because taxes, including central, local and central-local shared taxes, are all 
pre-settled by the central government and under strict budgetary 
administration.  
 
Hence, it is clear that there are four components in the Chinese fiscal system, 
namely, the tax revenue and non-tax revenue according to their sources; 
budgetary revenue and non-budgetary revenue according to their 
administration style and level. However, the scale of these four revenues is 
not clearly separate from each other, especially the concepts and scale 
between the non-tax revenue and extra-budgetary revenue.  
 
Due to the uniqueness of the extra-budgetary revenue in China’s fiscal 
system, the definition of non-tax revenue could be a little confusing. As a 
broad definition, the non-tax revenue is all government lawful revenue from 
sources other than taxes (IMF, 2001). In the case of China, there are two 
types of IMF defined non-tax revenue: budgetary non-tax revenue, which is 
the non-tax sourced revenue under budgetary managed, often called off 
budgetary revenue; and non-budgetary non-tax revenue, which is outside the 
budgetary management, namely the extra budgetary revenue. In other words, 
the extra budgetary revenue is equivalent to the non-budgetary non-tax 
revenue. 
 
In reality, the term of “non-tax revenue” appeared in the official documents 
without a clear definition and it was not until early 21st century that the 
definition and scope were finally given by the Ministry of Finance (M.O.F., 
2002, 2004). 
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According to the official document, the non-tax revenue is the non-tax 
sourced, lawfully gained fiscal funds by central, local governments, 
government institutions, institutional organizations, government agencies and 
other public organizations, for the purpose of satisfying quasi or general public 
needs (M.O.F., 2002, 2004). The scope of non-tax revenue includes all the 
off-budgetary revenue. However, it does not include some of the extra-
budgetary revenue, such as the social security fund and legal reserves of 
housing acquisition (M.O.F., 2002, 2004).  
 
Figure 4-1 shows the fiscal revenue decomposed by the different categories 
according to their revenue sources, and different administration styles and 
levels. 
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Figure 4-1: Structure of China’s fiscal revenues 
 
The lack of clear definition in the early years and the complex structure of the 
non-tax revenue have resulted in an understanding where non-tax revenue in 
different studies indicates different meanings. Hence, in this study, all 
government fiscal revenue apart from taxes is defined as the non-tax sourced 
revenue. Revenue from taxes is defined as the tax revenue. The portion of 
non-tax sourced revenue under the central budget control and administration 
is classified as the off-budgetary revenue. Other non-tax sourced revenue 
outside the central budget control and administration are defined as the extra-
budgetary revenue. The budgetary non-tax revenue and the off-budgetary 
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revenue are interchangeable in the following sections. Figure 4-2 is the re-
classified fiscal revenue categories for the convenience of this study.  
 
Figure 4-2: Re-categorized fiscal revenue structure 
 
 
4.3 The transfer system from central to local governments 
It is widely acknowledged that the government transfer system is a key 
component in the country’s fiscal system and has an important impact on the 
central-local government fiscal relationship. In order to better understand the 
central and local fiscal revenue relationship, the development of the central 
transfer system in China is examined in this section.  
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Central government’s macroscopic readjustment and control is highly reliant 
on the central transfer system, and the transfer system is essential in terms of 
balancing fiscal power between local governments, resource redistribution, 
narrowing inequality, as well as for the purpose of the long lasting political 
stability of the country (Bergvall, Charbit, Kraan, & Merk, 2006; Boadway & 
Shah, 2007; Egger, Koethenbuerger, & Smart, 2010; Ma, 1995; Oates, 1999).  
 
The transfer system in China has experienced numerous reforms and 
adjustments in the last thirty years. According to the different characteristics, 
the intergovernmental transfers can be classified into three categories: 
general transfer, special transfer, and tax rebates (Jin, 2007). 
 
The main purpose of the central transfer payments is to relieve financial stress 
and to balance the fiscal disparities of local governments, whereas the 
purpose of special transfer payments is to serve the central political agenda 
and to rectify local expenditure preference (Dong, 2013). The tax rebates 
however, were newly introduced after the tax sharing system. The main 
purpose of the tax rebates was to maintain the incentives of relatively better 
developed areas.  
 
4.3.1 The transfer system before the tax sharing system (pre 1994) 
Before the 1878 open door reform, the central transfer system from central to 
local governments was simple and direct. The fiscal principle in the pre-reform 
period was Tongshou Tongzhi, which means “uniform collection and uniform 
spending”. Under this driving principle, all local revenues and expenditures 
were budgeted by the central government, and the central transfer was simple 
and straight, and quite efficient under the planned economy.  
 
However, this kind of transfer system sacrificed entirely the local incentives of 
raising fiscal revenues because the fiscal revenue was handed totally to the 
central government and any budget deficit was automatically filled by the 
central transfer (Lin, 2009; Shen, 2011; Wong, 2000).  
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After the open door reform in the late 1970s, China’s economy was 
experiencing tremendous changes; the mechanism of the planned economy 
broke down, along with a huge fiscal system reform. During the reform period, 
the main purpose of the central transfer was still, as it was before, filling the 
fiscal gaps, with some other mixed adjustment functions under the newly 
introduced contract responsibility system between central and local 
governments (Shen, 2011).    
 
Under the newly introduced contract responsibility system, there were mainly 
six different types of intergovernmental transfers according to its functions and 
calculation method. These were the income share transfer, fixed amount 
grants, fixed amount submit, and special founding introduced in 1980, the 
fixed ratio submit introduced in 1985, and the progressive increase rates 
submit which was introduced in 1988 (Jin, 2007). 
 
The Table below 4-1 displays the main characteristics of six main transfers.  
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Table 4-1: Types of intergovernmental transfers between 1980 and 1993 
 
 
Types of intergovernmental transfers between 1980 and 1993 
Income 
share 
transfer 
Fixed 
amount 
grants 
Fixed 
amount 
submit 
Special 
funding 
(1980 – 1993) General transfers from central to 
local, amount was based on the revenue sharing 
method/ratio between central and local. Ratio was 
vary in different provinces and in different years. 
(1980-1993) General transfers from central to local, 
unconditional central transfer for the purpose of 
balancing fiscal of particular among local 
governments.  
 (1980 – 1993) General transfers from relatively 
richer local governments to the central government, a 
specific amount of revenue is required to submit to 
the central government.  
(1980 – 1993) Special transfers from central to local, 
unconditional central transfer for the purpose of 
financing fiscal deficient/special difficulties of 
particular local governments 
Fixed ratio 
submit 
(1985 – 1993) General transfers from relatively 
richer local governments to the central government, a 
specific ratio of revenue is required to submit to the 
central government.  
Progressive 
increase 
rates submit 
 (1988 – 1993) General transfers from relatively 
richer local governments to the central government, a 
specific amount of revenue, which calculated based 
in the revenue increase rate in vary years, was 
required to submit to the central government. 
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4.3.2 The transfer system after the tax sharing system (1994 – present)  
During the 1994 reform, on the basis of the restructured revenue system, the 
transfer system between central and local governments was also reformed in 
terms of the amount and form. It was after the tax sharing reform, the 
intergovernmental transfers were turned into a formula-based system. In order 
to avoid huge shocks to the transfer system, the central government decided 
to maintain the majority of the general transfer methods and process the 
reform step by step (M.O.F., 2000).  
 
In order to structure a transfer system which matched the new tax sharing 
system, in 1995, the Ministry of Finance issued the “Interim implementation 
regarding the intergovernmental transfers”, which marked the first step of the 
general transfer reforms. Since then until 2011, the Ministry of Finance issued 
the same interim implementations each year with a more formulized and 
standardized transfer adjustments. During the reform period, there were 
mainly four types central transfer mechanisms, namely the tax rebates, fixed 
subsidies, special transfers, and equalization transfers (M.O.F., 2000) 
 
4.3.2.1 The introduction of tax rebates 
In order to smooth the impact of the tax sharing reforms to the local 
governments, and also  maintain the incentive of local governments, a new 
central transfer was introduced in 1994, namely the tax rebates. The basic 
concept of tax rebates is that the central government would return part of the 
tax revenue to the local governments. The tax rebates first involved VAT and 
consumption tax. Later in 2002, the personal income tax and enterprise 
income tax were also bought under the tax rebate program (M.O.F., 2000).  
 
It is worth commenting that the tax rebates are calculated according to the 
base year, which results in a relatively poorer adjustment power on the issue 
of fiscal disparities. Since the richer provinces have larger tax revenues 
compared to less developed provinces, a larger share of tax rebates are also 
retained in richer provinces. This has potentially created a problem: the rich 
provinces have more tax rebates, hence they have more fiscal power to 
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finance their development; whereas the poorer provinces, with a relatively 
small tax rebate base, receive a much smaller share of the tax rebate, thus, 
the tax rebates are working as a function of creating fiscal disparities 
(Martinez, Qian, Wang, & Zou, 2006; Wong, 2000). 
 
4.3.2.2 Fixed subsidies 
In order to replace the old annually negotiated transfer mechanism by a more 
formula based mechanism, the central government introduced the “fixed 
subsidies” transfer. The fixed subsidies replaced the majority of the old 
negotiated transfer methods. The number of transfers was calculated by a 
formula which set the base year as 1993. One of the important properties of 
this calculation is that local governments were guaranteed to receive a size of 
transfer which was not less than the level in 1993. However the purpose of 
this transfer was to reduce the remaining revenue held by local governments, 
and it was expected to be replaced by an equalization transfer by shrinking its 
size from time to time (Ahmad, Li, & Richardson; 2002; Ma & Norregaard, 
1998). 
 
4.3.2.3 Special transfers  
The special transfer was partly continued from the old transfer system, but 
increased the scale and extended into more details. A special transfer was a 
conditional transfer, which was directly financed and administered by the 
central government. Different from other transfers however, it was based on 
an ad hoc negotiated basis. This is due to the fact that a special transfer was 
delivered to different areas in various periods, to serve purposes as varied as 
disaster relief, environmental projects, price subsidies, education projects, for 
example, in specific regions or areas. Ad hoc negotiation was the practical 
choice for the special transfer (M.O.F., 2000).   
 
4.3.2.4 Equalization transfers 
The new equalization transfer was also partly continued from the old general 
transfer system, but categorised separately according to its equalization 
function. The main function of the equalization transfer is to balance the rapid 
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increase of local fiscal gaps and regional disparities. It is worth mentioning 
that the equalization transfer is the most formulized transfer in the early stage 
of the reforms. the variables in the calculation of local expenditure needs 
includes all kinds of objective factors such as the number of civil servants, 
regional wage disparities, population factors, and GDP; later in 1997, factors 
such as local fiscal capacities were also taken into the calculation (Ahmad et 
al., 2000; Ma & Norregaard, 1998; Wang, 2002). 
 
4.3.3 The development of central transfers 
Even though the official terms of general transfer have changed name a few 
times since 2002, the different names are only to indicate the political 
preferences of central government; the characteristics and nature of the 
general transfer has not changed, but categorized under different names 
according to their functions (Han, 2014). 
 
Under the new revenue sharing system, the number of central transfers has 
been increasing steadily. Figure 4-3 below is the percentage share of central 
transfers in the total central expenditure between 1990 and 2013.  
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Figure 4-3: Percentage of central transfers in the total central expenditures 1990 - 2013 
 
Data source: M.O.F. (1995-2015) 
 
It is clear that to see that before the 1994 tax sharing reform, the share of the 
total central transfer was maintained below 40%, however this figure had 
jumped to 58% in 1994. Until the present day, over 70% of total central 
government expenditure is taken by the central transfers.   
 
In contrast, from the local governments’ aspect, in 2011, for example, 44% of 
the total local fiscal revenue was dependent on the central transfer. 
Particularly in the western areas, the central transfers contributed over 60% of 
western governments’ total fiscal revenues (Dong, 2013). 
 
4.4   The budgetary revenue before 1978 
The major sources of government revenue during the pre-1978 period came 
from profits and taxes from State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), and the state 
required SOEs to hand in all their profits (Lin, 2009). The budgetary principle 
was called Tongshou Tongzhi, which means “uniform collection and uniform 
spending” (Lin, 2009). “Uniform collection” can be explained in the way that all 
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the profits are subjected to the central government; and “uniform spending” 
means that almost everything, even including the prices of the production, the 
total amount of the output and total number of sale, were all decided and 
budgeted by the central government (Yang, 2001; Shen et al., 2012). 
 
As the central government treated the revenue from SOEs as its main 
revenue, other budgetary revenue, mainly taxes, were regarded as something 
that mainly related to private economies (Xu & Cui, 2011). According to the 
National Bureau of Statistics of PRC (2014) and the China Financial Year 
Book: Compilation of 50 Years (1949-1999), in the year of 1978, the total tax 
revenue was only 45.86% of the total government revenue, whereas the total 
revenue from the SOEs accounted for 50.52% of the total public government 
revenue (N.B.S., 2014; M.O.F., 2000). 
 
It may be noted that within the budgetary revenue, the tax structure in the pre-
1978 period was very unbalanced. The industrial and commercial tax, which 
was mainly from the SOEs, was contributing on average over 80% to the total 
government tax revenues compared to other tax revenues between 1950 and 
1978 (Wang, 1984). 
 
The figure 4-4 is an illustration of the industrial and commercial tax revenues 
as percentage of total government tax revenue.  
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Figure 4-4: Industrial and commercial tax revenues as percentage of total government tax 
revenue: 1950 – 1978 
 
Data source: N.B.S. (2000)  
 
The Milestone in China’s economic development was the market-oriented 
economic reforms started in the late 1970s. After the launching of the reforms, 
the state had put more effort on changing the economic system from a 
planned economy to a market-oriented economic system (Jia & Zhao, 2008). 
The purpose of this reform was to improve production efficiency through 
economic decentralization, and the budgetary revenue reform was considered 
as the vital part in the new market-oriented economic reforms (Lin, 2000). 
 
4.5 The Decrease of two ratios between 1978 and 1993 
In December 1978, during the Third Plenary session of the eleventh central 
committee of the Chinese communist party, the authorities decided to adjust 
the policy focus of the nation from cultural and political revolution to economic 
and technological progress by setting the goal of “four modernizations”, 
making economic development as the top priority for the country (Yueh, 
2010). The aspects of the four modernizations are agriculture, industry, 
science and technology, and the military establishment (Mackerras, McMillen, 
& Watson, 2003, p. 95). Many “open door” policies were applied afterwards, 
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and the role of taxation was considered to be very important in achieving the 
“four modernizations” (Liu, 2000). 
 
Through 15 years of reform since 1978, China’s economy experienced rapid 
growth. The real GDP (base year = 1978) in 1978 was 365.02 billion yuan. 
Only eight years later in 1986, the real GDP reached 766.28 billion yuan, 
double the figure in 1978. By the end of 1994, the real GSP level in China had 
reached 1660.63 billion yuan, which was already over 4.5 times larger than 
the level in 1978 (N.B.S., 1978-2015).  
 
Accompanied with the remarkable economic growth, China’s tax revenues 
also experienced a great increase. The total tax income in 1978 was 51.93 
billion yuan, which contributed only 46% of the total budgetary revenue; 
whereas in 1993, this figure increased to 97% of the total budgetary revenue 
with the amount of 425.53 billion yuan; the importance of taxation had begun 
to attain top priority in the total fiscal revenue. (M.O.F., 2000) 
 
Even though China had achieved great economic success through the 
opening up policy and reforms, it was not without problems. Along with the 
great achievement, there were problems which existed that diminished the 
success of the rapid growth of GDP, especially regarding the central and local 
budgetary revenue performance. 
 
4.5.1 The decrease of budgetary revenue share in GDP 
Taking advantage of the open door policy between 1978 and 1993, China’s 
GDP had experienced rapid growth. The total budgetary revenue increased 
alongside the GDP, but at a much slower pace compared to the GDP. In 
1978, the total budgetary revenue was 113.23 billion yuan, the share of total 
budgetary revenue in the GDP was 31%, whereas this figure had dropped to 
22% in 1985, 16% in 1990 and 11% in 1994 (M.O.F., 2000). 
 
Figure 4-5 below shows the percentage of budgetary revenue in GDP 
changes over the period of 1978 to 1994. 
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Figure 4-5: The total public budgetary revenue share in GDP: 1978 – 1994 
 
Data source: N.B.S. (2000) China financial yearbook, compilation of 50 years: 1949-1999. 
 
 
As noted earlier at the beginning of this section, the share of tax revenue in 
the total budgetary revenue had increased from 46% in 1978 to 97% in 1993. 
However, due to the poor performance of the budgetary revenue share in 
GDP, tax revenue was in fact decreasing as a percentage share of GDP 
during the period 1978 to 1994. The ratio of tax revenue and the GDP in 1978 
was 14%; during the first six years after the open door policy, it remained at 
13%. In 1985, caused by the first and second steps of “Li Gai Shui”, which led 
to a huge amount of SOEs’ profits becoming industrial and commercial related 
taxes, the ratio of tax revenue and the GDP jumped to 23%; however, since 
1986, this figure has experienced a sharp and steady downward trend. In 
1993, the tax revenue only accounted for 12% of the GDP, which was even 
lower than the figure in 1978 (M.O.F., 2000). 
 
4.5.2 The decrease of Central government budgetary revenue among 
the total government budgetary revenue 
With the downward trend in the budgetary revenue share in the GDP, the 
share of the central government budgetary revenue in China’s total fiscal 
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revenue has also declined since the mid-1980s. The shifting of the budgetary 
revenue share between central and local governments can be explained by 
various fiscal responsibility systems that were introduced during the period 
between early 1980 and 1994. 
 
During the period of 1980 and 1994, in order to boost the incentive of local 
government to collect revenues, the process of fiscal administrative 
decentralization was initialized by the introduction of a series of uniform-
sharing formulae, named “the Contract Responsibility system” (Ahmad et al., 
2002; Shiyi & Jun, 2009). According to the contract responsibility system, the 
fiscal revenue was divided into three main parts, namely central-fixed 
revenues, local-fixed revenues, and shared revenues. The sharing rules were 
determined and settled by the central government (Wang et al., 2009). 
 
During the period of 1980 to 1984, under the newly introduced uniform sharing 
system, a large fiscal disparity was created due to the fact that the uniform 
sharing system had boosted the surpluses in the wealthy provinces, and led to 
the poor provinces suffering more heavily from fiscal deficits (Shen et al., 
2012). In order to solve the problem caused by the uniform sharing system, 
two adjustments regarding the central-local revenue sharing system were 
introduced between 1985 and 1993. One is the redesigned revenue-sharing 
arrangement responsibility system, which was introduced in 1985, and the 
other  is the fiscal contracting system, introduced in 1988 (Jia & Zhao, 2008).  
 
Under the new arrangements introduced in 1985, the revenue-sharing ratio 
between central and local governments was adjusted according to the budget 
balances in the previous years (Jia & Zhao, 2008). Hence, the wealthy 
provinces shared less revenue with the local government, and poorer 
provinces were allowed to retain more shared revenue. Provinces were 
required to set up the revenue and expenditure targets, and local expenditure 
was required to be financed by the local government’s own self-generated 
revenues and retained shared revenues (Wang et al., 2009; Shen et al., 
2012).  
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The introduction of the shared revenue system between central and local 
government led to an increase of central government revenue share in the 
total fiscal revenue in the early 1980s; however, the later revenue system 
adjustments caused a steady decrease in the central government revenue 
after 1984 (M.O.F., 2000). The central government revenue relied heavily on 
tax revenues from local governments, however, local provinces were less 
willing to raise budgetary revenue due to the existence of the floating rate of 
shared revenues (Ma, 2005).  In contrast, as a  result of the 1988 fiscal 
contracting system, the local governments were responsible for their own 
fiscal expenditure, hence, a great effort was put into the raising of off-
budgetary revenues, which was much less regulated by the revenue sharing 
system (Ma, 2005; Shen et al., 2012).  
 
Figure 4-6 illustrates the declining trend of the percentage of central 
government budgetary revenues in total national budgetary revenue between 
1978 and 1993, with a comparison with the local government budgetary 
revenue.  
 
Figure 4-6: The decline of the central government budgetary revenue: 
 
Data source: M.O.F. (2000)  
[Note: a] the central and local revenue in this table represents the income from central and 
local level governments themselves. 
[Note: b] The figure here excludes debt revenues. 
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It can be seen from figure 4-6 that since the launch of the opening up policy in 
1978, the proportion of the central government budgetary revenue in the total 
government budgetary revenue mounted steadily, from nearly 15% to 40% in 
1984. In contrast, after the reform of the industrial and commercial taxes in 
1984, the proportion of central government budgetary revenue dropped 
steadily alongside the introduction of various contract responsibility systems 
between 1985 and 1993. By 1993, the central government budgetary revenue 
only accounted for 22% of the total government revenue. The steady decline 
in the central government revenue seriously weakened the power of bridging 
income inequality, and affected the important public services that were 
sustained by the central government (Shen et al., 2012).  
 
4.6 Budgetary revenue performance and its main characteristics 
following the tax sharing system  
The decline of the two ratios, namely, the ratio of budgetary revenue in GDP 
and the ratio of central government budgetary revenue in total government 
budgetary revenue, led the central government into great fiscal stress, and  
the term  “the problem of the two ratios” was soon widely recognized in China, 
especially by the central government (Wong & Bird, 2008).  
 
Against this background, the key turning point of the fiscal relationship 
between the central and local government, a tax sharing system was 
introduced, and it fundamentally re-shaped the fiscal structure and central-
local fiscal relationship in China (Jia & Zhao, 2008). The tax sharing system 
completely changed the tax revenue division method between central and 
local governments from the arrangement based on a uniform formula based 
method (Chou, 2009). 
 
The newly designed revenue sharing system had replaced the previous case-
by-case negotiation contract system, the largest component in the tax 
revenue, the turn over taxes, was reformed into the Value Added Tax, and the 
central government is taking the majority share (Liu, 2008). 
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The newly established “National Tax Bureau” controls the central tax and 
central-local shared tax collections, and the “Local Tax Bureau is only 
responsible for the local taxes. The separate central and local tax bureaus 
have restrained the local authorities’ tax exemption policies, and all the 
provincial level turn over tax reductions and exemptions have been abolished 
by the National Tax Services (Wong, 2000). Furthermore, any tax reductions 
or exemptions in the future must be approved by the National Tax Bureau and 
reported in a separate schedule of tax return (Shen, 2011). Through a 
tightened fiscal control, the 1994 fiscal reform recentralized the fiscal system 
(Wong, 2000; Wang et al., 2009; Shen, 2011). 
 
4.6.1 Increased budgetary revenue share in GDP 
One of the great achievements of the 1994 fiscal reform and tax sharing 
system was the increase in the government revenue share in the GDP. Figure 
4-7 below indicates the upward trend of the budgetary revenue as a 
percentage of the GDP. 
 
Figure 4-7: Total government budgetary share in GDP: 1978 – 2013 
 
Data source: N.B.S. (1978-2015) 
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From Figure 4-7 above, it is evident that since the open door policy in 1978, 
the government budgetary revenue share in GDP decreased steadily. 
However, the situation fundamentally changed after the 1994 reform. Since 
then, a clear and steady increase has been observed, lasting until 2013.  
 
4.6.2 Increase in the central government budgetary revenue share in 
the total budgetary revenue 
The 1994 reform turned the tide in the decrease in fiscal revenue share; 
however, the greatest achievement of the 1994 reform was the sharp jump of 
the central government’s fiscal revenue in the share of total government 
revenue. Figure 4-8 below shows the trend of central government budgetary 
revenue as a percentage of the total government budgetary revenue. 
 
Figure 4-8: Central government budgetary revenue share in total government budgetary 
revenue: 1978 – 2012 
 
Data source: M.O.F. (1995-2015, 2000) 
 
 
According to figure 4-8, the central government budgetary revenue share in 
1993 accounted only for 22% of the total government revenue; however, this 
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figure had jumped to more than 55% in 1994, a one-off increase in the central 
revenues in just one year.  
 
4.6.3 Unbalanced tax burden distribution between different taxes 
Even though by 1993, China had as many as 38 taxes, the distribution of 
taxes in total tax revenue was very unbalanced. Tax revenue from value-
added tax was 108.15 billion Yuan in 1993, and business tax collected 96.61 
billion Yuan in the same year. The share of these two taxes in the total tax 
revenue in 1993 reached almost 50% of the total tax revenue. In the 425.53 
billion total tax revenue in 1993, the total revenue from the value-added tax, 
business tax, product tax, state-owned enterprises income tax, and custom 
duties reached 370.84 billion Yuan, which accounted for over 87% of the total 
tax revenue. Other than these five taxes, the remaining 33 taxes contributed 
less than 13% to the total tax revenue. (M.O.F., 2000) Figure 4-9 depicts the 
unbalanced tax contribution by various taxes in 1993. 
 
Figure 4-9: Unbalanced tax contribution to the overall tax revenue: 1993 
 
Data source: M.O.F. (2000)  
 
After the tax sharing reform, value added tax, consumption tax, business tax 
and enterprise income tax were still the dominant tax sources.  
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Figure 4-10 depicts the average tax contribution by various taxes between 
1994 and 2013. 
 
Figure 4-10: Unbalanced tax contribution to the overall tax revenue: 1994 – 2013 
 
Data source: M.O.F. (1995-2015)  
 
The picture is very clear; during the period 1994 to 2013, the average 
contribution of VAT, business tax, and enterprise income tax accounted for 
almost 70% of the total tax revenue. This fact sealed the dominant position of 
the turn-over taxes in China’s tax revenue system.  
 
4.6.4 Unbalanced tax revenue contribution compares to the GDP level  
In addition to the regional income and fiscal disparity, there is also an 
unbalanced tax revenue—GDP ratio which commonly exists at local level. 
 
Figure 4-11 below is an example for year 2005; all 31 provinces are ranked by 
their GDP level in the first column, and the ratio of tax revenue to GDP is 
presented in the second column. 
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Figure 4-11: Regional disparity of tax revenue contribution to the GDP 
 
Data source: N.B.S. (1978-2015) 
 
According to Figure 4-11, the average tax revenue ratio to GDP in the year 
2005 was 5.82%; however, the richest five provinces in terms of GDP only 
contributed the average tax revenue ratio at 5.59%, which was even lower 
than the country average level. In contrast, in the poorest six provinces, the 
tax revenue ratio to GDP is higher than the country average level. It is quite 
clear that the contribution of tax revenue to the GDP is widely unbalanced in 
terms of their GDP level.  
 
4.6.5 Local government fiscal deficient  
At the pre-reform period, the local government fiscal deficit was automatically 
filled  by the central transfer (Liu, 2008). This was introduced during a series 
of fiscal reforms in the 1980s and early 1990s when the expenditure 
responsibility was decentralized to local governments (Wong, 2000). 
Moreover, because the shared revenue system was based on a case by case 
Year 2005 GDP (100 million yuan) Tax revenue as percentage of GDP (%)
Guangdong 22557.37 6.77%
Jiangsu 18598.69 5.95%
Shandong 18366.87 4.50%
Zhejiang 13417.68 7.27%
Henan 10587.42 3.45%
Hebei 10012.11 3.93%
Shanghai 9247.66 14.63%
Liaoning 8047.26 6.57%
Sichuan 7385.1 4.90%
Beijing 6969.52 12.71%
Hunan 6596.1 4.06%
Hubei 6590.19 4.31%
Fujian 6554.69 5.45%
Heilongjiang 5513.7 4.48%
Anhui 5350.17 4.57%
Shanxi 4230.53 6.45%
Jiangxi 4056.76 4.21%
Guangxi 3984.1 4.79%
Shaanxi 3933.72 5.25%
Tianjin 3905.64 6.93%
Inner-mongolia 3905.03 5.30%
Jilin 3620.27 4.15%
Chongqing 3467.72 5.10%
Yunnan 3461.73 7.11%
Xinjiang 2604.19 5.48%
Guizhou 2005.42 6.85%
Gansu 1933.98 4.76%
Hainan 897.99 6.07%
Ningxia 612.61 6.01%
Qinghai 543.32 5.04%
Xinjiang 248.8 3.27%
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negotiation between central and local government, richer provinces tended to 
have more advantages during the negotiation and maintain a larger share of 
their revenue. Less developed provinces, however, did not receive enough 
fiscal support by the central transfer due to the weakened transfer power 
caused by the decline of the two ratios. Adding up the 1994 central fiscal 
revenue recentralization, local governments are under great fiscal deficit 
(Shen, 2011; Shen et al., 2012). 
 
Under the expenditure assignment between central and local government 
during the reform period, the exclusive central expenditure are on national 
defence, foreign affairs, public debt and geological prospecting expenses; 
however,  urban maintenance and construction, environmental protection, 
water supply and community services do not come out of central expenditure. 
The rest of the expenditure, such as on education, health care, social welfare, 
government administration, capital construction, research and development, 
and  culture development  are shared expenditure responsibilities by both 
central and local governments (M.O.F. 2010). It is clear that the shared 
expenditure items are day-to-day public administration and social services. 
Figure 4-12 shows the expenditure of both central and local government and 
their percentage share in the total national expenditure for different 
expenditure items in year 2007, 2008, and 2009.  
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Figure 4-12: The expenditure items in central and local governments:2007-2008-2009 
 
Data source: M.O.F. (1995-2015)  
 
Unit: 100 Million Yuan
item National Central Central % Local Local% National Central Central % Local Local% National Central Central % Local Local%
General Public Services 8514.24 2160.17 25.37% 6354.07 74.63% 9795.92 2344.55 23.93% 7451.37 76.07% 9164.21 1084.21 11.83% 8080 88.17%
Diplomacy 215.28 213.78 99.30% 1.5 0.70% 240.72 239.15 99.35% 1.57 0.65% 250.94 249.71 99.51% 1.23 0.49%
Aid to Foreign Countries 111.54 111.54 100.00% 125.59 125.59 100.00% 132.96 132.96 100.00%
National Defense 3554.91 3482.32 97.96% 72.59 2.04% 4178.76 4098.95 98.09% 79.81 1.91% 4951.1 4825.01 97.45% 126.09 2.55%
Public Security 3486.16 607.83 17.44% 2878.33 82.56% 4059.76 648.63 15.98% 3411.13 84.02% 4744.09 845.79 17.83% 3898.3 82.17%
Armed Police 585.17 462.16 78.98% 123.01 21.02% 664.13 502.26 75.63% 161.87 24.37% 866.29 679.11 78.39% 187.18 21.61%
Public Security 1757.48 62.42 3.55% 1695.06 96.45% 2057.67 51.44 2.50% 2006.23 97.50% 2354.89 62.25 2.64% 2292.64 97.36%
Education 7122.32 395.26 5.55% 6727.06 94.45% 9010.21 491.63 5.46% 8518.58 94.54% 10437.54 567.62 5.44% 9869.92 94.56%
Science and Technology 1783.04 924.6 51.86% 858.44 48.14% 2129.21 1077.35 50.60% 1051.86 49.40% 2744.52 1433.82 52.24% 1310.7 47.76%
Culture, Physical Education 898.64 127.21 14.16% 771.43 85.84% 1095.74 140.61 12.83% 955.13 87.17% 1393.07 154.75 11.11% 1238.32 88.89%
Social Security and 5447.16 342.63 6.29% 5104.53 93.71% 6804.29 344.28 5.06% 6460.01 94.94% 7606.68 454.37 5.97% 7152.31 94.03%
Housing for Social Security 725.97 26.43 699.54
Medical and Health Care 1989.96 34.21 1.72% 1955.75 98.28% 2757.04 46.78 1.70% 2710.26 98.30% 3994.19 63.5 1.59% 3930.69 98.41%
Environment Protection 995.82 34.59 3.47% 961.23 96.53% 1451.36 66.21 4.56% 1385.15 95.44% 1934.04 37.91 1.96% 1896.13 98.04%
Urban and Rural Community 3244.69 6.2 0.19% 3238.49 99.81% 4206.14 14.33 0.34% 4191.81 99.66% 5107.66 3.91 0.08% 5103.75 99.92%
Agriculture Forestry and 3404.7 313.7 9.21% 3091 90.79% 4544.01 308.38 6.79% 4235.63 93.21% 6720.41 318.7 4.74% 6401.71 95.26%
Transportation 1915.38 782.25 40.84% 1133.13 59.16% 2354 913.2 38.79% 1440.8 61.21% 4647.59 1069.22 23.01% 3578.37 76.99%
Expenditure for Purchasing 849.13 487.68 57.43% 361.45 42.57% 1002.74 659.19 65.74% 343.55 34.26% 1085.08 648.81 59.79% 436.27 40.21%
Mining power and 2879.12 508.23 17.65% 2370.89 82.35%
Cereals Oil and Reserve 2218.63 781.44 35.22% 1437.19 64.78%
Banking 911.19 778.04 85.39% 133.15 14.61%
Earthquake Rebuilding 798.34 62.47 7.82% 735.87 92.18% 1174.45 130.6 11.12% 1043.85 88.88%
Interest Payment for 
Domestic and Foreign Debts
1491.28 1320.7 88.56% 170.58 11.44%
Other Expenditure 7209.05 2017.31 27.98% 5191.74 72.02% 9167.16 2547.65 27.79% 6619.51 72.21% 3203.25 601.83 18.79% 2601.42 81.21%
Total 49781.35 11442.06 22.98% 38339.29 77.02% 62592.66 13344.17 21.32% 49248.49 78.68% 76299.93 15255.79 19.99% 61044.14 80.01%
2007 2008 2009
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It is clear that the majority of the shared expenditure responsibility is highly 
reliant on local governments. Categories include medical and health care, 
urban and rural development, public services, education.  Figure 4-13 gives a 
clear illustration of the historical divergence of central-local expenditure since 
early 1981 to 2013.  
 
 
Figure 4-13: Percentage of central and local expenditures in total national expenditure:  
1981 – 2013 
 
Data source: M.O.F. (1995-2015)  
 
The responsibility for expenditure decentralization can be clearly seen from 
Figure 4-13. The central government shares less and less expenditure during 
the period between 1981 and 2013, whereas the local governments’ 
expenditure has experienced a steady increase, especially after 2000.  
 
4.7   The non-tax sourced revenue and its characteristics in China 
Tax revenue is only one of the components in China’s fiscal system. 
Moreover, it is not necessarily vital in every stage of fiscal development 
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(Wong & Bird, 2008). This is mainly caused by the existence of non-tax 
sourced revenue. The existence of non-tax sourced revenue has a long 
history in China’s fiscal system, and is very important in China’s fiscal revenue 
system. The following sections focus on the history and characteristics of both 
extra-budgetary revenue and off-budgetary revenue.  
 
4.7.1 Extra-budgetary revenue in the pre-1994 period 
Before the 1978 reform, under the “unified collection and unified spending” 
principle, the major components of government revenue were the tax revenue, 
and enterprise profits. However, there were other revenues, named the “extra-
budgetary revenues”. The extra-budgetary revenue had drawn little attention 
in the pre-reform period due to its relatively small size and its insignificance in 
public finance (Ma, 2005; Guifen, 2007). It was after the 1978 reforms that the 
rapid growth rate of the extra-budgetary revenue became one of the main 
concerns.  
 
During the pre-reform period, the share of extra-budgetary revenue was 
maintained at a level lower than 20%; however, the situation changed 
dramatically after the 1978 reform (M.O.F., 2000). The increase in the rate of 
the extra-budgetary revenue in 1991, 1992 and 1993 was 19.7%, 18.9% and 
46.7%, respectively. In contrast, the increased rate of the tax revenue in these 
three years was  only 5.96%, 10.26% and 29.07% respectively (M.O.F., 
2000). The increase in the rate of the extra budgetary revenue was much 
faster than the increase in the rate of tax revenue.  
 
Figure 4-14 is the amount of budgetary and extra-budgetary revenues in 
China during the period 1952 to 1992. 
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Figure 4-14: Budgetary and extra-budgetary revenues: 1952 – 1992 
 
Data source: M.O.F. (2000) 
 
According to Figure 4-14, the rapid increase in the extra-budgetary revenue 
reached its peak after the Li Gai Shui reform in the middle 1980s. The amount 
of extra-budgetary revenue was almost equal to the budgetary revenue. In the 
years 1991 and 1992, the extra-budgetary revenue was even more than the 
total budgetary revenue in the total government fiscal revenue; the ratios 
between the extra-budgetary and budgetary revenues were 50.73% and 
52.53% respectively in 1991 and 1992. The contribution of extra-budgetary to 
the total fiscal revenue was so huge that it was named “the second budget” or 
“half the mountain” during the 1980s and 1990s (Jia & Liu, 2005, p. 24; 
Guifen, 2007, p. 64). 
 
4.7.2 Causes of the rise in extra-budgetary revenue before 1994 
The rapid growth of extra-budgetary revenues was caused by many factors, 
but the most important one, argued by many scholars, is that the inappropriate 
design of various reforms during the pre-1994 period, which encouraged local 
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governments to raise revenues other than taxes (Heady, Wong, & Woo, 1995; 
Ahmad et al., 2002; Shen, 2011; Shen et al., 2012).  
 
Rapid reforms and adjustments of fiscal central-local relationships had bred 
distrust between central and local governments. When the central government 
was struggling with the decreased central revenues, part of the reason was 
traced to the excessive local revenues. Numerous revenue sharing methods 
were introduced throughout the whole period. On several occasions in the 
1980s, the central government even “borrowed” revenues from local 
governments. Rapid adjustments of the fiscal system had left an impression 
that the surplus revenue is unsafe under the central government’s fickle 
revenue sharing system. As a result, it had led to a rapid increase in local 
non-tax source revenues for the purpose of secure local revenues (Heady et 
al., 1995; Ahmad et al., 2002; Shen, 2011; Shen et al., 2012).  
 
Under the contract responsibility system, local governments would purposely 
hide the budgetary revenues because this information had a direct influence 
on the amount of retained surplus. This is because the revenue sharing 
method under the contract responsibility system was mainly through the 
negotiations between central and local governments. However, a larger share 
of tax revenues would lead to a higher portion of income payable to the 
central government (Ahmad et al., 2002). 
 
In the meantime, the decline of central fiscal revenue had caused a cut in 
central transfers and the expansion of local expenditure responsibility. Hence, 
the highly decentralized expenditure assignment, along with the inapposite 
negotiation based contract responsibility system, had led to a phenomenon 
whereby the local governments were purposely hiding the budgetary revenue 
by less intensive tax collection, and raising revenue through the setting up and 
raising of fees, self-raising funds, and fines (Lin, 2000).  
 
4.7.3 The main characteristics of the Budget Law in 1994  
The issue of the growth in extra-budgetary revenue had not been better since 
the early 1990s reform. The expenditure assignment between the central and 
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local governments had not changed significantly after the tax sharing system 
had been introduced, and in addition, local governments had no right, at least 
not on a formal basis, to change the rates or bases of any taxes, nor could 
they introduce new taxes. Hence the incentive of raising extra-budgetary 
revenue had passed onto the new system  (Wong, 2000). 
 
Taking into consideration f the rapid shrinking of the budgetary revenue, the 
State Council had published “the Regulations on the Management of the State 
Budget” in 1991. However, the extra-budgetary revenues were left almost 
untouched. Throughout the “Regulations”, the extra-budgetary revenues were 
only mentioned in two articles: 
 
First, in article 71, transferring budgetary revenue into extra-budgetary 
revenue, or transferring extra-budgetary expenditure into the budgetary 
expenditure, was considered to be committing a crime against budget law.  
 
Second, in article 76, government institutions, agencies and units were 
required to strengthen the administration on the extra-budgetary revenues.  
 
It is clear that the “regulations” did not touch the scale of the extra-budgetary 
revenue, nor r any detailed rules of how to manage the extra budgetary 
revenue.  
 
What changed the tide was “the Budget Law of the People’s Republic of 
China” issued by the NPC in 1994, and “the Regulation for the Implementation 
of the Budget Law of the People’s Republic of China” issued by the State 
Council in 1995. After the budget law, the classification and administration of 
the off-budgetary revenue was changed significantly according to the budget 
law and the regulation. 
 
The budgetary law re-categorized the scope of budgetary and off-budgetary 
revenues. The budgetary revenue after the budget law consisted of four main 
parts, namely, tax receipts, receipts from State-owned assets, receipts from 
special items, and other receipts. Tax receipts mean the tax revenue, receipts 
135 
 
from the state-owned assets refers to “the part of the proceeds that are 
derived from the departments and entities from possessing, using, and 
disposing of, according to law, the domestic and overseas state-owned 
assets” (Article 19, chapter 3 of the Budget Law in 1995). The special items 
refer to the “revenue that is, according to special needs, established, 
collected, included in the budget management, and used for special purposes 
upon approval of the State Council or of the Ministry of Finance, which is 
authorized by the State Council” (Article 9, chapter 9 of the Regulation for the 
Implementation of the Budget Law in 1995). 
 
The budget law and the matched regulations centralized budgetary control. 
The extra-budgetary revenue is not under the national budget management. 
Hence, local units treated the extra-budgetary revenues as “private savings”, 
which was not owed in any way to the central government (Wong, 2000, 
2008). By re-scaling the budgetary revenue, central government now has a 
tighter control over both budgetary and extra-budgetary revenues. Evidence 
can be found in the Budget Law in 1995: 
 
Article 12, Chapter 2 of the Budget Law: “The National People’s Congress 
examines the central and local draft budgets and the reports on the 
implementation of the central and local budgets……the Standing Committee 
of the National People’s Congress supervises the implementation of the 
central and local budgets…”  
 
Article 14, Chapter 2 of the Budget Law: “The State Council…organized the 
implementation of the central and local budgets…supervises the 
implementation of the budgets of the departments of the central government 
and of the local governments, alters or annuls inappropriate decisions and 
orders made by the departments of the Central Government or by the local 
governments on budgets or final accounts…”  
 
Article 16, chapter 2 of the Budget Law: “The financial department of a local 
government at any level…regularly reports to the government at the 
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corresponding level and the financial department of the government at the 
next higher level on the implementation of the general budget…”  
 
Article 18, Chapter 2 of the budget law:  “The various units compile the drafts 
of their own budgets and final accounts, turn over budgetary revenues as 
prescribed by the state, manage the budgetary expenditure, and accept 
supervision of the relevant departments of the State.”  
 
Article 76, chapter 11 of the Budget Law: “The people’s government at various 
levels, all departments and units shall strengthen the management of non-
budgetary funds. Measures for the management of non-budgetary funds shall 
be formulated separately by the State Council…”  
 
4.7.4 Non-tax sourced revenue after the 1994 Budget Law 
After the establishment of “the Budget Law of the People’s Republic of China” 
in 1994, and “the Regulation for the Implementation of the Budget Law of the 
People’s Republic of China” in 1995, the central government had stronger 
control over budgetary and extra-budgetary revenues. However, this did not 
stop the raising of non-tax sourced revenues, especially the off-budgetary 
revenue. The following sub-sections focus on the non-tax sourced revenue 
performance after the 1994 budget law; especially, the other form of non-tax 
sourced revenues in China’s fiscal revenue system: the off-budgetary 
revenue.  
 
4.7.4.1 The increased size of off-budgetary revenue  
After the 1994 tax sharing reform, along with the fast increase in tax revenue, 
the off-budgetary revenue also experienced rapid growth. Figure 4-15 is the 
tax revenue and off-budgetary revenue as a percentage of total budgetary 
revenue.  
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Figure 4-15: Decomposition of local government budgetary revenue by tax and non-tax 
sourced revenues 
 
Data source:M.O.F. (1995-2015)  
 
It is clear that the tax revenue share decreases overall throughout the whole 
period, whereas the off-budgetary revenue increases steadily over time. The 
size of the off-budgetary revenue has almost doubled form the early stage of 
post-reform period to the 21st century. The off-budgetary revenue share 
before 2000 was on average less than 10% in the total budgetary revenue. 
However, this figure reached over 20% after 2010.  
 
The off-budgetary revenue in the figure and discussion above only includes 
the non-tax sourced revenue that was under budget management. However, 
the existence of extra-budgetary revenue is not included. In fact, the extra-
budgetary revenue was a huge revenue source compared to the tax revenue 
and off-budgetary revenue, especially in the early period after the 1994 
reform.  
 
Figure 4-16 gives a brief investigation regarding the comparison of the size of 
tax revenue, budgetary non-tax revenue (off budgetary revenue), and extra-
budgetary revenue.  
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Figure 4-16: Size comparison between tax revenue, budgetary non-tax revenue, and extra-
budgetary revenue in local governments: 1995 – 2010 
 
Data source: M.O.F. (1995-2015)  
Note: the total revenue is calculated as the sum of budgetary revenue and extra-budgetary 
revenue. 
 
By taking into consideration extra-budgetary revenue, it is clear that tax 
revenue only contributed, on average, less than 60% of the total government 
fiscal income during the period between 1995 and 2010. One point to be 
noted is the upward trend of budgetary non-tax revenue and the declining 
trend of budgetary revenue.  The trend of decreasing extra-budgetary revenue 
in the total revenue does not necessarily indicate the cutting down of extra 
budgetary revenue. This is because through many years, the central 
government has been trying to readjust the scale and definition of various 
extra-budgetary revenues to categorize them into budgetary revenues, i.e., 
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turning them into off-budgetary revenue instead, and bringing them under the 
central government budget control. Taking a serious note of the tremendous 
size of the extra-budgetary revenue, the central government has made a great 
effort to control its administration and management by taking the sub-
categories of the extra-budgetary revenue into budget control. In other words, 
transforming the extra-budgetary revenue into off-budgetary revenue (Tong et 
al., 2013; Zheng & Wang, 2013). 
 
For example in 1996, the State Council had issued the “Decision of the State 
Council on Strengthening the Administration of Extra Budgetary Funds”. 
Hence, 13 major funds and fees in the extra-budgetary revenues, including 
road toll, electric power construction funds, were bought into the budgetary 
revenue scale. One year later in1997, further 13 categories of extra-budgetary 
revenues were also bought into the budget control (Zheng & Wang, 2013). 
The effort continued until 2011, the term of “extra-budgetary revenue” had 
vanished from China’s statistical year book, when the central government 
decided that all extra-budgetary revenues are taken into the budgetary 
revenue and under the budget control (Tong, et al., 2013). 
 
4.7.4.2 The component of off-budgetary revenue 
When investigating further into the different components of the off-budgetary 
revenue, the scale of off-budgetary revenue, and its special characteristics are 
revealed.  
 
The off-budgetary revenue category can be categorized into 7 different types, 
namely special program fees, administrative and institutional fees, penalty 
receipts, governmental funds, income of state-owned assets and resources 
(SOA/R), planned subsidies to loss-suffering state-owned enterprises (PSL), 
and other non-tax receipts (M.O.F., 2000; Guifen, 2007). This section mainly 
focuses on the special characteristics of some off-budgetary categories.  
 
a. The planned subsidies to loss-suffering state-owned enterprises 
(PSL) 
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Among the eight non-tax categories, PSL is rather special compared to 
others. Acceding to the Ministry of Finance, the PSL is government arranged 
funds with the purpose of covering state owned enterprise deficits caused by 
self-operation or government policies (M.O.F., 2009). According to the 
property of the PSL, it is a subsidy of fiscal expenditure, hence in principle, 
and also according to the “Classification of the Functions of Government” 
published by the United Nations in 2000, a subsidized fiscal expenditure to the 
public enterprise. Including the PSL in the budgetary revenue side is mainly 
due to political reasons. Thus, inclusion of the PSL in the budgetary revenue 
has resulted in the size of off-budgetary revenue being underrated.  
 
The inclusion of the PSL expenditure into the off-budgetary revenue also 
created an un-common data bias at the provincial level. For example, in 
Shanghai in 2000, the total tax revenue was 50.14 billion yuan, whereas, the 
total budgetary revenue only accounted for 48.54 billion yuan, even lower 
than the tax revenue. The reason behind this is that the amount of PSL was 
3.72 billion yuan, and all other non-tax revenue accounted for 2.12 billion 
yuan. This resulted in the non-tax revenue appearing as a negative number of 
1.60 billion yuan (M.O.F., 2001).  
 
b. Government fees, charges and funds 
The other property of the off-budgetary revenue is the huge share of 
government fees, charges and funds. These types of off-budgetary revenue 
are mainly judicial administration revenues, mainly contributed by special 
program fees, administrative and institutional fees, penalty receipts, and 
government l funds. Even though the government fees, charges and funds are 
classified as non-tax sourced revenue in the statistical yearbook, it is difficult 
to say that it is entirely different from tax revenue in China. 
 
The non-tax sourced revenue and tax revenue are conceptually different, yet 
under some circumstances, difficult to clearly distinguish. Tax is defined as 
the compulsory monetary contribution to the state’s revenue; and fiscal 
revenue is defined as the revenue collected by the State to finance the 
activities of the public sector. Theoretically, non-tax revenue is recognized as 
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the revenue, which is gained from other sources than taxes, but a question is 
raised when asking how we deal with a non-tax sourced revenue which has 
tax properties, or if any revenue is classified as non-tax revenue but is actually 
almost conformable to the concept of “tax”? 
 
Fauvelle-Aymar (1999) argues that in developed countries, the tax revenue 
and the non-tax revenue are inherently different, whereas in developing 
countries, many non-tax revenues, such as the revenue from the public 
sector, are similar to taxes in political terms. Bird et al. (2006) also points out 
that the practices and possible mistakes in revenue classification in 
developing and transitional countries have blurred the differences between tax 
revenue and non-tax revenue. 
 
According to the definition of taxes from the OECD, compulsory, non-
repayable and exclusive of tax offence fines and compulsory loans, are the 
main characteristics that distinguish taxes from fees (OECD, 1996). If a 
payment is compulsory and non-repayable but is clearly related to the cost of 
the service provided, then it is not considered as tax. Whereas, if such 
payment is qualified under each of these four conditions:  
1. The amount of charges greatly exceeds the total cost of the service 
provided. 
2. Payers of the charges do not directly benefit from the service provided.  
3. No specific service is provided by the government according to the 
amount of charges or fees received from the payer. 
4. Benefits received only by the charges or fees’ payer, but the service 
received by each payer does not vary according to the amount of each 
individual’s payment. 
 
Then it would be considered as unrequited, i.e., taxes (OECD, 1996).  
 
The non-repayable feature is the critical quality that distinguishes the tax from 
fees; but in the case of China, this question becomes extremely complex. 
When the investigation considers the non-tax revenue of local government in 
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China, it touches an area which is intricate and complex—local governments’ 
fees, charges and funds.  
 
According to the 1994 budget law, local government fees and charges are 
under a two level management system. Local provincial governments have 
the right to approve the titles and scales of fees and charges, but these must 
be reported and recorded by the central government. However, the standard 
procedure seriously lacks any legal basis and control (Ma, 2005).  
 
In 1997, the total amount of fees and charges had almost reached half of the 
total budgetary revenue. Until 1998, there were more than 300 items of the 
administrative institution fees from central government. At the local level, 
some provinces had even more than 400 fees and charges; in the more than 
200 categories of government funds and special charges, fewer  than 50 
categories were authorized by the Central State Council or the Ministry of 
Finance; over 70% were established by local governments (Zhang, 2006; Jia 
& Zhao, 2008, pp. 118-120).  
 
When the investigation delves  deeper into the sub-provincial governments 
and their related departments, the items of fees and charges are in their 
thousands (Gao, 2010). At the provincial or lower level of government, the 
various departments have their own authorities to establish and collect various 
fees and charges. The regulations seriously lack supervision and control, and 
some of the categories of fees or charges do not even have a basic standard 
to specify how much to collect (Jia & Liu, 2005). Those departments included, 
but are not limited to, the transport departments, land resource management 
departments, industry and commerce departments, health inspection and 
supervision departments, public security departments, supervisory 
departments, urban development departments, environmental protection 
departments, and education departments (Jia & Liu, 2005). 
 
It is worth noticing that the scale of revenues from these categories in China’s 
local governments is relatively large. Taking the most recent data, according 
to the China Statistical Yearbook (2013), in year 2012, the total off-budgetary 
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revenue was counted as 23% of the total public budgetary revenue, with over 
half of the off-budgetary revenue funded by special program fees, and 
administrative and institutional fees, which counted as 12% of total local 
budgetary revenue.  Figure 4-17 shows details of the structure of local 
budgetary revenue and decomposition of the off-budgetary revenue.  
 
Figure 4-17: Structure of local budgetary revenue and decomposition of local government’s 
off-budgetary revenue in 2012 
 
Data source: M.O.F. (2013)  
 
 
Moreover, the performance of the off-budgetary revenue varies greatly across 
regions. The off-budgetary revenue share of the total budgetary revenue in 
Beijing and Zhejiang was only 6%, whereas in some provinces, such as 
Tianjin, Hunan, Chongqing, this figure has exceeded almost one third of the 
total budgetary revenue. Figure 4-18 gives an illustration of the odd-budgetary 
revenue size in the public budgetary revenue across provinces in 2012. 
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Figure 4-18: Off-budgetary revenue share in local governments’ public budgetary revenue in 
2012 
 
Data source: M.O.F. (2013)  
 
Non-tax sourced revenues, including local government fees, charges and 
funds, are part of local government revenue, but in the case of China, these 
fees and charges in a large scale, match the requisites of a tax in concept.  
Moreover, the administration of this part of revenue is loose and complex, and 
causes serious problems such as boosting income inequality, breeding 
corruption, and eroding the tax base (Lin, 2002; Wu, 2002; Jia & Liu, 2005; 
Lin, 2005). One typical example is the Educational Surcharges which are one 
example of government fees, and according to the “Interim Provisions on the 
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Collection of Educational Surcharges” published by the State Council in 2005, 
an educational surcharge is applied to all entities and individuals who are 
obliged to pay product tax, value-added tax and business tax. Education 
surcharges exclude those who are already paying the rural education 
charges. The amount of the educational surcharges one needs to pay is 3% of 
the total payable amount of the sum of product tax, value-added tax, and 
business tax (M.O.F. 2006). 
 
4.7.4.3 Previous studies regarding the off-budgetary and extra-
budgetary revenues 
The rapid increase in non-tax revenue has also drawn the sharp attention of 
researchers. In addition, it is worth mentioning that considering the complex 
classification and various adjustments of the categories of non-tax revenue, 
many scholars have adopted different methods of measurement of the non-
tax revenue by re-categorizing the non-tax revenue. 
 
Qiao and Wang (2009) present an empirical study on the relationship between 
non-tax revenue and economic growth during the period of 1994 and 2007. 
The authors define and calculate the non-tax revenue as the sum of non-tax 
sourced budgetary revenue and extra-budgetary revenue. The results indicate 
that in the 14 years after the tax sharing reform, the rate of the average 
annual increase in the non-tax revenue was even higher than the GDP 
average annual increase rate. In addition, local government contributed the 
majority of the total non-tax revenue. Over the data set period (1994 – 2007), 
on average, over 80% of non-tax revenue was contributed by local 
government. Qiao and Wang (2009) further point out that the non-tax revenue 
and GDP were positively causally interrelated, and the relationship was even 
stronger at local level than central level (Qiao & Wang, 2009).  
 
Gao (2010) has investigated the size of non-tax revenue after the 1994 tax 
sharing reform until 2006. Gao (2010) defines the non-tax revenue as the sum 
of budgetary non-tax revenue and extra-budgetary revenue, and an 
investigation of the size of tax revenue and non-tax revenue was performed. 
However, the PSL has not been excluded in the budgetary non-tax revenue. 
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Different from Qiao and Wang’s study (2009), Gao (2000) inspected the 
extent of the normalization administration of the non-tax revenue by 
introducing the ratio of budgetary non-tax revenue and total non-tax revenue. 
The results show that the ratio increased throughout the time line both at the 
central and local government levels. This supports the early arguments that 
the central government is making a great effort to manage the extra-budgetary 
revenue by taking them into the budgetary revenue and under budget control. 
When the investigation considers the total non-tax revenue size in central and 
local governments by introducing the ratio of non-tax revenue and tax 
revenue, clear evidence of a huge divergence between central and local 
government non-tax revenues was revealed. The central government non-tax 
revenue ratio increased from 4.8% in 1998 to 7.24% in 2007, whereas the 
local government non-tax ratio decreased from 78.03% in 1998 to 55 and 11% 
in 2007. Regardless of the different trends, central government non-tax 
revenue was never higher than 10% throughout the time line. However, the 
figure at the local level was never lower than 50% (Gao, 2000). 
 
Bai, Wang, and Zhang (2013) adopt the same scale and definition of non-tax 
revenue as Gao (2000), based on data from 1994 to 2010. They investigated 
the relationship among non-tax revenue, GDP and tax revenue by applying a 
regression analysis from the perspective of cycle analysis. A causal 
relationship between non-tax revenue and GDP was also detected, and local 
non-tax revenue showed an unusual correlation to the economic growth, 
which added support to the previous Qiao and Wang’s study (2009). 
Interestingly, a causal relationship between tax and non-tax revenue was also 
found. As Bai et al. (2003) conclude, the increase in tax revenue had a clear 
crowding-out effect on the non-tax revenue, whereas the expanding of non-tax 
revenue does not necessarily crowd-out the tax revenue (Bai, et al. 2013).  
 
Meng and Su (2015) in their study on the relation of tax competition, fiscal 
stress and the size of non-tax revenue of local governments is based on the 
data period from 2007 to 2011, define and calculate the non-tax revenue as 
the sum of five categories: special program fees, administrative and 
institutional fees, penalty receipts, income of state-owned assets and 
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resources, and other non-tax receipts. The authors conclude that the average 
annual increase rate of non-tax revenue during 2007 and 2011 had almost 
reached 26% per year. The authors point out that fiscal needs are not 
necessarily the only explanation of the expansion of non-tax revenue, other 
factors, like local government competition, the needs of economic 
development, fiscal expenditure, the size of the central transfer, all share a 
significant impact on  the size of non-tax revenue (Meng & Su, 2015).  
 
Tong, Li, and Wang (2014) based on a data set from 2000 to 2010, analysed 
separately the budgetary non-tax revenue, government fund income and non-
fiscal revenue; however, Tong et al. (2014) did not include any SOEs related 
to non-tax revenue, that is to say, the PSL. By comparing the three different 
types of non-tax sourced revenues, the budgetary non-tax revenue shows the 
largest t growth. The share of budgetary non-tax revenue in GDP in 1993 was 
only 0.12%. However, this figure had increased over 14 times in 2010. The 
result indicates that the strategic interaction regarding the non-tax sourced 
revenues between the local governments, are widely prevalent. In addition, 
strong statistical evidence of local governments’ reliance on the non-tax 
sourced revenue was also detected. Based on the findings, Tong et al. (2014) 
conclude that one of the driving powers behind the expansion of non-tax 
sourced revenue is the financial deficiency due to the lack of fiscal autonomy 
of local governments   
 
4.8 Summary  
The main purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the main characteristics of 
China’s fiscal revenue and its performance, as well as the revenue 
relationship between central and local government. 
 
It is revealed in the early parts of this chapter that the fiscal system in China is 
rather complex. The fiscal revenue is classified into budgetary and extra-
budgetary revenues in China’s official documents. The budgetary revenue is 
the government fiscal revenue under the central budget control, whereas the 
extra-budgetary budgetary revenue is not (Tong et al., 2013). Within the 
budgetary revenue, there are tax revenues and off-budgetary revenues. The 
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concept and scale of the non-tax revenue in China was never clearly defined 
until early the 21st century (Gao, 2000).  
 
As a key element in the central-local government fiscal relationship, the 
central transfer system in China has also experienced numerous reforms and 
adjustments in the last thirty years. After the open door reform in the late 
1970s, the central transfer system had also reformed from Uniform collection 
and uniform spending to contract based responsibility system. However, on 
the basis of the restructured revenue system in early 1990s, especially the tax 
sharing system between central and local governments, the intergovernmental 
transfers were turned into a more formula-based system. However, regardless 
the many reforms of the central transfer system, its characteristics and nature 
has never changed.   
 
Before 1978, all profits were under the control of the central government, and 
almost everything, even including the prices of the production, total number of 
the output and total amount of sale, were all decided and budgeted by the 
central government (Lin, 2009; Yang, 2001; Shen et al., 2012). The main 
fiscal revenue was the profit from DOEs, hence the tax revenue was 
considered as not important in the fiscal revenue system.  
 
The main characteristic of fiscal revenue performance after the market 
oriented reforms in 1978 was the decline of two ratios, namely the decline of 
the ratio of total budgetary revenue to the GDP, and the ratio of central 
government budgetary revenue to the total government budgetary revenue 
(Jia & Zhao, 2008). At the same time, the extra-budgetary revenue 
experienced rapid growth (M.O.F., 1995-2015).  
 
After the 1994 reform, the share of budgetary revenue in the GDP had 
increased steadily, and the most important reform was the fiscal recentralized 
1994 reform that resulted in a sharp increase in the central government’s 
budgetary revenue, and left the local governments in great fiscal stress (Shen, 
2011; Shen et al., 2012). In the meantime, even though the rising tide of the 
extra-budgetary revenue was controlled to some degree, the large share of 
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non-tax sourced revenue in the local government fiscal revenue system did 
not disappear (Jia & Liu, 2005; Guifen, 2007).  
 
Consideration of the different components of the non-tax sourced revenue 
reveals that the planned subsidies to loss-suffering state-owned enterprise is  
a fiscal expenditure item according to its property and international standard. 
Classifying the PSL as off-budgetary revenue was mainly due to political 
reasons; however, this has resulted in an underrated off-budgetary revenue 
size, as well as some off normal statistical data in some regions (M.O.F., 
1995-2015).  
 
Within the off-budgetary revenue, the government fees, charges, and funds 
take a large portion of the total off-budgetary revenue (Jia & Liu, 2005). These 
fees, charges and funds are largely loose, complex, and lack supervision and 
control. Almost all government departments at all levels of government have 
their own fees and charges. In addition, according to many scholars, these 
fees, charges and funds arguably match the concept of taxes (Lin, 2002; Wu, 
2002; Jia & Liu, 2005; Lin, 2005).  
 
The aim of this research is to find the key determinants of the variation of the 
tax revenue capacity in China, and to evaluate China’s tax revenue 
performance at provincial level. It is clear to see from this chapter that tax 
revenue performance is just one part of the total fiscal revenue performance in 
China. In addition, the prevalent non–tax sourced revenue has played a 
crucial role throughout the history of China’s fiscal revenue development.  
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5 Chapter Five: Research design, methodology and Methods  
 
5.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, the methodology and methods used in this study are 
discussed.  
 
Section 5.2 contains the research paradigm for this research. In this section, 
the paradigm of this research is explained. Section 5.3 presents the model 
structuring, which explains the different steps used to approach the results. 
Section 5.4 lists the models and variables used in this study. The main 
purpose of Section 5.5 is to determine the dependent variables, namely the 
tax ratio and the current revenue ratio. In Section 5.6, a detailed discussion of 
each variable in determining both the tax ratio and current revenue ratio, the 
proxies of tax performance, is presented. The discussions include a brief 
summary of empirical results from previous studies and their relevance to the 
current study. Finally, a brief summary is presented in section 5.7. 
 
5.2 Research paradigm 
In this section, the theoretical perspectives of this research is explained. This 
includes ontology, epistemology, methodology, the paradigm for this research, 
method, and finally, data source and collation approaches. 
 
As a researcher, it is essential to understand the area and direction of the 
study. It is also important to understand the key philosophical position of the 
researcher as researchers are guided by a set of beliefs or worldview: the 
paradigm of the research (Hatch and Cunliffe (2012).  
 
The research paradigm is the set of common beliefs and agreements about 
how problems should be understood and addressed, based on the 
researcher’s ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions 
(Kuhn, 1962; Guba and Lincoln, 1994; Sarantakos, 2012). In brief, ontology 
refers to what actually exists as reality, epistemology refers to how we can 
gain knowledge of what exists, and methodology deals with which way to 
obtain knowledge (Maxwell, 2012; Killam, 2013). The relationship between 
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ontology, epistemology, methodology, paradigm, method, and data collection 
are tightly bound together. As Howell (2012) states, “Paradigms of inquiry 
incorporate clear indications of how ontology and epistemology are intrinsic to 
each methodological approach and consequent plan for data collection” 
(Howell; 2012. pp. viiii). The chart 5-1 below illustrates the relationship 
between all the important terms within the paradigm.  
 
Chart 5-1: The relationship between ontology, epistemology, methodology, paradigm, 
method, and data collection 
 
 
 
In real world social research, there could be many paradigms according to 
different sets of beliefs. However, there are three paradigms, namely 
positivism, interpretive paradigm, and critical paradigm, which are the most 
dominant paradigms and provide theoretical foundations for the diversity of 
methodologies (Sarantakos, 2012). Hence in this section, these three 
dominant paradigms are used as guidelines to understand different theoretical 
perspectives.  
 
5.2.1 Ontology 
Ontology is about the beliefs about reality, the nature and structure of being 
(Rawnsley, 1998; Scotland, 2012; De Kock, 2015). In other words, ontology 
ontology
•what actually 
exists
•the nature of 
reality
epistemology
•how we gain 
knowledge of 
what exists
methodology
•how to obtain 
knowledge
methods
•what kind of 
tools or 
instruments can 
we use to obtain 
knowledge
data
collection
•what data 
should be 
collected
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answers the questions of what is reality, and what is true? Different beliefs 
about the nature and structure of reality are the fundamental building bricks of 
all kinds of different research. One typical belief about the nature and 
structure of reality will lead to a typical research approach (Killam, 2013).  
 
It is obvious that there could be many ontological positions depending on the 
researcher’s beliefs about reality. However, there are three main ontological 
positions, which can be used as guide examples for discussion: realism, as 
believed in positivism paradigms; relativism, as believed in interpretive 
paradigms; and historical realism, which is adopted in critical paradigms. 
 
The ontological position of realism means that the existence of reality is 
independent from the researcher (Cohen, Manion, and Morrison; 2013).  In 
simple words, one truth exists and does not change within the context of what 
is being studied (Killam, 2013).  
 
In contrast, relativism believes that reality is totally subjective from person to 
person (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Reality is from people’s consciousness, reality 
without consciousness is meaningless (Crotty, 1989). In other words, 
relativism believes in multiple versions of reality subject to different persons 
perceptions. In addition, reality evolves and changes according to people’s 
consciousness (Killam, 2013).  
 
Different from  realism and relativism,  historical realism believes that reality is 
defined by history and crystallised over time; in other words, reality is 
constantly forming by social, political, cultural, economic, ethnic, and gender 
values (Guba & Lincon, 1994; Howell, 2012; Scotland, 2012). In simple words, 
reality is being made to be “real” overtime under the context of social 
structures and policies (Killam, 2013).  
 
5.2.2 Epistemology 
Epistemological beliefs answer questions about how we learn knowledge and 
new discoveries. Researchers’ different beliefs regarding the nature of reality 
and truth fundamentally shapes researchers’ beliefs of the relationship 
153 
 
between the researcher and their studies. In another words, Different 
ontological beliefs will dictate different epistemological beliefs (De Kock, 
2015). Epistemology explains the nature of knowledge and the relationship 
between the researcher and the knowledge (Killam, 2013).   
 
From the realism aspect, since reality truly exists externally and objectively 
from human behaviour, in order to get an objective measurement, it is 
believed that researchers should totally separate from what they are 
researching. In other words, knowledge is only gained from the observation 
and analysis of the external reality (Blaikie, 2007).This approach is known as 
objectivism in ontological position (Heron & Reason, 1997; Killam, 2013).  
 
On the other hand, researchers who believe that the truth of reality exists 
subjectively and is influenced by human behaviour, such as relativism and 
historical realism, will adopt an different kind of approach which the interaction 
from the researcher to the research is needed to discover meaning (Killam, 
2013). The epistemological position of such beliefs is called subjectivism 
(Scotland, 2012).   
 
From a relativism ontological position, researchers believe that social 
phenomena are based on individuals’ actions, motivated by their own feelings, 
thinking, and will. In other words, the basic element is people’s actions, and 
hence, it is more important to consider an individual’s feelings and thinking 
((Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). Similarly, from a historical realism ontological 
position, a subjective approach to reality is also adopted. Different from the 
relativism position however, researchers are more accepting the influence from 
historical values than an individual’s feelings, thinking, and will (Howell, 2012).   
 
5.2.3 Methodology 
Based on a set of ontological and epistemological positions, how should 
knowledge be discovered and analysed in a systematic way? This brings the 
discussion to methodology. Methodology deals with the question of the way of 
obtaining the knowledge, given the sets of ontological and epistemological 
beliefs (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). In simple words, methodology refers to 
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philosophies that guide how knowledge should be gathered (Killam, 2013). 
Understanding of the methodology is vitally important because methodology 
translates the principles of a paradigm into a research language. In addition, it 
also provides guidelines on how the research should be carried out according 
to the particular research paradigm (Sarantakos, 2012).  
 
Positivists believe that knowledge should be gained through scientific 
experiments based on a hypothesis since the reality exists externally and is 
separate from human behaviour (Howell, 2012). Studies that are based on 
this methodological approach are often referred to as quantitative 
methodology studies. The existing theory works by testing the social 
phenomena, and the use of theoretical models is recommended (Blaikie, 
2007). 
 
Relativism and historical realism philosophies believe that researchers in the 
research methodology should be inside the subjective reality, and 
methodologies should be built through interactions between and among the 
researcher and participants, since the social world does not subjectively exist, 
but is a human creation (Sarantakos, 2012). This methodology approach is 
referred to as qualitative methodology.  
 
5.2.4 Paradigm for this research  
Based on the researcher’s ontological, epistemological and methodological 
assumptions discussed above, different philosophical positions, i.e. 
paradigms, are formed. Every paradigm is based on different assumptions of 
what reality and truth are, and the relationship between them and the 
researcher. This set of beliefs will underpin the particular research 
methodology, which works as the strategy of actions that guide the use of 
certain methods and data (Scotland, 2012). Table 5-1 below illustrated a 
summary of all three paradigms that discussed before, and their ontological, 
epistemological, and methodological positions.  
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Table 5-1: Ontological, epistemological and methodological positions behind three main 
paradigms 
Paradigms Positivism Interpretive 
paradigms 
Critical paradigms 
Ontology Realism: One truth 
about reality exists 
objectively, does not 
change, and is 
separate from human 
behaviours. 
Relativism: Multiple 
truths exist, 
subjectively, 
mentally constructed, 
changes according to 
people’s 
consciousness 
Historical realism: 
Reality is made to be 
“real” through social 
constructions 
through history, and 
constantly influenced 
by social values. 
Epistemology Objectivism: 
researcher and what 
is being researched is 
totally separate. 
Subjectivism of 
individuals:  consider 
individuals’ feelings. 
Subjectivism of 
historical values: 
accepting the 
influence from 
historical values. 
Methodology Quantitative 
methodology: 
scientific 
experiments based 
on hypothesis 
 
Qualitative methodology: interactions 
between researcher and the subject of 
research are needed. 
Source: Adapted from Kuhn (1962, 1996), Crotty (1989), Howell (2012) and Killam (2013)  
 
It is worth noting that as the debate over philosophical concepts has been 
going for centuries, basic concepts of existing paradigms are challenged and 
changed over time (Kuhn, 1962; 1996). New paradigms are emerging and 
evolving; some are sudden, and some are gradually changed (Kuhn, 1996). 
Hence, even though in the above discussion three dominant paradigms have 
been presented, none of them is a solid approach but a system providing 
guidance for understanding, as there are many diversities that share some 
similarities but are different to a certain extent. In addition, there is no 
empirical way to prove or disprove whether one paradigm is better than 
another, since all assumptions are conjecture (Scotland, 2012).  
 
How to pick the right paradigm for a particular research topic depends on the 
beliefs of the researcher and the questions that the researcher wants to 
answer, the aims of the research, and the objective of the research (Killam, 
2013).  
 
The main aim of this study is to find the key determinants of the variation of 
the tax revenue capacity in China, and to evaluate China’s tax revenue 
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performance at provincial level. The primary purpose of this study is to seek 
answers to questions regarding the following: 
1. What are the key determinants affecting the tax capacity in China at 
provincial level? 
2. How did the tax revenue perform in China at provincial level? 
3. Is there any regional variation of tax performance at the provincial 
level? 
4. What policies may be suggested to improve the tax revenue 
performance in China? 
 
To achieve this aim, the following objectives are set out:  
1. To explore the relationship between the tax capacity and certain 
economic and social factors. 
2. To evaluate the tax revenue performance at provincial level in China 
3. To examine the variation of regional tax revenue performance in China. 
4. To make suggestions for policy makers to improve the tax performance 
in China. 
 
The nature of this research is to prove certain causal relationships, and the 
researcher believes one reality exists objectively and independent from the 
researcher, and knowledge is only gained from observation and analysis of 
the external reality through scientific experiments based on a hypothesis. 
Therefore, positivism is the underpinning paradigm of this research. Since the 
research is required to be objective, and the variables needed for this 
research are measurable and therefore quantifiable, the quantitative 
methodology is adopted in this research. To achieve the research aim, the 
statistical analysis methods should be compatible and essential for this study.  
 
5.2.5 Data source and collection approaches 
The nature of the research topic, the research objectives and the paradigm of 
this research lends itself to the research methods of statistical analysis and the 
use of statistical data. Both primary and secondary data may serve the purpose 
of this research. Since primary data are collected from the researcher specially 
for the purpose of one particular study, it may be more controllable over the 
157 
 
quality of the data and even more appropriate to generate a more accurate 
result than secondary data (Denscombe, 2014). However, the realistic 
demands of this study requires to use secondary data published by statistical 
bureaus. The data needed for this research are massive in size and very difficult 
to obtain by the author, especially where the regional comparison between 
provinces are vital for this study, hence the criteria of the data need to be unified 
at a very high level.  
 
In order to ensure the quality of the data, the data used in this study are only 
collected from statistics yearbooks and reports published by the Chinese 
government authorised organizations. The table 5-2 below lists the sources of 
all raw data used in this study. 
 
Table 5-2: The sources of all raw data used in this study 
Title Published year Publisher Administrator Cover years 
China Statistical 
Yearbook 
Each year 
from 1978 to 
2015 
China Statistics 
Press 
National Bureau of 
Statistics of China 
1978 – 2015 
 
China Compendium 
of Statistics: 1949-
2008 
2010 China Statistics Press 
National Bureau of 
Statistics of China 1949-2008 
China Financial 
Statistical Yearbook 
Each year 
from 1995 to 
2015 
Chinese 
Finance 
Periodical Office 
Ministry of Finance 
of the People’s 
Republic of China 
1995-2015 
China Financial 
Statistical Yearbook: 
Compilation of 
50Years 
2000 
Chinese 
Finance 
Periodical Office 
Ministry of Finance 
of the People’s 
Republic of China 
1949-1999 
China Population 
and Employment 
Statistical Yearbook 
Each year 
from 1994 to 
2015 
China Statistics 
Press 
Department of 
Population and 
Employment 
Statistics of the 
National Bureau of 
Statistics of China 
1994-2015 
Procuratorial 
Yearbook of China 
Each year 
from 1994 to 
2015 
China 
Procurator 
Press 
China’s Supreme 
People's Procurator 
 
1994-2015 
Financial Statistic 
Yearbook of each 
province 
Various years Statistics Press of each province 
Statistics Bureau of 
each province 1994-2015 
Statistical Yearbook 
of each province Various years 
Statistics Press 
of each province 
Statistics Bureau of 
each province 1994-2015 
 
 
As discussed in chapter one, due to the availability of the data,  level one of 
administrative units in mainland China are used for this thesis. This is due to 
the fact that in most of the national statistical yearbooks there are only national 
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level and provincial level statistics included; data from lower administrative units 
are either missing in some regions or incomplete during the period of this study.  
 
The 31 level one administrative regions include 22 provinces, 5 autonomous 
regions, and 4 municipalities that are directly under the Central Government.   
All 31 regions are listed in the table 5-3 below. 
 
Table 5-3: All 31 level one administrative regions included in this study 
Provinces 
Anhui, Fujian, Gansu, Guangdong, Guizhou, 
Hainan, Hebei, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, 
Hunan, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Jilin, Liaoning, Qinghai, 
Shaanxi, Shandong, Shanxi, Sichuan, Yunnan,  
and Zhejiang 
Autonomous regions Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Tibet, and Xinjiang 
municipalities Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai, and Tianjin 
 
Chongqing is one of the cities which belonged to Sichuan province until 1997, 
when it became a level one administrative municipality under the central 
government. Since the data series in this research started from 1995, the 
administrative level transformation of Chongqing leads the research to either 
merge Chongqing back to Sichuan province or make adjustments and 
estimation of data in 1995, 1996. In this research, the author decided to adjust 
and estimate the data in 1995 and 1996 rather than merging Chongqing back 
to Sichuan due to two main reasons: firstly,  the huge size of economic activities 
of Chongqing might create a super-sized unit by merging Chongqing and 
Sichuan; second, the importance of Chongqing city in China - many important 
data regarding  Chongqing city, for instance the tax revenue, non-tax revenue, 
GDP level, foreign trade, urban and rural incomes, central transfers, local 
government expenditures, are separately presented in most of China’s 
statistical year books, even before 1997. A similar approach was also accepted 
by previous studies that involved the same problem (Xie, 2011).  Hence in this 
study, Chongqing is treated as one of the level one administrative regions 
throughout the study period between 1995 and 2013.  
 
For the convenience of the reader, all 31 level one administrative regions are 
collectively referred to as “provinces”. The detailed data collection approaches 
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for each variable needed are further discussed in section 5.5 and 5.6.  
 
5.3  Model structuring  
Linking the research objectives with the literature review, the following 
observations can be made: 
1. Several economic factors are affecting China’s tax performance, 
proxied by the tax/current revenue ratio. 
2. Several social factors are affecting China’s tax performance, proxied by 
both tax revenue and current revenue ratios. 
3. The tax ratio alone cannot truly represent the true tax revenue 
performance in China because of some salient features of China’s tax 
system. 
4. China’s tax revenue performance at the provincial level has been 
limited by the existence of non-tax-sourced revenue. 
 
Adopting the well-established popular regression approach and following the 
previous tax effort study by Williamson (1961); Plasschaert (1962); Hinrichs 
(1965); Lotz and Morss (1967); Thorn (1967); Shin (1969); Weiss (1969); Lotz 
and Morss (1970); Bahl (1971); Truong and Gash (1979); Leuthold (1991); 
Badu and Li (1994); (Ghura, 1998); Fauvelle-Aymar (1999); Piancastelli 
(2001); Alfirman (2003); Mertens (2003); Teera and Hudson (2004); Bird et al. 
(2006); Wang et al. (2009); Pessino and Fenochietto (2010); Huang et al. 
(2012); Karagöz (2013); yao and Lin (2013), the method adopted in this 
research involves several steps: 
 
Step one: Building the tax effort index models for both tax ratio and current 
revenue ratio.  
 
In order to generate accurate results, building a proper regression model is 
crucial. The two models and their variables used in this study are listed in 
Section 5.4. 
 
Step two: Constructing the actual tax ratio and current revenue ratio at 
provincial level in China.  
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Linking the salient feature of China’s tax performance, these are the two 
dependent variables used in the regression model, namely the tax ratio and 
the current revenue ratio.  
 
Tax ratio is measured as the ratio of actual tax collection to the GDP level. 
Current revenue ratio is measured as the ratio of actual collection of current 
revenue to the GDP. To obtain the current revenue ratio, the current revenue 
must be identified and calculated. As revealed in chapter 4, the fiscal revenue 
values presented in the Chinese Statistical Yearbook do not stand for the true 
government fiscal revenue due to the existence of extra-budgetary revenue 
outside the budget before 2010 and the constant changes of the scale of 
budgetary, off-budgetary and extra-budgetary revenues during the period 
1995 to 2010. The detailed description and calculation of the two dependent 
variables is presented in Section 5.5. 
 
Step three: Obtaining and calculating the relevant independent variables that 
serve the purpose of the research objectives and hypothesis.  
 
To structure the appropriate explanatory variables, further investigation of the 
relevant data is required. The independent variables included in this research 
are selected economic and social factors based on the hypotheses generated 
from the literature reviewed, which are supposed to be the determinants of tax 
and non-tax-sourced revenues. A detailed discussion of each explanatory 
variable is presented in Section 5.6. 
 
Step four: Interpreting results. 
 
With a proper regression model design, an appropriate regression result will 
be generated and presented. Specifically, the hypotheses testing and 
regression results, the determinants of the tax and non-tax-sourced revenues 
of each provincial government, the tax revenue performance of each 
provincial government, will be presented and discussed in Chapter six. 
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5.4 The models and variables 
It is revealed in chapter 4 that the existence of the non-tax sourced revenue is 
the salient feature of China’s fiscal revenue system. Hence, in addition to the 
traditional tax ratio, this study has also constructed the current revenue ratio 
as the second dependent variable. Both tax ratio and current revenue ratio are 
the proxies of tax performance. Further details on how to identify and 
calculate the actual tax ratio and current revenue ratio can be found in section 
5.5. 
 
Based on the 11 hypotheses that have been generated from the literature 
reviewed, there are in total 11 independent variables included in this search, 
namely per capita GDP, industrial sector income share in GDP, service sector 
income share in GDP, trade share in GDP, population growth rate, population 
density, non-agricultural population rate, urban-rural income disparity, per 
capita central transfer, anti-corruption effort, and government expenditure in 
percentage of GDP. Detailed discussions of these 11 independent variables 
are presented in section 5.6.1 to 5.6.6. 
 
Hence, the mathematical expression of the tax ratio models is as follows: 
 
ܻܶ = ݂(ݎ݌ܿ݃݀݌, ݅݊݀, ݏ݁ݎ, ݐݎܽ݀݁, ݃ݎ݌݋݌, ݀݊݌݋݌, ݊ܽ݌݋݌, ݅݊ܿ݋݉݁, ݐݎܽ݊ݏ݌ܿ, ݂݁ݔ݌, ܿ݋ݎݑ݌) 
Equation 5-1 
 
Where: 
ܻܶ = ݐℎ݁ ݎܽݐ݅݋ ݋݂ ܽܿݐݑ݈ܽ ݐܽݔ ݎ݁ݒ݁݊ݑ݁ ܽ݊݀ ܩܦܲ 
ݎ݌ܿ݃݀݌ = ݎ݈݁ܽ ݌݁ݎ ܿܽ݌݅ݐܽ ܩܦܲ 
݅݊݀ = ݅݊݀ݑݏݐݎ݈݅ܽ ݏ݁ܿݐ݋ݎ ݅݊ܿ݋݉݁ ܽݏ ݌݁ݎܿ݁݊ݐܽ݃݁ ݅݊ ܩܦܲ 
ݏ݁ݎ = ݏ݁ݎݒ݅ܿ݁ ݏ݁ܿݐ݋ݎ ݅݊ܿ݋݉݁ ܽݏ ݌݁ݎܿ݁݊ݐܽ݃݁ ݅݊ ܩܦܲ 
ݐݎܽ݀݁ = ݏݑ݉ ݋݂ ݅݉݌݋ݎݐݏ ܽ݊݀ ݁ݔ݌݋ݎݐݏ ܽݏ ݌݁ݎܿ݁݊ݐܽ݃݁ ݅݊ ܩܦܲ 
݃ݎ݌݋݌ = ݊ܽݐݑݎ݈ܽ ݌݋݌ݑ݈ܽݐ݅݋݊ ݃ݎ݋ݓݐℎ ݎܽݐ݁ 
݀݊݌݋݌ = ݌݋݌ݑ݈ܽݐ݅݋݊ ݀݁݊ݏ݅ݐݕ 
݊ܽ݌݋݌ = ݊݋݊ − ܽ݃ݎ݅ܿݑ݈ݎݑ݈ܽ ݌݋݌ݑ݈ܽݐ݅݋݊ ݎܽݐ݁ 
݅݊ܿ݋݉݁ = ݅݊ܿ݋݉݁ ݅݊݁ݍݑ݈ܽ݅ݐݕ 
ݐݎܽ݊ݏ = ݌݁ݎ ܿܽ݌݅ݐܽ ܿ݁݊ݐݎ݈ܽ ݐݎܽ݊ݏ݂݁ݎ 
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݂݁ݔ݌ = ݃݋ݒ݁ݎ݊݉݁݊ݐ ݂݅ݏ݈ܿܽ ݁ݔ݌݁݊݀݅ݐݑݎ݁ ݅݊ ܩܦܲ 
ܿ݋ݎݑ݌ = ܽ݊ݐ݅ − ܿ݋ݎݎݑ݌ݐ݅݋݊ ݂݂݁݋ݎݐ 
 
And the mathematical expression of the current revenue ratio model is: 
 
ܴܻ = ݂(ݎ݌ܿ݃݀݌, ݅݊݀, ݏ݁ݎ ݐݎܽ݀݁, ݃ݎ݌݋݌, ݀݊݌݋݌, ݊ܽ݌݋݌, ݅݊ܿ݋݉݁, ݐݎܽ݊ݏ݌ܿ, ݂݁ݔ݌, ܿ݋ݎݑ݌) 
Equation 5-2 
Where: 
ܴܻ = ݐℎ݁ ݎܽݐ݅݋ ݋݂ ܽܿݐݑ݈ܽ ܿݑݎݎ݁݊ݐ ݎ݁ݒ݁݊ݑ݁ ܽ݊݀ ܩܦܲ 
ݎ݌ܿ݃݀݌ = ݎ݈݁ܽ ݌݁ݎ ܿܽ݌݅ݐܽ ܩܦܲ 
݅݊݀ = ݅݊݀ݑݏݐݎ݈݅ܽ ݏ݁ܿݐ݋ݎ ݅݊ܿ݋݉݁ ܽݏ ݌݁ݎܿ݁݊ݐܽ݃݁ ݅݊ ܩܦܲ 
ݏ݁ݎ = ݏ݁ݎݒ݅ܿ݁ ݏ݁ܿݐ  ݅݊ܿ݋݉݁ ܽݏ ݌݁ݎܿ݁݊ݐܽ݃݁ ݅݊ ܩܦܲ 
ݐݎܽ݀݁ = ݏݑ݉ ݋݂ ݅݉݌݋ݎݐݏ ܽ݊݀ ݁ݔ݌݋ݎݐݏ ܽݏ ݌݁ݎܿ݁݊ݐܽ݃݁ ݅݊ ܩܦܲ 
݃ݎ݌݋݌ = ݊ܽݐݑݎ݈ܽ ݌݋݌ݑ݈ܽݐ݅݋݊ ݃ݎ݋ݓݐℎ ݎܽݐ݁ 
݀݊݌݋݌ = ݌݋݌ݑ݈ܽݐ݅݋݊ ݀݁݊ݏ݅  
݊ܽ݌݋݌ = ݊݋݊ − ܽ݃ݎ݅ܿݑ݈ݎݑ݈ܽ ݌݋݌ݑ݈ܽݐ݅݋݊ ݎܽݐ݁ 
݅݊ܿ݋݉݁ = ݅݊ܿ݋݉݁ ݅݊݁ݍݑ݈ܽ݅ݐݕ 
ݐݎܽ݊ݏ݌ܿ = ݌݁ݎ ܿܽ݌݅ݐܽ ܿ݁݊ݐݎ݈ܽ ݐݎܽ݊ݏ݂݁ݎ 
݂݁ݔ݌ = ݃݋ݒ݁ݎ݊݉݁݊ݐ ݂݅ݏ݈ܿܽ ݁ݔ݌݁݊݀݅ݐݑݎ݁ ݅݊ ܩܦܲ 
ܿ݋ݎݑ݌ = ܽ݊ݐ݅ − ܿ݋ݎݎݑ݌ݐ݅݋݊ ݂݂݁݋ݎݐ 
 
 
5.5 Determination of the dependent variables 
5.5.1 Calculation of the actual tax ratio  
According to the literature, actual tax ratio is calculated by the ratio of actual 
tax collection and GDP.  
In a mathematical format, 
 
ݐݕ௜௧ =
ݐݎ௜௧
ܩܦ ௜ܲ௧
 
Equation 5-3 
 
Where: 
ݐݕ = ݐܽݔ ݎܽݐ݅݋ 
ݐݎ = ܽܿݐݑ݈ܽ ݐܽݔ ݎ݁ݒ݁݊ݑ݁ ܿ݋݈݈݁ܿݐ݅݋݊ 
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ܩܦܲ = ݃ݎ݋ݏݏ ݀݋݉݁ݏݐ݅ܿ ݌ݎ݋݀ݑܿݐ ݈݁ݒ݈݁ 
݅ = ݌ݎ݋ݒ݅݊ܿ݁ 
ݐ = ݕ݁ܽݎ 
 
The tax revenue data is collected from the China Financial Statistical 
yearbook, and the GDP data is collected from the China Statistical Yearbook.  
 
5.5.2 Calculation of the actual current revenue ratio  
Traditionally, the dependent variable in the tax effort index regression analysis 
is the ratio of the actual tax collection and GDP. Starting around the 1990s, 
some researchers began to use a wider indicator to capture the government’s 
true tax-like income or the wider range of fiscal revenue performance. 
 
For example, Fauvelle-Aymar (1999) argues that even though tax revenue 
and non-tax revenue are inherently different based on their respective 
definitions, given the important position of the public enterprises in developing 
countries, they are generating a noticeable amount of non-tax revenues, 
which is similar to the tax revenue in political terms. Hence, in Fauvelle-
Aymar’s study, two dependent variables were used, the ratio of tax revenue to 
GDP and the current revenue ratio to GDP, which included some tax-like non-
tax revenues. Bird et al. (2006) pointed out that the consideration of current 
revenue, which is the sum of tax revenue and non-tax revenue other than 
grants, is an important indicator of tax performance in developing and 
transitional economies to avoid the misclassification of states’ revenues. Tuan 
Minh, Blanca, and Jeep (2008) followed the study by Bird et al. (2006) and 
argue that the measurement of fiscal revenue effort can be accomplished by 
the extension of tax effort regression. Le et al. (2012) also follows the previous 
studies regarding the separation of dependent variables into the tax and 
revenue ratio and separately investigates the tax ratio for the tax effort and 
fiscal revenue, which is equal to tax plus non-tax collection, and defines this 
as the fiscal effort.  
 
The researcher of this study believes that the consideration of the current 
revenue in the tax effort index model is necessary in the case of China. As 
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argued in Chapter four, the existence of a huge size of non-tax-sourced revenue 
is the special characteristic of China’s fiscal system. Especially at the local 
provincial level, the significant size of off-budgetary revenue and extra-
budgetary revenues are generated from government fees and charges. Tax 
revenue and its usage are well organized and controlled by the government; 
however, the government fees and charges are rather complex and lack 
transparency. Relevant roles and administration regarding the fees and charges 
collection lack relevant lawful doctrines. Local governments are granted most 
of the power regarding the establishment, adjustment, and collection of fees 
and charges. Highly decentralized expenditure responsibility and lack of central 
administrative control of non-tax-sourced revenue, such as local fees, charges, 
and funds, has resulted in local government collecting a noticeable amount of 
revenues as a major component of the local fiscal revenue system (Lin, 2000; 
Ma, 2005; Wong & Bird, 2008; Shen, 2011; Shen et al., 2012; Tong et al., 2013; 
Zheng & Wang, 2013). 
 
As mentioned in Chapter four, the distinction between tax revenue and non-tax 
revenue is rather blurred in China. Local governments have the minimum 
autonomous administrative power over tax because taxes, including both 
central and local taxes, are pre-determined by central government. It can be 
argued that the non-tax-sourced revenues are acting as a function, which is 
similar to tax revenues in the local fiscal system. A noticeable amount of off-
budgetary and extra-budgetary revenues arguably match the concept of tax 
revenue (Lin, 2002; Wu, 2002; Jia & Liu, 2005; Lin, 2005). It is therefore 
reasonable to use the current revenue in the tax effort model. In addition, due 
to a large proportion of the government’s total revenue being non-tax-sourced 
revenue, it is not appropriate to leave it out of the equation when discussing 
tax-related issues. 
 
This research investigates the tax performance in China, and to find the key 
determinants of the variation of the tax revenue capacity and tax revenue 
effort in China. It follows the previous studies of Fauvelle-Aymar (1999), Bird 
et al. (2006), Tuan Minh et al. (2008), and Le et al. (2012). They constructed a 
broader fiscal revenue indicator by adding up the tax revenue and selected 
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non-tax-sourced revenue. This research has constructed the current revenue 
ratio at provincial level in China as a broader, but more accurate fiscal 
revenue indicator. 
 
Under the budget management system in China, the non-tax-sourced revenue 
is also divided into two sections: the off-budgetary revenue and extra-budgetary 
revenue. The difference between these two is that the former is under budget 
management, as a major component of the general fiscal revenue in China’s 
Fiscal Statistical Yearbook, while the extra-budgetary revenue is not included 
in the Chinese Statistical Yearbook as a component of the general fiscal 
revenue until 2011 (M.O.F., 1995-2015). 
 
Since this study involves a panel analysis, which combines both the cross-
section data and time-series data, one fact that should not be ignored is the 
changes in the coverage of data during the study period. Off-budgetary and 
extra-budgetary revenues are conceptually different; however, in order to 
better control the size of the extra-budgetary revenue and take them into 
budget management step by step, the central government has made an effort 
to merge the items in the extra-budgetary revenue into off-budgetary revenue. 
This effort continued until 2011, when all the extra-budgetary revenue was 
merged into the off-budgetary revenue, and the term “extra-budgetary 
revenue” vanished from China’s official statistical documents (Tong et al., 
2013; Zheng & Wang, 2013). Hence, for the purpose of data consistency and 
analysis accuracy, current revenue is calculated as the sum of off-budgetary 
and extra-budgetary revenue. 
 
In addition, two items from the off-budgetary revenue, namely the revenue 
from SOEs and the planned subsidies to loss-suffering of SOEs (PSL), are 
excluded from the data. It was explained in Chapter 4 that according to PSL’s 
property and the classification by UN, PSL is a subsidized fiscal expenditure 
in principle. Inclusion of the PSL in the off-budgetary revenue might cause 
data bias for some provinces. In addition, the revenue from SOEs is highly 
related to the PSL, as both reflect the activities of SOEs. 
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Hence, the current revenue ratio is calculated based on the formula given 
below: 
ݎݕ =
ݐݎ + ݋ܾݎ + ܾ݁ݎ − ݎݏ݋݁ − ݌ݏ݈
݃݀݌
 
Equation 5-4 
Where: 
ݎݕ = ܿݑݎݎ݁݊ݐ ݎ݁ݒ݁݊ݑ݁ ݎܽݐ݅݋ 
ݐݎ = ݐܽݔ ݎ݁ݒ݁݊ݑ݁ 
݋ܾݎ = ݋݂݂ ܾݑ݀݃݁ݐܽݎݕ ݎ݁ݒ݁݊ݑ݁ 
ܾ݁ݎ = ݁ݔݐݎܽ ܾݑ݀݃݁ݐܽݎݕ ݎ݁ݒ݁݊ݑ݁ 
ݎݏ݋݁ = ݎ݁ݒ݁݊ݑ݁ ݂ݎ݋݉ ܵݐܽݐ݁ ܱݓ݊݁݀ ܧ݊ݐ݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ݏ݁ݏ 
݌ݏ݈ = ݌݈ܽ݊݊݁݀ ݏݑܾݏ݅݀݅݁ݏ ݐ݋ ݈݋ݏݏ ݏݑ݂݂݁ݎ݅݊݃ ܵݐܽݐ݁ ܱݓ݊݁݀ ܧ݊ݐ݁ݎ݌ݎ݅ݏ݁ݏ 
݃݀݌ = ݃ݎ݋ݏݏ ݀݋݉݁ݏݐ݅ܿ ݌ݎ݋݀ݑܿݐ 
 
The tax revenue data and the GDP data are both collected from China 
Financial Statistic Yearbooks. The data of the off budgetary revenue, extra 
budgetary revenue, revenue from state owned enterprises and planned 
subsidies to loss suffering state owned enterprises are collected from the 
Financial Statistical Yearbook of each province. 
   
5.6 Obtain and generate the independent variables 
The factors taken into consideration in this research as explanatory variables 
are grouped into six categories for the convenience of the study, which 
consists of a total of 11 variables for the purpose of the 11 hypotheses in this 
study. The six categories are traditional tax handles, GDP decomposition, 
population factors, income inequality, corruption level, and governmental 
factors. The stage of development, which is measured by the per capita GDP, 
and the openness level are two variables included in this study as the 
traditional tax handles. The industrial sector value added and service sector 
value added to GDP are included in the GDP decomposition category. The 
population factors include three variables, namely the population growth rate, 
population density, and non-agricultural population rate. For the category of 
income inequality, this study is mainly focused on the rural-urban income 
disparity.  The corruption level in this study is reflected by the anti-corruption 
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effort index at provincial level. Finally, the level of dependence on central 
transfer and the degree of government competency are included in the 
governmental factors to represent the government’s dependency and 
capacity. Table 5-4 provides the summary of all the six categories and their 
corresponding variables. 
 
 
Table 5-4: Six categories and their corresponding variables 
 
 
5.6.1 Traditional tax handles  
Piancastelli (2001) provide strong evidence that three traditional tax handles, 
the per capita income, the trade ratio, and the agriculture share, are the most 
influential variables in the tax effort model. 
 
In Piancastelli’s (2001) study, the regression analysis covers data on 75 
countries during the period 1985 to 1995. The variables of per capita GNP and 
traditional tax 
handles
• per capita GDP
• openness level
GDP 
decomposition
• industrial sector value added
• service sector value added
population 
factors
• population growth rate
• population density
• non-agricultural population rate
income 
inequality • urban-rural income disparity
governmental 
factors
• level of dependence on central transfer
• government capacity
corruption • anti-corruption effort index
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the trade share explain over half of the variance of the tax effort.  
 
Teera and Hudson (2004), Gupta (2007), and Pessino and Fenochietto (2010) 
all derived similar results. The significance level of the three variables in Terra 
and Hudson’s study on tax effort of 116 countries during the period 1975 to 
1998 added strong evidence to Piancastelli’s conclusion.  
 
Gupta’s (2007) panel data analysis of 105 developing countries in a time period 
of 25 years also supported Piancastell’s result (Gupta, 2007). 
 
Based on the strong empirical evidence discussed above, two of the traditional 
tax handles, namely the per capita GDP and the openness level, are taken into 
consideration in this research. The agricultural sector-related factor is also 
included in this research, but taking a different approach. A detailed description 
is presented in the later section. 
 
The following section provides a detailed analysis of the three variables used 
in the above-mentioned studies.  
 
5.6.1.1 Per capita GDP 
It is well documented in the tax effort literature that a higher level of economic 
development generates more public demand and expenditure, as well as a 
greater income and tax base to collect tax revenues (Lotz & Morss, 1967; Bahl, 
1971; Tanzi & Zee, 2000; Piancastelli, 2001; Bird et al., 2008; Pessino & 
Fenochietto, 2010).  
 
It is also widely accepted that the higher level of development an economy 
has the greater influence on taxation it has (Shin, 1969). A higher state of 
development would increase the surplus of total income where government 
generates tax revenues (Shin, 1969). The most popular indicator of the level 
of development is the per capita GDP. It is also widely used by many 
scholars as one of the most influential variables in the tax effort-related 
models even today (Piancastelli, 2001; Teera & Hudson, 2004; Gupta, 2007; 
Pessino & Fenochietto, 2010). 
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Therefore, the same indicator is also applied in this research. In order to 
obtain a comparable result and avoid the impact from the change of inflation, 
per capita GDP at each province is deflated using the per capita GDP deflator 
index of each province for each year.  
 
The function of real per capita GDP in a mathematical expression is as 
follows: 
 
ݎ݌ܿ݃݀݌௜௧ = ݂(݌ܿ݃݀݌௜௧  , ݌ܿ݃݀݌݅݀௜௧) 
Equation 5-5 
Where: 
ݎ݌ܿ݃݀݌ = ݎ݈݁ܽ ݌݁ݎ ܿܽ݌݅  ܩܦܲ 
݌ܿ݃݀݌ = ݊݋݈݉݅݊ܽ ݌݁ݎ ܿܽ݌݅ݐܽ ܩܦܲ 
݌ܿ݃݀݌݅݀ = ݌݁ݎ ܿܽ݌݅ݐܽ ܩܦܲ ݂݈݀݁ܽݐ݋ݎ ݅݊݀݁ݔ 
݅ = ݌ݎ݋ݒ݅݊ܿ݁ 
ݕ = ݕ݁ܽݎ 
 
The nominal per capita GDP and its deflator index data are collected from the 
Chinese Statistical Yearbook. 
 
Most of the empirical studies showed a positive relationship between the per 
capita GDP and tax ratio, although some scholars argue that the increase in 
per capita GDP might have a different impact because the per capita GDP is 
more positively related to a progressive tax system or indirect taxes (Shin, 1969; 
Ghura, 1998). However, in Chapter three and Chapter four of this paper, it was 
revealed that China’s tax system during the study period is mainly based on 
turnover tax, namely the indirect taxes such as value-added tax, business tax, 
and consumption tax, which are the dominant components in the tax revenue 
structure. Hence, based on the strong empirical evidence and the 
characteristics of China’s tax structure, a positive relationship between tax effort 
and current revenue effort is expected in this research. 
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5.6.1.2 Openness level 
The openness level of an economy is one of the classic, yet important tax 
handles. The openness level is usually measured by the share of either imports 
to GDP or the sum of imports and exports to GDP (Hinrichs,1965). 
 
As early as 1965, Hinrichs (1965) detected that the share of imports  in GDP 
has a greater explanatory power than the per capita GDP in lesser developed 
countries. The foreign trade sector is normally well organized and easier to 
manage, also with lower administrative costs (Ghura, 1998; Gupta, 2007). A 
high level of foreign trade, which indicates a higher openness level, normally 
results in a greater performance of the economy, hence improving the tax ratio. 
This has been proven by many other researchers (Ghura, 1998; Keen & Simone, 
2004; Baunsgaard & Keen, 2010). 
 
The previous studies have been mainly focused on inter-country analysis. 
According to the nature and scope of this research, it was felt that the provincial 
openness level should be measured as the trade share both internationally and 
among other provinces. However, the data relating to the local trades is rarely 
available. Hence in this research, the provinces’ foreign trade share measured 
as the sum of import and export to GDP is used as the proxy of local 
government’s overall openness level, and a positive relationship between the 
trade share and the tax ratio is expected. The function of the openness level in 
a mathematical expression is: 
 
ݐݎܽ݀݁௜௧ =
݁ݔ݌௜௧ + ݅݉݌௜௧
ܩܦ ௜ܲ௧
 
Equation 5-6 
Where: 
trade = openness level 
exp = total export 
imp = total import 
GDP = gross domestic product 
i = province 
t = year 
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The GDP, total export, and total import data are obtained from the Statistical 
Yearbook of each province for various years. 
 
5.6.2 The Decomposition of GDP  
The following section explains the variables related to the GDP decomposition 
used in this study. The variables generated from the GDP decomposition in 
this study were the industrial sector value added to GDP and the service 
sector value added to GDP.  
 
Due to the strong connection between economic development and tax bases, 
the structural differences with the GDP play an essential role in the tax effort-
related studies. The analysis of GDP composition/decomposition started as 
early as in 1970s, when Bahl (1971) included the mining share of income as 
one of the explanatory variables in his research on taxation in 1970. This 
approach was followed by many researchers. Consequently, the industrial 
sector-related variables, such as the mining share, manufacturing share, and 
industrial share in GDP, were gradually accepted and used in tax research 
(Bahl, 1971; Leuthold, 1991; Fauvelle-Aymar, 1999; Piancastelli, 2001; 
Mertens, 2003; Teera & Hudson, 2004). 
 
However, it was not until recently, from the early 21st century, that scholars 
further divided GDP into service sectors, which was in turn used in the tax 
research. The typical variable is the share of service sector in GDP or service 
sector value added in GDP (Piancastelli, 2001; Chaudhry & Munir, 2010). 
Hence, two explanatory variables are included in this research, namely the real 
manufactory sector value added to GDP and service sector value added to GDP. 
 
5.6.2.1 Industrial sector value-added 
Theoretically, the industrial sector is relatively easier to tax, because it’s 
normally well organized, and its revenue is better recorded. This is also true for 
China, as China’s fiscal structure is largely dependent on the revenues 
generated from industrial sectors (Wong, 1992; Wang et al., 2009). 
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The industrial value added to GDP is calculated using the following formula: 
 
݅݊݀௜௧ =
ݎ݅݊݀௜௧
ݎ݃݀݌௜௧
 
Equation 5-7 
Where: 
݅݊݀ = ݎ݈݁ܽ ݅݊݀ݑݏݐݎ݈݅ܽ ݒ݈ܽݑ݁ − ܽ݀݀݁݀ ݐ݋ ܩܦܲ 
ݎ݅݊݀ = ݎ݈݁ܽ ݅݊݀ݑݏݐݎ݈݅ܽ ݌ݎ݋݀ݑܿݐ݅݋݊ ݂݈݀݁ܽݐ݁݀ ܾݕ ݅݊݀ݑݏݐݎ݈݅ܽ ݂݈݀݁ܽݐ݋ݎ ݅݊݀݁ݔ  
ݎ݃݀݌ = ݎ݈݁ܽ ܩܦܲ ݂݈݀݁ܽݐ݁݀ ܾݕ ܩܦܲ ݂݈݀݁ܽݐ݋ݎ ݅݊݀݁ݔ  
݅ = ݌ݎ݋ݒ݅݊ܿ݁ 
ݐ = ݕ݁ܽݎ 
 
The industrial value added to GDP level is calculated in this research by real 
industrial total production and real GDP level. Each individual manufactory 
production value and GDP level is deflated by the industrial deflator index and 
GDP deflator index; hence, the real manufactory value added is calculated by 
the ratio of real manufactory production and real GDP. The industrial production, 
GDP, industrial deflator index, and the GDP deflator index are collected from 
the China Statistical Yearbook.   
 
Due to the special historical relationship between the SOEs and the local 
government, there is a large share of contribution of industry sector towards the 
tax revenues. Thus, it is predicted that the industry’s share is positively related 
to the tax ratio. 
 
5.6.2.2 Service value-added  
The calculation of the service sector value added to GDP is from the same data 
source and the same method as the industrial value added to GDP. The formula 
used is as follows: 
 
 
 
ݏ݁ݎ௜௧ =
ݎݏ݁ݎ௜௧
ݎ݃݀݌௜௧
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Equation 5-8 
Where: 
ݏ݁ݎ = ݎ݈݁ܽ ݏ݁ݎݒ݅ܿ݁ ݏ݁ܿݐ݋ݎ ݒ݈ܽݑ݁ ܽ݀݀݁݀ ݐ݋ ܩܦܲ 
ݎݏ݁ݎ = ݎ݈݁ܽ ݏ݁ݎݒ݅ܿ݁ ݏ݁ܿݐ݋ݎ ݌ݎ݋݀ݑܿݐ݅݋݊ ݂݈݀݁ܽݐ݁݀ ܾݕ ݏ݁ݎݒ݅ܿ݁ ݏ݁ܿݐ݋ݎ ݂݈݀݁ܽݐ݋ݎ ݅݊݀݁ݔ 
ݎ݃݀݌ = ݎ݈݁ܽ ܩܦܲ ݂݈݀݁ܽݐ݁݀ ܾݕ ܩܦܲ ݅݊݀݁ݔ 
݅ = ݌ݎ݋ݒ݅݊ܿ݁ 
ݐ = ݕ݁ܽݎ 
 
The Chinese local government tax revenue is highly reliable on value added 
tax. Therefore, it can be argued that a more developed service sector will lead 
to a higher level of tax revenue due to the positive relationship between the 
service sector and the sales and consumption brought by this sector.  
 
Nonetheless, the results of the relationship between the share of the service 
sector in GDP and tax effort are mixed in the previous studies. The argument 
that a positive relationship may exist between the service sector and sales and 
consumption is based on one assumption that activities in service sectors are, 
at least mostly, formal activities. However, many scholars have pointed out that 
the existence of large scale informal activities in developed countries is 
inevitable due to the important role of informal activities in the development of 
the country’s economy (Tanzi & Davoodi, 2000; Botlhole, 2010). Some 
empirical studies seem to support this view. According to the tax effort study of 
75 developed and developing countries presented by Piancastelli (2001), a 
non-significant relationship between the service sector share in GDP and the 
tax effort was found. Similar results were also provided by Chaudhry and Munir 
(2010), when they investigated the relationship between the service sector 
share in  GDP and the tax effort level in Pakistan; the result indicated a non-
significant relationship. However, a very  different result emerged in the study 
presented by Botlhole (2010) on the determinants of tax ratio in Sub-Saharan 
African countries during the period of 1990 to 2007: a significant negative sign 
between the service sector share in GDP and the tax-GDP ratio. 
 
The huge divergence in the results regarding the relationship between service 
sector share in GDP and the tax ratio has provided strong evidence that the 
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influence of the service sector share in GDP on the tax-GDP ratio is strictly 
country-specific. Hence, it is difficult to point out the direction regarding the 
effect of the service sector without a systematic investigation of the size of 
informal activities in the service sector. In addition, relevant studies regarding 
the relationship between tax effort and service sector are scant.  
 
As revealed in Chapter three and four, in China the current tax system is mainly 
focused on turnover taxes such as VAT, consumption taxes, and business taxes. 
Thus, based on the empirical finding regarding the relationship between the 
service sector share in GDP and the tax ratio, especially the importance of 
turnover taxes in China’s tax structure, it is expected in this research that the 
variable measured as the service sector value added in GDP will produce a 
positive sign in the tax ratio and current revenue ratio regressions. Similarly, if 
the service sector in China has mostly informal activities, a positive sign is also 
expected in the relationship between current revenue ratio and service value 
added. This argument is based on the fact that a large proportion of the non-
tax-sourced revenue, the local governments’ fees, charges, and funds are 
under a two level management system between central government and local 
government. The rights of establishment, collecting, and spending of the 
governments’ fees, charges, and funds are mostly in the hands of local 
government, and this area seriously lacks legal basis and control (Lin, 2002; 
Wu, 2002; Jia & Liu, 2005; Ma, 2005). Therefore, it may be argued that the 
greater the number of informal activities in the service sector, the higher the 
non-tax-sourced revenue, and hence, a higher current revenue ratio. The 
analysis of the difference of performance of the service sector in both tax ratio 
and current revenue ratio would provide valuable results for one of the 
hypotheses in this study: China’s provincial level tax revenue performance is 
limited by the existence of non-tax-sourced revenue. 
 
5.6.3 Population factors 
The role of population factors in the tax-GDP ratio studies has captured the eye 
of researchers for a long time. The most adopted variables representing the 
role of population factors are the population growth rate and the population 
density. However, questions regarding how  population factors influence the tax 
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effort in the model is debatable (Teera & Hudson, 2004). Hence, to understand 
the impact of population factors on tax and current revenue ratios, one needs 
to understand the characteristic of the population factor in the nation.  
 
The population factors taken into account in this study are the population growth 
rate, population density, and non-agricultural population rate. Each of the 
variables has a special meaning in China.  
 
5.6.3.1 Population growth rate 
It is argued by Shin (1969) that a higher population growth rate would increase 
tax collection due to the rise in consumption and sales. However, a higher 
population growth rate might also have a negative relationship with tax 
collection due to the lag effect of capturing taxpayers (Bahl, 2004; Teera & 
Hudson, 2004). 
 
While studying the impact of population growth rate on the Chinese economy 
in general and on tax performance in particular, a unique phenomenon should 
also be taken into account – the “one child policy” in China. During the opening 
up period in 1979, in order to improve the average family living standards, the 
Chinese government included a strict population control program as one of the 
main components of its economic reform; hence, the “one child policy” was 
introduced and strictly enforced (Xing, 2003). Parents who had more than one 
child and did not qualify as an exception were charged  penalties and ostracized 
or even rejected from housing and welfare benefits (Mishkin, 2011, p. 162). 
 
Since then, the State Family Planning Bureau set out targets and policy 
directions for each of the provincial and lower level governments. The most 
affected people were urban residents and government employees. Some 
exceptions were made for famers in rural and remote areas, families with 
special difficulties, and ethnic minorities. The figure of population growth rate is 
therefore an important indicator of how well the local governments meet the 
specific targets given by the State Family Planning Bureau regarding birth 
control (Hesketh, Lu, & Xing, 2005). 
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Nonetheless, the variable representing the population growth rate used in this 
research is the natural population growth rate, which is calculated as the ratio 
of the difference between the birth rate and mortality rate and total population. 
The birth rate is calculated as the number of new born babies in every 1,000 
people within the province’s total population, and the mortality rate is calculated 
in the same way. 
 
The relevant data was collected from China Population and Employment 
Statistics Yearbook. The arithmetic expression for calculating the natural 
population growth rate is as follows: 
 
݃ݎ݌݋݌௜௧ =
ܾ݅ݎݐℎ௜௧ − ݉݋ݎݐ௜௧
݌݋݌௜௧
∗ 1000‰ 
Equation 5-9 
 
Where: 
݃ݎ݌݋݌ = ݊ܽݐݑݎ݈ܽ ݌݋݌ݑ݈ܽݐ݅݋݊ ݃ݎ݋ݓݐℎ ݎܽݐ݁ 
ܾ݅ݎݐℎ = ܾ݅ݎݐℎ ݎܽݐ݁ 
݉݋ݎݐ = ݉݋ݎݐ݈ܽ݅ݐݕ ݎܽݐ݁ 
݌݋݌ = ݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ ݌݋݌ݑ݈ܽݐ݅݋݊ 
݅ = ݌ݎ݋ݒ݅݊ܿ݁ 
ݐ = ݕ݁ܽݎ 
 
It may be argued that the increase in population growth rate would raise tax 
collection due to the rise in consumption and sales. This is pertinent in China. 
As revealed in chapter three and four, China’s local taxes largely rely on 
turnover taxes, such as value added taxes, business taxes, and consumption 
taxes, whereas the personal income tax only accounts for a tiny share in 
China’s total tax revenue. In turn, it may be argued that the rate of population 
growth increases the tax exemption and has a lag effect on tax collection. In 
addition, this indicator might also reflect the degree of influence caused by the 
“one child policy”; thus, a negative relationship is expected between the natural 
population growth rate and the tax/current revenue effort.  
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5.6.3.2 Population density 
Population density is argued to be another relevant factor in tax revenue 
performance due to its significant role in the level of development of the 
economy, as a higher population level indicates wider taxable sources (Teera & 
Hudson, 2004). As Shin (1969) points out, it is highly likely that the positive 
relationship between population density and tax revenue would be found due 
to the increase in consumption and sales (Shin, 1969). 
 
In the case of China, a huge share of tax revenue is generated by value-added 
taxes, mainly generated from consumption and sales; hence, it is argued in this 
research that a positive relationship is expected between population density 
and tax/current revenues. 
 
Population density is calculated by the ratio of total population and the total land 
area in square kilometres. Data is collected from China Population and 
Employment Statistical Yearbook. In a mathematical form, population density 
can be described as shown below: 
 
݀݊݌݋݌௜௧ =
݌݋݌௜௧
ܽݎ݁ܽ௜
 
Equation 5-10 
Where: 
݀݊݌݋݌ = ݌݋݌ݑ݈ܽݐ݅݋݊ ݀݁݊ݏ݅ݐݕ 
݌݋݌ = ݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ ݌݋݌ݑ݈ܽݐ݅݋݊ ݅݊ ݑ݊݅ݐݏ ݋݂ 10000 ݌݁݋݌݈݁ 
ܽݎ݁ܽ = ݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ ݈ܽ݊݀ ܽݎ݁ܽ ݅݊ ݑ݊݅ݐݏ ݋݂ ݏݍݑܽݎ݁ ݈݇݅݋݉݁ݐݎ݁ݏ 
݅ = ݌ݎ݋ݒ݅݊ܿ݁ 
ݐ = ݕ݁ܽݎ 
 
5.6.3.3 Non-agriculture population rate 
As argued in Chapter two, variables related to the agriculture sector are the 
most important traditional tax handles till today. Agricultural activities mainly 
take place in rural areas, which makes it rather difficult to generate tax revenues 
compared to other sectors, since most of the public sector activities are urban-
based (Tanzi, 1992; Teera & Hudson, 2004). A larger agricultural share in the 
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economic structure indicates a lower demand of governmental activities and 
services due to the fact that the agricultural sector is normally composed of 
subsistence farmers through large scale informal activities in rural areas. Hence, 
it is difficult for the tax authorities to control and collect tax (Ghura, 1998; Teera 
& Hudson, 2004; Karagöz, 2013). The empirical evidence indicates that a 
negative relationship between the agriculture sector share of GDP and the tax 
ratio was often found by many scholars (Leuthold, 1991; Tanzi, 1992; Ghura, 
1998; Karagöz, 2013). 
 
Tax generation in the agriculture sector is especially difficult in China. According 
to the literature review chapter, it is noticeable that tax reduction and exemption 
has been one of the core tax reforms in the agriculture sector since 1978. 
Consequently, the total agriculture-related taxes has kept decreasing. This 
exemption of tax and tax reduction in the agriculture sector continued until 2006, 
and eventually, all the agriculture-related taxes were officially abolished. 
 
From another perspective, it may be said that the higher the non-agricultural 
population, the lower the agricultural section activities and the higher the tax 
revenues; thus, the other population variable in the tax/current revenue function 
used is the non-agricultural population rate. 
 
Moreover, the non-agricultural population in China has its own special and 
important issues because of its close link with migration.  
 
According to Bao, Örn, Hou, and Yaohui (2009), during the years 1982 to 1987, 
30 million Chinese people migrated within or between provinces. However, this 
number rose to 144 million from 1995 to 2000, a size expanding by almost 5 
times. Furthermore, there was a large surge of migration of rural residents to 
urban areas, especially to coastal areas and metropolitans (Bao et al., 2009). 
This enormous migration resulted in an unbalanced population density across 
the country. Thus, a change in the non-agricultural population rate also 
indicates the degree of migration from rural areas to urban areas. On the one 
hand, the migration from rural areas to urban areas provided millions of workers 
for urban cities. On the other hand, it boosted the urbanization level, since those 
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workers contributed highly to the urban economy (Knight, 2008; Shunfeng, 
Erqian, & Mukhopadhyay, 2009). 
 
As mentioned before, since the relationship between the agriculture sector’s 
production and tax collection turned rather weak in China after the abolishing 
of agricultural tax, research has shown that the non-agricultural population rate 
is a better proxy for this research, as it can capture both the size of the 
agriculture sector and the urbanization level. In a mathematical form, the non-
agricultural population rate can be expressed as follows:  
 
݊ܽ݌݋݌௜௧ =
ݐ݊ܽ݌݋݌௜௧
݌݋݌௜௧
 
Equation 5-11 
 
 Where: 
݊ܽ݌݋݌ = ݊݋݊ ܽ݃ݎ݅ܿݑ݈ݐݑݎ݈ܽ ݌݋݌ݑ݈ܽݐ݅݋݊ ݎܽݐ݁ 
ݐ݊ܽ݌݋݌ = ݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ ݊݋݊ − ܽ݃ݎ݅ܿݑ݈ݐݑݎ݈ܽ ݌݋݌ݑ݈ܽݐ݅݋݊ 
݌݋݌ = ݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ ݌݋݌ݑ݈ܽݐ݅݋݊ 
݅ = ݌ݎ݋ݒ݅݊ܿ݁ 
ݐ = ݕ݁ܽݎ 
 
The total population and non-agricultural population data are collected from 
China Population and Employment Statistical Yearbook.  
 
Based on the strong empirical and theoretical evidence discussed above, a 
positive relationship between the non-agriculture population rate and the 
tax/current revenue ratio is expected in this research.  
 
5.6.4 Income inequality 
Countless studies have provided evidence that income inequality harms 
investment, social and political stability, and economic growth (Hung Mo, 2000; 
Jędrzejczak, 2015; Zhang & Bao, 2015). Therefore, it is not surprising to find 
that the issue of income inequality in the world as well as in China has greatly 
drawn the attention of both scholars and authorities. 
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5.6.4.1 Urban-rural income disparity in China 
It is well documented that since the openness reform of China in 1978, income 
inequality has been  increasing at a fast pace along with rapid economic growth, 
especially the resident income disparity (Peng, Song, & Peng 2013). The Gini 
coefficient, which is a widely accepted measurement for  income inequality,  
increased by over 150% between 1978 to 2006 (Chen, Dai, Pu, Hou, & Feng, 
2010). The widening gap between rich and poor has threatened both the 
economic growth and the social harmony of the entire society. Along with the 
great achievement of fast economic growth, the not so hidden rapid growth of 
income inequality has become the authority’s “irritating headache” (Zhang & 
Bao, 2015). 
 
Using a cross-section data set in 1982, Tsui (1993) found that the disparity in 
urban-rural residents’ incomes largely contributed to the overall inequality in 
China. Following the tax sharing reform in 1994, the urban-rural residents’ 
income disparities have still not improved. Figure 5-1 depicts the divergence of 
urban and rural household real per capita annual income from 1978 to 2013.  
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Figure 5-1: Urban-rural residents’ income disparities: 1978 - 2013 
 
Data source: N.B.S. (2014)  
Note. The real income value is calculated by the urban per capita annual disposable income 
index and rural net income index, and the base year is 1978.  
 
 
It can be seen that the income gap between the urban and rural household has 
been widening throughout the whole period, and especially after 1994, where 
the divergence shows a faster pace. In 2013, the annual average per capita 
disposable income of urban households was over 2.5 times larger than their 
rural counterparts.  
 
5.6.4.2 Income inequality in tax effort index study 
Income inequality is also documented in the tax effort index literature as one of 
the important social factors related to the tax revenue performance. Bird et al. 
(2006) Investigated the determinants of tax performance for selective 
developing countries and high income countries and included income inequality 
as one of the demand side variables. A significant and negative relationship was 
182 
 
found between the income inequality and the tax/current revenue ratio. In their 
stochastic frontier panel data tax ratio analysis of 113 countries, Fenochietto 
and Pessino (2013) reveal that the Gini index, an indicator for income equality, 
was highly significant and negatively related to the tax ratio. 
 
In this study, urban-rural resident income disparity is used as the proxy of the 
income inequality in China, which will be explained in detail later. 
 
5.6.4.3 Income inequality measurements  
Currently, the most used statistical indicators in the field of income inequality 
and the area of study of the regional inequality are the Gini coefficient and the 
Theil index.  
 
The Gini coefficient was first introduced by Corrado Gini in 1912, and its core 
idea is to measure the inequality of income or wealth (Gini, 1936). The Gini 
index ranks the income inequality between 0 and 1 – a Gini index of 0 indicates 
perfect equality, where each person or unit has equal share of income or wealth 
as compared to others; and a Gini index of 1 indicates extreme unbalanced 
inequality, where only one person or unit possesses the entire income or wealth 
of the whole sample. Normally, the Gini index is between 0 and 1; if the income 
or wealth is more equally distributed, the Gini index is closer to 0 and vice versa 
(Bellù & Liberati, 2006). 
 
The foundation of the Gini index is the Lorenz curve. The Lorenz curve was first 
introduced in 1905 by Max O. Lorenz in his article “Methods of measuring the 
concentration of wealth”. In the paper, Lorenz developed a simple method that 
illustrated the concentration of wealth and formatted it into a graphical 
representation. The graphical expression of the Lorenz curve can be seen in 
Figure 5-2 below: 
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Figure 5-2: The Lorenz Curve 
 
Line OP represents the cumulative share of individuals from the lowest to the 
highest incomes; line YP indicates the cumulative share of income earned; and 
line OY indicates the perfect equal distribution of income.  The Lorenz curve is 
the actual income or wealth distribution indicated by the curve between area A 
and area B. Hence, the Gini index is the ratio of area A and area A+B. The larger 
the size of area A, the greater the income or wealth inequality. 
 
The other indicator of income inequality is the Theil index. The Theil index was 
introduced in 1967 by Henri Theil. He described the Theil index as “the 
expected information content of the indirect message which transforms the 
population shares as prior probabilities into the income shares as posterior 
probabilities” (Theil, 1967, pp. 125-126). 
 
The foundation of the Theil index was the information theory presented by 
Shannon and Weaver (1949), which measures the expected information 
content of the probability of occurrence of a set of events (Shannon & 
Weaver, 1949). In Shannon and Weaver’s information theory, suppose there 
are n events and one of them has the possibility of occurrence ݔ௜, then we 
have: 
෍ ݔ௜
௡
௡ୀଵ
= 1 
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Equation 5-12 
Then, the expected information content H is measured as follows: 
ܪ = ෍ ݔ௜
௡
௡ୀଵ
∗ ݈݋݃
1
ݔ௜
 
Equation 5-13 
 
Suppose the event’s occurrence possibility is 1, then we have the expected 
information content H equal to 0; in contrast, if the possibilities of occurrences 
of all the events are equal, i.e. ݔ௜ =
ଵ
௡
 , ݊ = 1, … ݊, then we have the maximum 
content of information ܪ = log (݊). Applying this theory to the income 
distribution analysis, suppose ݔ௜ is the income share of unit i, then the 
expected information content H is thus a measure of income inequality among 
all units (Conceição & Ferreira, 2000; Conceicao & Galbraith, 2000; Bar-Am, 
2016). 
 
Based on the Equation 5-13, we have the Theil index for n groups of people 
(݊ = 1, … ݅) as follows: 
 
ܶ = ෍ ቌ
ܫ௜
ܫ
∗ ݈݊
ܫ௜
ܫൗ
௜ܲൗܲ
ቍ
௡
௡ୀ௜
 
Equation 5-14 
Where: 
ܶ = ܶℎ݈݁݅ ݅݊݀݁ݔ 
ܫ = ݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ ݅݊ܿ݋݉݁ 
ܲ = ݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ ݌݋݌ݑ݈ܽݐ݅݋݊ 
݅ = ݃ݎ݋ݑ݌ݏ 
݊ = 1, … ݅. 
 
If the income share of a certain number of people is equal to its population 
share, i.e. ܫ௜ ܫ ൗ = 
௜ܲ
ܲൗ , then we have ln(1) = 0, and hence, T = 0, which 
indicates perfect income distribution among n groups of people. Otherwise, 
the larger the Theil index, the greater the income disparity among groups. 
 
185 
 
The Gini coefficient is sensitive for middle income groups, whereas the Theil 
index, according to its definition, more sensitively reflects the income gaps 
between the two ends, i.e. the highest and the lowest (Wang & Ouyang, 
2007). Thus, the Theil index is more suitable to reflect urban-rural income 
disparities since only two individual units are involved.   
 
5.6.4.4 Measurement of urban-rural income disparity in China using the 
Theil index 
 
According to the Theil index Equation 5-14, the urban-rural income inequality 
can be expressed by the following mathematical Equation 5-15: 
 
݅݊ܿ݋݉݁ =
ܫ௨
ܫ௨௥
∗ ݈݊
ܫ௨
ܫ௨௥ൗ
௨ܲ
௨ܲ௥
ൗ
+
ܫ௥
ܫ௨௥
∗ ݈݊
ܫ௥
ܫ௨௥ൗ
௥ܲ
௨ܲ௥
ൗ
 
Equation 5-15 
 
Where: 
݅݊ܿ݋݉݁ = ݑݎܾܽ݊ ݎݑݎ݈ܽ ݅݊ܿ݋݉݁ ݀݅ݏ݌ܽݎ݅ݐݕ ܶℎ݈݁݅ ݅݊݀݁ݔ 
ܫ = ݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ ݅݊ܿ݋݉݁ 
ܲ = ݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ ݌݋݌ݑ݈ܽݐ݅݋݊ 
ݑ = ݑݎܾܽ݊ ݎ݁ݏ݅݀݁݊ݐݏ ݃ݎ݋ݑ݌ 
ݎ = ݎݑݎ݈ܽ ݎ݁ݏ݅݀݁݊ݐݏ ݃ݎ݋ݑ݌ 
 
The total resident population, total urban resident population, and the total rural 
resident population are collected from China Population and Employment 
Statistical Yearbook. The total residents’ income, total urban residents’ income, 
and the total rural residents’ income are collected from the China Statistical 
Yearbook.  
 
Taking into consideration the previous empirical evidence that indicates a 
negative impact of income inequality on the social and economic environment, 
a negative sign between urban-rural Theil index and tax effort/current revenue 
effort is expected in this study. 
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5.6.5 Anti-corruption effort  
5.6.5.1 Definition of corruption 
It is essential to define corruption at the early stage of the related study despite 
the fact that the definition of corruption is still under debate. In most of the 
literature, a broad definition of corruption is accepted, that is to define corruption 
as the abuse of public power for private benefit (Bird et al., 2006; Everhart, 
Martinez-Vazquez, & McNab, 2009; Ionescu, 2011).  
 
It is can be seen from the above discussion that the definition of “corruption” is 
still fuzzy. However, Bardhan (1997) pointed out that considering the cultural 
differences which exist across countries and even in regions within countries, 
what might be considered as a bribe in one culture might be recognized as a 
favour or “routine transaction” in another culture (Bardhan, 1997). Nevertheless, 
no one can deny that there may be some grey areas between corruption 
activities and non-corruption activities.  
 
5.6.5.2 Literature regarding the relationship between corruption and 
tax/current revenue ratio 
The phenomenon of corruption has been an important social issue since 
ancient times in the history of human society. The strong relationship between 
corruption and other aspects of economic performance has been found in a lot 
of research (Ghura & Hadjimichael, 1996; Bardhan, 1997; Mauro, 1997). The 
systematic analysis of the relationship between corruption and tax revenue 
performance was also carried out in late 1990s. 
 
 A typical example is of the study carried out by Ghura (1998). In the study, the 
authors used data from 39 countries over 11 years to examine the relationship 
between corruption and tax ratio. The corruption level was used as one of the 
explanatory variables in the panel analysis. The result showed a highly 
statistical negative relationship between corruption and tax ratio. Since then, 
studies regarding the relationship between the corruption level and tax revenue 
performance have mushroomed. The studies include but are not limited to those 
conducted by Bird et al. (2006), Le et al. (2012), and Fenochietto and Pessino 
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(2013). 
 
By investigating the institutional function of the government in selected 
developing and high income countries, Bird et al. (2006) confirms from the 
results that the corruption level and the rule of law has the greatest explanatory 
power on both tax and current revenue ratio among all the institutional factors. 
In their study on tax and fiscal revenue capacity and effort in 110 countries  Le 
et al. (2012)   also confirmed the highly significant and negative impact of the 
corruption level in both the tax revenue ratio model and fiscal revenue ratio 
model. Fenochietto and Pessino (2013) Also found a positive and highly 
significant relationship between the controls of corruption and tax ratio in both 
developed and developing countries. Fenochietto and Pessino (2013) stressed 
that a significant increase in a country’s tax capacity could be achieved by 
higher government efficiency, which could reduce the level of corruption. The 
conclusion from Fenochietto and Pessino’s study infers that the level of 
government efficiency is positively related to tax capacity and tax effort. 
Conversely, a high level of corruption will adversely affect tax capacity and tax 
effort.  
 
Despite the numerous studies on the relationship between tax/current revenue 
performance and corruption level for inter-country analysis, one can hardly find 
a study of tax effort index with corruption as one of the explanatory variables at 
intra-country analysis, especially for China, where corruption is notably known. 
In order to close this gap in the literature, for the first time according to the 
researcher’s knowledge, an attempt is made to link corruption as one of the 
social factors with both tax and current revenue ratio models. 
 
5.6.5.3 Guanxi and corruption in China 
Corruption has its own unique meaning in China due to the prevailing “Guanxi”: 
a special social and cultural phenomenon in China and fertile soil for corruption.  
 
Literally, “Guanxi” refers to the interpersonal relationships and connections. 
However, to fully understand the meaning of the Guanxi network system in 
mainland China is rather difficult for people from other areas, even those from 
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the same ethnic group sharing the same Chinese traditions, for example, for 
people from Taiwan and Hong Kong (Chenting & Littlefield, 2001).  
 
The practice of Guanxi has long been a tradition for Chinese people because 
of the long tradition in  Chinese society that “rule by man instead of rule by law” 
(Fan, 2002, p. 376). 
 
This special feature in China’s socialist market economy has resulted in a 
unique phenomenon that the Chinese economy does not evolve towards 
market capitalism, but towards a relationship-based Guanxi-web capitalism 
(Boisot & Child, 1996; Lovett, Simmons, & Kali, 1999). 
 
The development and practice of Guanxi prevails in China to such an extent 
that it has become China’s most distinguished feature from western 
management practice. As Davies, Leung, Luk, and Wong (1995) point out, the 
main difference between western and Chinese practice is that written contracts 
and procedures play a dominant role in western management practice, whereas 
in China, personal relationships, i.e. Guanxi, comes first (Davies et al., 1995). 
 
More importantly, Guanxi and corruption are like conjoined twins that are 
difficult to be separated especially when the government officials get involved 
in Guanxi style social networking system and corruption emerges.  
 
However, some scholars argue that Guanxi is a valuable resource in all aspects 
(Davies et al., 1995). According to Davies et al. (1995), Guanxi is not something 
that only exists, but something that people are managing and constructing. 
Developing or gaining access to a particular Guanxi (personal relationship to 
officials or authorities) or Guanxi social networking system (personal 
relationships among groups of people) is known as “La Guanxi”, meaning 
bridging personal relationships between individuals or groups of officials and 
authorities (Chenting & Littlefield, 2001). The practice of ‘La Guanxi’ has hence 
turned China into a breeding ground of corruption. The degree of constructing 
and bridging Guanxi between people has become so serious that corruption 
has evolved into institutionalised and intensified corruption with a huge Guanxi 
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web containing numerous politicians and businessmen (Fan, 2002; Wedeman, 
2004; Jianming & Zhizhou, 2008). 
 
It should be noted that after the economic reform in 1978, the government 
officials realized that their power is linked to greater personal benefits, where 
people who have no power can also reap the benefits through  connections; 
hence, the exchange of power and favours through a Guanxi style social 
networking system, i.e. La Guanxi, is widely being practiced (Chenting & 
Littlefield, 2001). 
 
The practice of Guanxi is often recognized as corruption by western society, 
and even in China, the opinions regarding how to distinguish between Guanxi 
practice and corruption are nowhere near being settled (Lovett et al., 1999). 
 
 
5.6.5.4 The measurement of corruption and the anti-corruption effort 
In order to best conceptualize the definition of corruption, measuring 
corruption is crucial. In fact, a vast array of indicators and sources from 
various institutions have been generated. These include the corruption in 
government index from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) from Transparency International (TI), and 
the Index of Control of Corruption from the Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(WGI) published by the World Bank. A detailed analysis of the strengths and 
weaknesses of these measures was provided by Javier Urra in 2007. 
 
In China, there is no clear official definition of the term “corruption”, possibly 
because there is no clear difference between the practice of Guanxi and 
corruption. However, in “the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China” 
(1997), there are two articles related to the crime of corruption: 
 
In article 382, it  states that “Any State functionary who, by taking advantage of 
his office, appropriates, steals, swindles public money or property or by other 
means illegally takes it into his own possession shall be guilty of embezzlement” 
(NPC, 1997).  
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In article 385, it was noted that “Any State functionary who, by taking advantage 
of his position, extorts money or property from another person, or illegally 
accepts another person’s money or property in return for securing benefits for 
the person shall be guilty of acceptance of bribes” (NPC, 1997). 
 
Despite the criticisms against the subjective measurement of some of the 
indicators, especially the argument regarding the possibility that it might reflect 
personal opinion rather than the actual presence of corruption, the above-
mentioned indexes are still most widely used for measuring corruption at 
international level (Urra, 2007). Using the corruption in government index from 
ICRG, Ghura (1998) examined the link between government corruption and tax 
effort index in a study of 39 Sub-Saharan African countries. Bird et al. (2006) 
used the index developed by (Daniel, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2004) to investigate 
the impact of governance on tax revenue performance in a large sample of 
countries including Latin American countries and some high income countries 
in Europe. Meanwhile, Le et al. (2012) used the Corruption Perceptions Index 
(CPI) and examined the relationship between corruption and countries’ tax 
revenue performance in 100 countries. 
 
As mentioned before, although the studies on the relationship between 
corruption and tax revenue performance have become prolific since the 1990s, 
compared with those comparative studies across countries, similar studies 
within the context of a single country are scant. This may be because corruption 
is such a complex phenomenon and difficult to calculate, and the corruption 
indexes published by different organizations are all focused on international 
comparison.  
 
Nonetheless, some effort has been made to calculate the proper proxy for 
corruption at intra-country level. For instance, some scholars have investigated 
the total value of public investments in one or more sectors and compared it 
with the total value of the outcome or true final value of the sectors. By 
estimating the value loss during the investment-outcome process, a proxy of 
the level of corruption was captured (Reinikka & Svensson, 2004; Golden & 
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Picci, 2005; Olken, 2007; Richey, 2010). Unfortunately, this kind of indirect 
measurement suffers from the fact that the value loss might be caused by many 
other factors rather than corruption alone.  
 
Some attempts have also been made to capture the level of corruption at sub-
national level. Fisman and Gatti (2002) and Glaeser and Saks (2006) 
introduced the number of government officials’ corruption-related crime 
convictions as the proxy of the degree of corruption.  
 
Fisman and Gatti (2002) weighted the conviction numbers by the police 
employment number and the prison inmate number to control the judicial 
enforcement, whereas Glaeser and Saks (2006) weighted the conviction 
numbers to the total state population (number of convictions per 100,000 
people). This type of direct measurement of  corruption has an advantage over 
other measurements “simply that of data availability, quality and comparability” 
(Fisman & Gatti, 2002, p. 27). 
 
Hence in this study, following the path of Fisman and Gatti (2002) and Glaeser 
and Saks (2006), the author constructed an anti-corruption effort index based 
on the number of government officials’ corruption-related crime convictions.  
 
The corruption data at the Chinese local government level is relatively hard to 
find, and therefore, “the total registered legal case of acceptance of bribes and 
embezzlement” is used to proxy the corruption/anti-corruption. This type of data 
is also fits with the definition of corruption in China’s criminal law.  
 
As a result, based on the definition of corruption in the “the Criminal Law of The 
People’s Republic of China”, the availability of data and linking Guanxi practice 
with corruption in China, the anti-corruption effort in this research is named as 
anti-corruption effort ratio, which is calculated as the total number of registered 
legal cases of acceptance of bribes and embezzlement in every 1,000,000 
people. It is calculated by the following formula. 
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ܿ݋ݎݎ௜௧ =
ݎܿ௜௧
݌݋݌݉௜௧
 
Equation 5-16 
Where: 
ܿ݋ݎݎ = ܽ݊ݐ݅ − ܿ݋ݎݎݑ݌ݐ݅݋݊ ݂݂݁݋ݎݐ ݎܽݐ݅݋ 
ݎܿ = ݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ ݊ݑܾ݉݁ݎ ݋݂ ݎ݁݃݅ݏݐ݁ݎ݁݀ ݈݈݁݃ܽ ܿܽݏ݁ݏ ݋݂ ܿ݋ݎݎݑ݌ݐ݅݋݊ ݎ݈݁ܽݐ݁݀ ܿݎ݅݉݁ݏ 
݌݋݌݉ = ݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ ݌݋݌ݑ݈ܽݐ݅݋݊ ݅݊ ݑ݊݅ݐ ݋݂ ܯ݈݈݅݅݋݊ݏ 
݅ = ݌ݎ݋ݒ݅݊ܿ݁ 
ݐ = ݕ݁ܽݎ 
 
It is worth noting that Fisman and Gatti (2002) and Glaeser and Saks (2006) 
used a similar approach to measure the level of corruption. However, they 
emphasised that the corruption ratio they obtained was to represent the level of 
corruption rather than anti-corruption as in the case here. As discussed earlier 
in this section, the presence of Guanxi in China is so serious that it is rooted in 
the Chinese culture, which makes even accurately defining corruption almost 
impossible. Moreover, the large scale of “La guanxi” practice also makes it 
impossible to measure corruption using a single dimension. Hence, taking into 
consideration the salient features of the characteristics of corruption in China, 
it is believed that this ratio measures the provincial governments’ efforts to 
tackle corruption, and the term anti-corruption ratio is introduced in this study. 
 
Following the definition of corruption in “the Criminal Law of The People’s 
Republic of China”, the corruption variable presented in this research is the total 
number of registered crimes committed by the state functionary involved in 
bribes and embezzlement, which includes embezzlement, accepting bribes, 
misappropriation of public funds, and malpractice-related crimes. 
 
The data of registered legal cases of corruption-related crimes is obtained from 
the provincial prosecutor’s office reports published in the “Procuratorial 
Yearbook of China”, and the signs of anti-corruption index in both the tax 
revenue ratio model and current revenue ratio model are expected to be 
positive in this study. 
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5.6.6 Government factors 
5.6.6.1  Local Government dependency on central transfers 
It is argued that external financing has a displacement effect on the domestic 
tax revenues (Leuthold, 1991). Similar to this displacement effect, a problem 
called the “reverse causality” may occur (Roodman, 2008). In general, “reverse 
causality” refers to a phenomenon in which, due to a government or region’s 
poor economic performance, a country or region receives external grants. 
However, if the country or region starts relying on the external grants, its 
economic performance becomes poorer and a downward spiral would be 
expected according to Ghura (1998). 
 
The concept of “reverse causality” can be extended to the local government’s 
dependency on central transfers. In China, as in many other countries, there 
are central government transfers to local/provincial government. This transfer 
can be viewed as the functioning of the external grants received by the local 
government.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the main purpose of the central government transfer 
in China is to deal with local government deficiencies and fiscal disparities 
between provinces. However, the reverse causality effect may occur between 
the central government transfer and local provincial tax effort/current revenue 
effort. In another words, if a local government becomes heavily dependent on 
the central government’s transfer, its tax performance, instead of becoming 
better, may become worse. 
 
 Fan and Zhang (2010) argue that the central transfer system in China has a 
direct impact on the local governments’ economic performance. However, 
based on the data from 1995 to 2006, the increased amount of central transfer 
received by local governments was performing as a negative impact on the 
local economic growth rate, especially in the less developed provinces (Fan 
and Zhang, 2010). Litvack, Ahmad, and Bird (1998) argue that a negative 
relationship between government transfer and local tax effort might be expected 
194 
 
due to the local governments trading the transfer as a substitute for tax 
revenues. Bordignon, Manasse, and Tabellini (2001) also support the negative 
impact of central transfers to local tax revenue. The theoretical evidence is that 
due to the lack of information and communication between the two levels of 
government, local authorities tend to purposely reduce the tax revenue to obtain 
more central transfers (Bordignon, Manasse, and Tabellini, 2001). 
 
It may be noted that the central government transfer in the tax/current revenue 
ratio models has a special property. The value of central transfers received may 
also be viewed as the proxy for the level of the provincial government 
decentralization. 
 
As discussed in chapter 4, the tax sharing reforms during 1994 essentially 
involved a fiscal centralization process. Huge shares of local revenue were 
taken back by the central government, yet the local expenditure responsibility 
remained the same. Consequently, a great fiscal deficiency appeared among 
local governments. One of the approaches for the local government to increase 
revenue was to increase the non-tax-sourced revenue. Meanwhile, local 
governments began to rely more on the central transfers. Thus, the central 
transfers are also a good reflection of the impact of the 1994 centralization 
reforms on the provincial tax/current revenue performance.  
 
In order to investigate the relationship between the central transfers received 
by provincial governments and the tax/current revenue performance, the 
amount of central transfers received by provincial governments has been taken 
into this research as the proxy of the level of dependence on the central 
transfers. 
 
The arithmetic expression is as follows: 
 
 
ݐݎܽ݊ݏ݌ܿ௜௧ =
ܿݐݎ௜௧
݌݋݌௜௧
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Equation 5-17 
Where: 
ݐݎܽ݊ݏ݌ܿ = ݌݁ݎ ܿܽ݌݅ݐܽ ܿ݁݊ݐݎ݈ܽ ݐݎܽ݊ݏ݂݁ݎ ݎ݁ܿ݁݅ݒ݁݀ 
݌݋݌ = ݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ ݌݋݌ݑ݈ܽݐ݅݋݊ 
ܿݐݎ = ݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ ܽ݉݋ݑ݊ݐ ݋݂ ܿ݁݊ݐݎ݈ܽ ݐݎܽݏ݂݁ݎݏ ݎ݁ܿ݁݅ݒ݁݀ ݂݈݀݁ܽݐ݁݀ ܾݕ ݐℎ݁ ܥܲܫ  
ܥܲ = ܿ݋݊ݏݑ݉݁ݎ ݌ݎ݅ܿ݁ ݅݊݀݁ݔ 
݅ = ݌ݎ݋ݒ݅݊ܿ݁ 
ݐ = ݕ݁ܽݎ 
 
The total population data is collected from China Population and Employment 
Statistical Yearbook. The total value of central transfers received by each 
province is obtained from the Financial Statistical Yearbook of each province. 
The total amount of central transfers of each province has been deflated by the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) to eliminate the effect of price changes, where the 
CPI data is obtained from the Statistical Yearbook of each province.  
 
The external financial support has been proven by many early studies to have 
a negative impact on tax revenue performance (Lotz & Morss, 1970; Leuthold, 
1991; Ghura, 1998; Chaudhry & Munir, 2010). It is therefore hypothesised in 
this study that the reverse causality effect may also exist in China, i.e. the fiscal 
transfer from central to local government decreases the local governments’ 
motivation to explore the opportunities for increasing their tax/current revenue. 
Hence, a negative relationship between real per capita central transfer and 
tax/current revenue ratio is expected. 
 
5.6.6.2 Government capacity 
Capacity can be defined as the ability to carry out appropriate tasks (Antwi & 
Analoui, 2008). The main purpose of tax and revenue collection is to provide 
the financial support for the government’s expenditure and to enhance the 
government’s capacity in the economy in order to perform governmental 
functions such as wealth redistribution and economic development (Huossain, 
2014). 
 
Government capacity is very important in the economy. Overcoming market 
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failure, distributing income and wealth evenly, and maintaining market 
stabilisation are the three main functions of governments (Shoup, 1959; Gruber, 
2011). Hence, the capacity of a government can be explained by its ability to 
utilize its functions. 
 
As the main financial support for government capacity, the size of tax or fiscal 
revenue is mainly determined by the required scale of government functions. 
Especially in developing countries, the government requires more expenditure 
for public goods and services, and hence, a greater surplus for taxes, resulting 
in a greater tax capacity and effort (Huossain, 2014).  
 
A higher level of government expenditure in the economy will certainly increase 
the need for taxation, as well as the requirement of a larger amount of fiscal 
revenue to provide the financial support for high quality public goods and 
services. Hence, the depth and width of government capacity is one of the most 
influential factors in the tax/current revenue capacity and tax effort. 
 
Huossain (2014) Investigates the relationship between government capacity 
and fiscal expenditure and measures the government’s capacity by the 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP. In this research, the proxy of government 
capacity is measured as the ratio of local government budgetary fiscal 
expenditure and local GDP. The mathematical expression for government 
capacity is as follows: 
 
݂݁ݔ݌௜௧ =
݁ݔ௜௧
ܩܦ ௜ܲ௧
 
Equation 5-18 
Where: 
݂݁ݔ݌ = ݐℎ݁ ݌ݎ݋ݔݕ ݋݂ ݐℎ݁ ݃݋ݒ݁ݎ݊݉݁݊ݐ ܿܽ݌ܽܿ݅ݐݕ 
݁ݔ = ݐ݋ݐ݈ܽ ܾݑ݀݃݁ݐܽݎݕ ݂݅ݏ݈ܿܽ ݁ݔ݌݁݊݀݅ݐݑݎ݁ 
ܩܦܲ = ݃ݎ݋ݏݏ ݀݋݉݁ݏݐ݅ܿ ݌ݎ݋݀ݑܿݐ 
݅ = ݌ݎ݋ݒ݅݊ܿ݁ 
ݐ = ݕ݁ܽݎ 
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The data of budgetary fiscal expenditure is obtained from the Finance Yearbook 
of China, and the GDP figure is collected from the Chinese Statistical Yearbook. 
A positive relationship between the government’s capacity and tax/current 
revenue ratio is expected to be based on the theoretical and empirical evidence. 
 
5.7 Summary  
In this chapter, the theoretical perspectives and the method used in this 
research are discussed. In detail, the paradigm, data source and collection 
approaches, hypotheses, model structuring, and all variables are presented.  
 
As a researcher, it is essential to understand the key paradigm of the 
research. The research paradigm is the set of common beliefs and 
agreements about how problems should be understood and addressed, 
based on the researcher’s ontological, epistemological and methodological 
assumptions (Kuhn, 1962; Guba and Lincoln, 1994; Sarantakos, 2012). Within 
the paradigm, ontology refers to what actually exists as reality, epistemology 
refers to how we can gain knowledge of what exists, and methodology deals 
with which way to obtaining knowledge (Maxwell, 2012; Killam, 2013). 
Ontology dictates epistemology which dictates methodology which dictates 
methods. All of this needs to make sense for the question being asked since 
the question drives everything. 
 
The nature of this study dictates that the philosophical position of this 
research is the positivism paradigm: ontologically realism, epistemologically 
objectivism, quantitative methodology, statistical analysis method using 
secondary data collection approach.  
 
As derived from the literature reviewed, the author formulated 11 hypotheses 
for this study: 
 
H1: The stage of development is positively related to the tax revenue 
performance at provincial level in China. 
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H2: Development in the industrial sector is positively related to the tax 
revenue performance at provincial level in China. 
 
H3: The development of the service sector is positively related to the tax 
revenue performance at provincial level in China. 
 
H4: The openness level is positively related to the tax revenue performance at 
provincial level in China. 
 
H5: The population growth rate is negatively related to the tax revenue 
performance at provincial level in China. 
 
H6: The population density is positively related to the tax revenue 
performance at provincial level in China. 
 
H7: The shrinking of agricultural sector activities is positively related to the tax 
revenue performance at provincial level in China. 
 
H8: The resident income inequality is negatively related to the tax revenue 
performance at provincial level in China. 
 
H9: The external grants received by the local governments is negatively 
related to the tax revenue performance at provincial level in China. 
 
H10: The anti-corruption effort is positively related to the tax revenue 
performance at provincial level in China. 
 
H11: The government capacity is positively related to the tax revenue 
performance at provincial level in China. 
 
Based on the salient feature of China’s fiscal revenue system and 11 
hypotheses, this research has generated two tax effort index models, namely 
the tax ratio model, and the current revenue ratio model. The tax ratio model 
uses the ratio of actual tax collection and GDP as the dependent variable, 
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whereas in the current revenue ratio model, the author constructed the current 
revenue ratio which is the sum of tax revenue, off budgetary revenue, and 
extra budgetary revenue, but exclude revenue from State Owned Enterprises 
and planned subsidies to loss suffering State Owned Enterprises.  
 
 Each model contains the same 11 independent variables that are grouped 
into six categories for the convenience of the study. In addition, each 
individual variable is discussed in detail about their meanings and calculation 
methods. Each is explained in the context of China’s own fiscal and social 
characteristics. Other than those independent variables that are previously 
used in other literature, this research has, for the first time in the literature of 
China’s tax effort index studies, used the income inequality as one of the 
explanatory variables. In addition, this research has constructed the anti-
corruption effort ratio as another explanatory variable, which is the very first in 
the single country tax effort index studies’ literature. 
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6 Chapter six: Empirical result and discussions 
6.1 Introduction  
In this section, the process of data analysis and empirical results is presented, 
followed by a discussion on the results. 
 
The statistics of the raw data are discussed in Section 6.2. In Section 6.3, the 
explanation of the raw data processing is presented. In Section 6.4, all the 
independent variables used in this study are tested for multicollinearity 
through two widely used indicators, namely the Variance Inflation Factor and 
the Condition Number. Section 6.5 is mainly to identify the best regression 
model for this study among the pooled OLS, random effect, and fixed effect 
regression models. Firstly, the three regression models are explained. 
Secondly, along with the results of the three regression models, the Breusch 
and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier Test (LM test), and the Hausman test are 
also conducted, and the results are discussed in this section. Based on the 
results of the most appropriate model identified by the LM test and Hausman 
test, the significances and signs of each variable in both the tax ratio and 
current revenue ratio models can be obtained. By doing so, the hypothesis of 
this study can be tested. Hence in section 6.6, the summary of the testing of 
all 11 hypotheses and the statistical regression results for this study are 
presented. This is followed by section 6.7, which includes a discussion on the 
evaluation of both the tax ratio and current revenue ratio regression models. 
In section 6.8, a detailed discussion and interpretation of each variable used 
in the regressions is presented, and the determinants of the tax revenue and 
current revenue capacity are discussed and evaluated. Since the regressions 
provide the estimated tax capacity and the estimated current revenue 
capacity, the tax effort index can be contrasted, which is measured according 
to  Equation 2-8; the tax effort index is computed as the ratio of actual 
tax/current revenue ratio and the estimated tax/current revenue ratio. Hence, 
in Section 6.9, the interpretation of tax/current revenue capacity and effort 
index at provincial level is presented. Finally, a brief summary is presented in 
section 6.10.  
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6.2 Descriptive statistics 
In this section, a brief discussion regarding the raw data in this study is 
presented. The analysis of all individual data used is discussed in section 6.2.1. 
In order to further investigate the regional differences between provinces in 
terms of the variables, the arithmetic means of all variables for each province 
during the study period between 1995 and 2013 are computed and their 
divergence presented in Section 6.2.2.  
 
6.2.1 Descriptive statistics of raw data 
The descriptive statistics on the crude data are provided on all the variables 
used in this study. Table 6-1 below provides the descriptive statistics for the raw 
data.  
 
Table 6-1: Compact table of statistical summary 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Median Max Min 
ty 0.0633 0.0253 0.0556 0.1775 0.0280 
ry 0.1029 0.0248 0.1001 0.1884 0.0329 
ln_rpcgdp* 9.1444 0.7590 9.1178 11.0228 7.3884 
ind 0.4942 0.0999 0.5071 0.7339 0.1953 
ser 0.3672 0.0642 0.3542 0.6213 0.2561 
trade 0.2946 0.3479 0.1293 1.6682 0.0250 
grpop 6.3378 3.5663 6.0600 16.2000 -1.8000 
dnpop 0.0388 0.0539 0.0257 0.3809 0.0002 
napop 0.3335 0.1623 0.2864 0.9003 0.1352 
income 0.1292 0.0584 0.1266 0.3270 0.0187 
transpc 13.5047 18.1610 8.3477 184.5551 1.0356 
corup 32.5962 13.9129 29.4323 132.1514 9.9315 
fexp 0.1833 0.1464 0.1463 1.2914 0.0492 
where: 
ty=tax ratio 
ry=current revenue ratio 
rpcgdp=real per capita GDP 
ind = industrial sector value-added to GDP 
ser = service sector value-added to GDP 
trade = total trade share in GDP 
grpop = natural population growth rate 
dnpop = populaiton density 
napop = non-agricultural population rate 
income = urban-rural income inequality Theil index 
transpc = per capita central transfer 
corup = anti-corruption effort ratio 
fexp = governemnt budgetary fiscal expenditure in GDP 
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*rpcgdp has taken logarithm due to its large scale 
 
From Table 6-1 above, some observations can be made. 
 
Firstly, the huge differences between the minimum and maximum values in all 
variables possibly indicate regional disparities in terms of economic and social 
factors. However, the differences may be caused by regional factors as well as 
time factors; this is tested in the later section of spatial-temporal analyses.  
 
Secondly, the minimum value of the population growth rate is the only variable 
that presents as a negative number. By looking into the data set, it is apparent 
that the population growth rate in Shanghai between 1995 and 2003, Beijing in 
2003, and Liaoning in 2011 and 2012 were all negative. This has supported 
earlier arguments that birth is hugely influenced by the implementation and 
strength of the “one child policy”. On the other hand, the most affected urban 
areas are Beijing and Shanghai because they are two provincial-level 
municipalities which were subjected to very strict enforcement of the “one child 
policy”.  
 
6.2.2 Descriptive statistics of cross-sectional data on the mean average 
between 1995 and 2013 for each provinces 
In order to best investigate the regional differences, all the variables included in 
this research are given the arithmetic means for each province during the study 
period between 1995 and 2013. Table 6-2 below lists the descriptive statistics 
of cross-sectional data on the mean average for each of the 31 provinces.  
 
Table 6-2: Descriptive statistics of cross-sectional data on the mean average for each 
provinces 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Median Max Min 
Ty 0.0633 0.0220 0.0571 0.1360 0.0405 
Ry 0.1029 0.0222 0.0992 0.1717 0.0742 
Ln_rpcgdp* 9.3012 0.5118 9.2068 10.4933 8.2920 
Ind 0.4942 0.0834 0.5034 0.6126 0.2599 
ser 0.3672 0.0619 0.3553 0.5896 0.2677 
trade 0.2940 0.3359 0.1260 1.3746 0.0646 
grpop 6.3378 3.1283 6.1226 12.4526 0.5908 
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dnpop 0.0388 0.0537 0.0258 0.2950 0.0002 
napop 0.3335 0.1577 0.2952 0.8090 0.1535 
income 0.1299 0.0530 0.1243 0.2357 0.0280 
transpc 13.5012 11.4109 11.0272 68.4076 5.1922 
corup 32.5962 7.9572 30.7941 52.5482 16.6464 
fexp 0.1832 0.1299 0.1577 0.8068 0.0850 
where: 
ty=tax ratio 
ry=current revenue ratio 
rpcgdp=real per capita GDP 
ind = industrial sector value-added to GDP 
ser = service sector value-added to GDP 
trade = total trade share in GDP 
grpop = natural population growth rate 
dnpop = populaiton density 
napop = non-agricultural population rate 
income = urban-rural income inequality Theil index 
transpc = per capita central transfer 
corup = anti-corruption effort ratio 
fexp = governemnt budgetary fiscal expenditure in GDP 
*rpcgdp has taken logarithm due to its large scale 
 
The table 6-2 clearly shows that regional disparities exist from both economic 
and social perspectives. 
 
The tax ratio and current revenue ratio performances per se vary significantly 
across provinces. The maximum value of tax ratio is 0.14, which is 3 times the 
minimum value. This divergence is smaller in terms of current revenue ratio, 
where the maximum figure is still over twice as big as the size of the minimum.  
 
The significant difference between the maximum and minimum value, i.e., the 
range of the logged real per capita GDP is evidence that the economic 
development among provinces is extremely unbalanced. The divergence of the 
unbalanced development level can also be found using the regional data in 
Figure 6-1 below. 
 
204 
 
Figure 6-1: The average means of real per capita GDP between 1995 and 2013 in each 
province 
 
 
 
Figure 6-1 clearly demonstrates that the development level across provinces is 
extremely unbalanced. The real per capita GDP level in Shanghai is over seven 
times higher than the lowest province, which is Guizhou. In addition, a clear 
pattern of geographical divergence is also revealed. Four provinces and 
municipalities, Shanghai, Tianjin, Beijing and Jiangsu, have the highest real per 
capita GDP and are all located along the eastern coastal or near coastal areas, 
but the four provinces, Guizhou, Gansu, Yunnan and Tibet, that show the lowest 
development level, are all located in remote western areas. 
 
The biggest regional divergence also occurs in the population density and trade 
share in GDP variables. In the remote provinces like Qinghai, Tibet, the 
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population density is only between 0.0007 (10000 people/square kilometres) 
and 0.0002 (10000 people/square kilometres), which does not even reach 2% 
of the country’s average. This is no doubt because of political and  geographical 
reasons (Crowe, 2013). The Qinghai-Tibet plateau, which is a vast elevated 
plateau in Central and East Asia, covers the majority of land area in Tibet and 
Qinghai; in addition, for years Tibet has suffered from problems of socio-political 
instability. (Xu, 1998; Tuttle, 2015) 
 
The regional disparities of the trade share also vary significantly. The provinces 
with higher trade shares in GDP are mostly located in the coastal areas. This 
has revealed that the coastal areas are taking their location advantages, thanks 
to the great influences of the open door policy (Yao & Zhang, 2001; DÉMurger, 
Sachs, Woo, Bao, & Chang, 2002; Fu, 2007; Hao & Wei, 2010; Whalley & Xin, 
2010).    
 
The mean level of the current revenue ratio is over 1.6 times larger than the tax 
ratio. This reveals the characteristic in China’s provincial government fiscal 
revenue system, which is, the provincial governments collect noticeable amount 
of revenue through non-tax sourced items. Based on the definition and 
calculation of the current revenue of provincial governments in China, the large 
amount of non-tax sourced items consists of mainly government  fees, charges, 
and funds (Lin, 2000; Zhang, 2006). 
 
6.3 Data processing 
The dataset in this research contains a total of 31 provinces and covers a 19-
year period, from 1995 to 2013. The estimation process is performed by STATA 
13 econometric software packages. Logarithms format was applied to all the 
variables to reduce the scale problem of the variables and to adjust the 
positively skewed distribution to more normal. In addition, logarithms format is 
also used to model the relationship between dependent variables and 
independent variables into percentage change relationships. Furthermore, all 
the explanatory variables have been given a first order time lag to best capture 
the coefficients. Table 6-3 illustrates the re-constructed variables after taking 
logarithms and one-year time lag into account, and these are the data entered 
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in the regression model. 
 
 
Table 6-3: Re-constructed variables descriptions (1996 – 2013) 
 
Variable N Mean SD Median Min Max 
ln_ty 589 -2.82 0.34 -2.89 -3.57 -1.73 
ln_ry 589 -2.3 0.23 -2.3 -3.41 -1.67 
ln_rpcgdp 589 9.14 0.76 9.12 7.39 11.02 
ln_ind 589 -0.73 0.23 -0.68 -1.63 -0.31 
ln_ser 589 -1.02 0.16 -1.04 -1.36 -0.48 
ln_trade 587 -1.72 0.94 -2.05 -3.69 0.51 
ln_grpop 576 1.68 0.75 1.81 -6.91 2.79 
ln_dnpop 589 -3.97 1.45 -3.66 -8.52 -0.97 
ln_napop 589 -1.2 0.44 -1.25 -2 -0.1 
ln_income 584 -2.17 0.53 -2.07 -3.98 -1.12 
ln_transpc 587 2.08 1.02 2.12 0.03 5.22 
ln_corup 589 3.41 0.37 3.38 2.3 4.88 
ln_fexp 587 -1.86 0.53 -1.92 -3.01 0.26 
 
 
6.4 Detecting multicollinearity for the variables used for the 
regressions 
This section is focused on the detection of the possibility of multicollinearity. A 
multicollinearity issue, which is the existence of near-linear relationships 
among the explanatory variables, is a problem which may exist in any 
econometric framework. A high level of multicollinearity may result in biased 
and inaccurate regression results by inflating the standard errors, and thereby 
threatening the reliability of the regression results (Farrar & Glauber, 1967; 
Prunier, Colyn, Legendre, Nimon, & Flamand, 2015). 
 
One of the ways to detect multicollinearity is to look into the correlation matrix. 
A high correlation between two variables often indicates a high possibility of 
multicollinearity. However, this method is considered unreliable because the 
existence of a high degree multicollinearity does not require high bivariate 
correlations between variables. 
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To deal with the problem in multiple regression models mentioned above, 
there are two widely used indicators to measure the degree of multicollinearity 
between independent variables, namely the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), 
and the Condition Number  (CN) (Bizeti, Carvalho, Souza, & Destro, 2004; Tu, 
Kellett, Clerehugh, & Gilthorpe, 2005; O’brien, 2007; Miles, 2014).  
 
A rough role for VIF is that it should not be greater than ten, otherwise the 
interference of multicollinearity needs to be taken into account (Tattar, 
Ramaiah, & Manjunath, 2016). In addition, moderate multicollinearity 
problems exist if the condition number is between 100 and 1000; if the 
condition number is larger than 1000, it indicates the almost linear-
dependence of the covariates. However, the multicollinearity problem is not an 
issue if the condition number is less than 100 (Bizeti, Carvalho, Souza, & 
Destro, 2004; Tattar, Ramaiah, & Manjunath, 2016). In table 6-4 below is the 
multicollinearity diagnostics using VIF and UN for all the independent 
variables.  
  
Table 6-4: The multicollinearity diagnostics for all the independent variables  
Variable VIF Tolerance Eigenval Condition Number 
ln_rpcgdp 4.45 0.2247 10.3879 1 
ln_ind 2.75 0.3635 0.7101 3.8248 
ln_ser 2.64 0.3787 0.4755 4.6742 
ln_trade 2.68 0.3727 0.1423 8.5432 
ln_grpop 1.83 0.5467 0.0951 10.4523 
ln_dnpop 3.66 0.2732 0.0622 12.9247 
ln_napop 5.19 0.1926 0.0508 14.3001 
ln_income 3.14 0.3186 0.0343 17.405 
ln_transpc 6.58 0.152 0.0271 19.585 
ln_corup 1.91 0.5228 0.0075 37.144 
ln_fexp 5.35 0.187 0.0056 43.007 
Mean VIF 3.65  0.0017 79.3261 
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As shown in the table above, since all VIF is less than 10 and the condition 
number is less than 100, the degree of multicollinearity is not an issue. 
 
6.5 Identifying the most appropriate regression model 
Generally speaking, there are three types of data in the empirical analysis: 
time series, cross-section and panel data. The time series data covers a 
single or multiple variables’ variance within a single unit of sample overtime, 
and the cross-section data describes a single or multiple variables variances 
among a group of samples at a specific time point. Panel data, however, 
considers multiple variables among a group sample and in different time 
periods. In other words, the panel data has two dimensions: time and space 
(Gujarati, 2009). The panel data which combines the time series and cross-
section data has several advantages, such as a higher degree of freedom and 
a rich sample variability (Hsiao, 2006).       
 
The dataset in this research contains 31 provinces covering a time period of 
19 years from 1995 to 2013, hence a panel regression is used.  
 
Three regression models, pooled OLS regression model, random effect 
regression model, and a fixed effect regression model, are built and run for 
both tax revenue effort and current revenue effort. In order to identify the best 
appropriate model for this study, two tests were also performed:  the Breusch-
Pagan LM test for the random effect model against the pooled OLS model, 
and the Hausman test for the fixed effect model against the random effect 
model. 
 
In short, there are in total six regression models which have been  built and 
run, and the best appropriate regression models have been identified by the 
Breusch-pagan LM test and Hausman test. The strategy of identifying the 
most appropriate regression model is summarized in the chart 6-1 below. 
 
 
Chart 6-1: The strategy of identifying the most appropriate regression model 
 
209 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.5.1 Pooled OLS model for tax ratio and current revenue ratio 
regression  
The pooled OLS regression model (or Constant Coefficients Model) pooled all 
observations, regardless of the variations of the coefficients within any specific 
province. The assumption behind the Pooled OLS is the non-stochastic of the 
explanatory variables, and the independent and identical distribution of the 
error term with zero mean and constant variance (Gujarati, 2009). The 
assumption of the Pooled OLS ignores the individual effects or the 
Tax revenue effort 
Pooled OLS model 
Breusch-Pagan LM test for 
the random effect model 
against the pooled OLS 
model 
Identify the best 
appropriate tax 
revenue effort 
model 
Tax revenue effort 
random effect 
model 
Hausman test for the fixed 
effect model against the 
random effect model 
Tax revenue effort 
fixed effect model 
Current revenue 
effort Pooled OLS 
model 
Breusch-Pagan LM test for 
the random effect model 
against the pooled OLS 
model Identify the best 
appropriate 
current revenue 
effort model 
Current revenue 
effort random effect 
model 
Hausman test for the fixed 
effect model against the 
random effect model 
Current revenue 
effort fixed effect 
model 
210 
 
uniqueness of different individual units. This may create a possibility of an 
issue with heterogeneity i.e., the variance is not constant.   
 
In this research, by adopting the pooled OLS model, the regression has 
pooled all the observations together and does not distinguished the 
uniqueness of individual provinces, assuming that heterogeneity or 
individuality of the provinces does not exist.  
 
The pooled OLS regression results for the tax ratio and current revenue ratio 
are provided in Table 6-5 below. 
 
Table 6-5: Pooled OLS regression results for the tax ratio and current revenue ratio model 
Pooled OLS regression for tax ratio (Ln_ty) and current revenue ratio (Ln_ry) 
 tax ratio (Ln_ty) 
  
 current revenue ratio (Ln_ry) 
Variables Coef. Std. Err. t P>t Variables Coef. 
Std. 
Err. t P>t 
ln_rpcgdp 
0.241 0.048 5.07 *** 0 
ln_rpcgdp 
0.092 0.042 2.2 ** 0.028 L1. L1. 
ln_ind 
0.137 0.049 2.78 *** 0.006 
ln_ind 
0.147 0.043 3.37 *** 0.001 L1. L1. 
ln_ser 
0.569 0.070 8.08 *** 0 
ln_ser 
0.550 0.062 8.88 *** 0 L1. L1. 
ln_trade 
0.067 0.017 3.98 *** 0 
ln_trade 
0.047 0.015 3.22 *** 0.001 L1. L1. 
ln_grpop 
0.002 0.013 0.17   0.868 
ln_grpop -
0.007 0.012 
-0.6 
  0.548 L1. L1. 
ln_dnpop 
0.107 0.010 10.68 *** 0 
ln_dnpop 
0.087 0.009 9.89 *** 0 L1. L1. 
ln_napop 
0.194 0.031 6.3 *** 0 
ln_napop 
0.092 0.027 3.38 *** 0.001 L1. L1. 
ln_income 
0.095 0.025 3.81 *** 0 
ln_income 
0.042 0.022 1.89 * 0.06 L1. L1. 
ln_transpc -
0.352 0.034 
-10.42 
*** 0 
ln_transpc -
0.300 0.030 
-10.1 
*** 0 L1. L1. 
ln_corup 
0.140 0.030 4.72 *** 0 
ln_corup 
0.139 0.026 5.32 *** 0 L1. L1. 
ln_fexp 
0.808 0.051 15.73 *** 0 
ln_fexp 
0.606 0.045 13.4 *** 0 L1. L1. 
Total number of observations: 541 Total number of observations: 541 
Prob>F (F test) = 0.0000 Prob>F (F test) = 0.0000 
R-squared = 0.8003 R-squared = 0.6566 
Adjusted R-squared = 0.7894 Adjusted R-squared = 0.6378 
t statistics in parentheses: * 0.1≥p>0.05, ** 0.05≥p>0.01, *** p≤0.01 
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The results reveal that most of the variables are significant in both the models 
and have the expected signs, except for the population growth rate and 
income inequality.  
 
It seems the population growth rate is not significant in either the tax ratio 
model or current revenue ratio model. The income inequality is significant in 
both models, whereas the signs in both models are positive, which is an 
unexpected result and contradictory to the prediction in this study.  
 
The traditional tax handles, the real per capita GDP and foreign trade share in 
GDP, are all positively and significantly related to both the tax ratio model and 
current revenue model.  The pooled regression model reveals that traditional 
tax handles still play a critical role in the tax effort index model. This finding is 
consistent with previous empirical studies (Piancastelli, 2001; Teera & 
Hudson, 2004; Gupta, 2007; Pessino & Fenochietto, 2010). 
 
Apart from the traditional tax handles, the GDP decomposition is also 
revealed as important in terms of improving tax/current revenue performance. 
Both the industrial value-added in GDP and service sector value-added to 
GDP are positively and significantly related to both the tax ratio model and 
current revenue ratio model. This finding confirms the strong relationship 
between the structural differences within the GDP and the tax/current revenue 
performance.    
 
The result also indicates the importance of population factors in the tax effort 
index models. Population density and the non-agricultural population rate are 
all positively and significantly related to both the tax ratio model and current 
revenue model. These results are consistent with the previous empirical 
studies and the prediction in this study.  
 
The anti-corruption factor is revealed as positively and significantly restated to 
both tax ratio and current revenue ratio. This result is consistent with all 
previous empirical studies that have indicated a negative relationship between 
the corruption level and tax revenue performance (Ghura & Hadjimichael, 
212 
 
1996; Bardhan, 1997; Mauro, 1997). Moreover, it is also discussed in Chapter 
5 that the“guanxi” practice makes corruption in China serious and distinctive 
(Boisot & Child, 1996; Lovett et al., 1999; Chenting & Littlefield, 2001; Fan, 
2002). Hence, this result reveals that the tax and current revenue at provincial 
level government can be significantly improved by containing the“guanxi” 
practice.  
 
Governmental factors also play a critical role in both models. The significance 
and negative sign of the real per capita central transfer in both models match 
the expectation of this research, that the tax/current revenue capacity are 
negatively influenced by the lack of financial independency. The same 
relationship is found between the government budgetary fiscal expenditure in 
GDP and the tax/current revenue ratio. This reveals the importance of 
government capacity in tax/current revenue capacities.  
 
One important finding by comparison of the tax ratio OLS model and current 
revenue ratio OLS model is that the two models share great similarity. All the 
variables share the same sign in both models.  In addition, except for the real 
per capita GDP and income inequality variables, the remaining 9 variables 
have the same significant level in both models. This may be the evidence of 
the argument that non-tax sourced revenues in the current revenue are similar 
to tax revenue in terms of function and nature.  
 
6.5.2 Random effect regression for the tax ratio and current revenue 
ratio 
The major drawback of the pooled OLS regression model is the possible 
existence of individual heterogeneity.  One of the approaches to dealing with 
the heterogeneity influence is to perform the random effect regression.   
 
The random effect model (error components model) takes a disturbance term 
approach by treating the intercept as a random variable with a mean value. 
However, a strict condition of the random effect model is that the composite 
error term shares no correlation to any of the explanatory variables within the 
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model in order to avoid inconsistent estimation of the regression coefficients 
(Gujarati, 2009, pp. 602-603). 
 
The random effect regression results for the tax ratio and current revenue 
ratio are provided in Table 6-6 below. 
 
Table 6-6: Random effect regression results for the tax ratio and current revenue ratio 
models. 
Random-effects GLS regression for tax ratio (ln_ty) and current revenue ratio (ln_ry) 
 tax ratio (ln_ty) 
  
 current revenue ratio (ln_ry) 
variable
s 
coefficie
nts 
stand
ard 
error
s 
Z-
values p>|z| 
variable
s 
coefficie
nts 
stand
ard 
error
s 
Z-
values 
p>|z
| 
ln_rpcgd
p  0.151 0.044 3.4 *** 0.001 
ln_rpcgd
p  0.167 0.045 3.74 *** 0.00 
L1. L1. 
ln_ind 
0.416 0.076 5.5 *** 0.00 
ln_ind 
0.313 0.076 4.11 *** 0.00 L1. L1. 
ln_ser 
0.218 0.086 2.53 ** 0.011 
ln_ser 
0.171 0.088 1.94 * 
0.05
3 L1. L1. 
ln_trade 
0.068 0.014 4.76 *** 0.00 
ln_trade 
0.007 0.015 0.45   
0.65
5 L1. L1. 
ln_grpop 
-0.014 0.009 -1.67 * 0.096 
ln_grpop 
-0.014 0.009 -1.55   
0.12
2 L1. L1. 
ln_dnpo
p 0.073 0.018 3.96 *** 0.00 
ln_dnpo
p 0.079 0.017 4.56 *** 0.00 
L1. L1. 
ln_napop 
0.220 0.037 5.87 *** 0.00 
ln_napop 
0.094 0.038 2.48 ** 
0.01
3 L1. L1. 
ln_incom
e 0.000 0.021 -0.01   0.993 
ln_incom
e -0.059 0.022 -2.66 *** 
0.00
8 
L1. L1. 
ln_trans
pc -0.269 0.023 -11.71 *** 0.00 
ln_trans
pc -0.271 0.024 -11.3 *** 0.00 
L1. L1. 
ln_corup 
0.019 0.021 0.95   0.344 
ln_corup 
0.041 0.022 1.88 * 0.06 L1. L1. 
ln_fexp 
0.684 0.044 15.47 *** 0.00 
ln_fexp 
0.669 0.046 14.61 *** 0.00 L1. L1. 
Total number of observations: 541 Total number of observations: 541 
Wald chi2 (28) = 2752.83 Wald chi2 (28) = 529.46 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
sigma_u =0.10289594 sigma_u =0.09012791 
sigma_e = 0.07220304 sigma_e = 0.07555822 
intra-class correlation (rho) = 0.67006348 intra-class correlation (rho) = 0.58726077 
within R-squared = 0.8528 within R-squared = 0.4958 
Between R-squared = 0.7185 Between R-squared = 0.5996 
Overall R-squared = 0.7154 Overall R-squared = 0.5259 
t statistics in parentheses: * 0.1≥p>0.05, ** 0.05≥p>0.01, *** p≤0.01 
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In the random effect model, all the variables show the expected signs in both 
models. Comparing with the OLS model, the random effect model shows 
different results.  
 
Firstly, the foreign trade share in GDP has lost its significance in the current 
revenue ratio model. Secondly, the population growth rate shows a significant 
relationship to the tax ratio in the tax ratio model. Thirdly, the income 
inequality and anti-corruption variables appeared as significant in the current 
revenue model. Apart from the differences, the two models still share a high 
degree of similarity. All variables show the same and expected signs in both 
models. Amongst the nine variables that show significant signs in the tax ratio 
model, seven are also revealed in the current revenue ratio model to be 
significantly related to the current revenue ratio. These seven variables are: 
real per capita GDP, industrial value-added in GDP, service sector value-
added in GDP, population density, non-agricultural population rate, real per 
capita central transfer, and government budgetary fiscal expenditure in GDP. 
 
The different results between the pooled OLS regression model and the 
Random effect regression model is because that the pooled OLS regression 
ignores the individual effects or the uniqueness of different individual units, 
whereas the random effect regression model accepts the individual effects by 
treating the intercept as a random variable with a mean value. Hence the 
Breusch-Pagan LM test is performed in the next section to identify the most 
appropriate regression model between Pooled OLS and Random effect.  
 
6.5.3 The Breusch-Pagan LM test 
In order to test which model is appropriate from the random effect and pooled 
OLS, the Breusch-Pagan LM test for the random effect model against the 
pooled OLS model is performed for both the tax ratio regression and current 
revenue regression. The testing process were completed in the STATA and 
the results are listed in Table 6-7. 
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Table 6-7: Breusch-Pagan LM test 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects 
Null hypothesis: no significant difference/panel effect across units 
Estimated results of LM test for tax ratio 
(Ln_ty) regression 
Estimated results of LM test for current revenue 
(Ln_ry) ratio regression 
ln_ty[id,t] = Xb + u[id] + e[id,t] ln_ry[id,t] = Xb + u[id] + e[id,t] 
  Var sd=sqrt(Var)   Var sd=sqrt(Var) 
Ln_ty 0.1070448 0.327177 Ln_ty 0.0477431 0.2185021 
e 0.0051611 0.0718408 e 0.00571 0.0755646 
u 0.0095949 0.0979536 u 0.0077076 0.0877932 
test:var(u)=0 test:var(u)=0 
Chibar2(01)=1654.25 Chibar2(01)=1152.92 
Prob>chibar2=0.0000 Prob>chibar2=0.0000 
 
Based on the LM test for both the tax ratio and current revenue ratio 
regressions, both tests reject the null hypothesis, which is the non-existing 
panel effect, at the significant level P< 0.00. Hence, it is concluded that there 
is evidence of significant uniqueness across provinces, therefore a random 
effect regression model is a better model than the polled OLS regression 
model.   
 
6.5.4 Fixed effect regression for tax ratio and current revenue ratio 
The fixed effect model accepts  individual heterogeneity by adopting the 
dummy variable technique by allowing each individual to have their own 
intercept value, whereas each individual intercept is time-invariant; in other 
words, they do not vary over time (Gujarati, 2009, p. 596). The basic idea 
allowing each cross-sectional unit to have a fixed intercept corrects the biased 
slope of the pooled OLS regression, when the fixed intercept effects are 
ignored.  
 
As the fixed effect regression model deals with the possibility of the existence 
of heterogeneity by acknowledging the individuality among observations in 
this study, the fixed effect model allows each province to have its own 
intercept value. However, it is further assumed that the intercept of different 
provinces may vary from each other, but the intercept does not change over 
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time.  Table 6-8 illustrates the fixed effect regression result for the tax ratio 
and current revenue ratio.  
 
Table 6-8: Fixed effect regression results for tax ratio and current revenue ratio models 
Fixed effect regression for tax ratio and current revenue ratio 
tax ratio 
  
current revenue ratio 
variable
s 
coeffi
cients 
standa
rd 
errors 
T-
value
s 
p>|t| variables 
coeffici
ents 
standa
rd 
errors 
T-
value
s 
p>|t
| 
ln_rpcg
dp  0.115 0.066 1.73 * 0.084 
ln_rpcg
dp  0.395 0.069 5.71 *** 
0.00
0 
L1. L1. 
ln_ind 
0.554 0.086 6.44 *** 0.000 
ln_ind 
0.360 0.090 3.99 *** 
0.00
0 L1. L1. 
ln_ser 
0.151 0.095 1.58   0.115 
ln_ser 
0.245 0.100 2.45 ** 
0.01
4 L1. L1. 
ln_trade 
0.075 0.015 4.93 *** 0.000 
ln_trade 
0.027 0.016 1.73 * 
0.08
4 L1. L1. 
ln_grpo
p -0.019 0.008 -2.23 ** 0.026 
ln_grpo
p -0.024 0.009 -2.75 *** 
0.00
6 
L1. L1. 
ln_dnpo
p 0.101 0.102 0.98   0.326 
ln_dnpo
p 0.569 0.107 5.31 *** 
0.00
0 
L1. L1. 
ln_napo
p 0.226 0.042 5.32 *** 0.000 
ln_napo
p 0.132 0.044 2.96 *** 
0.00
3 
L1. L1. 
ln_inco
me -0.016 0.024 -0.67   0.506 
ln_inco
me -0.098 0.025 -3.87 *** 
0.00
0 
L1. L1. 
ln_trans
pc -0.273 0.026 -10.4 *** 0.000 
ln_trans
pc -0.208 0.028 -7.56 *** 
0.00
0 
L1. L1. 
ln_coru
p 0.019 0.020 0.95   0.342 
ln_coru
p 0.055 0.021 2.6 ** 
0.01
0 
L1. L1. 
ln_fexp 
0.629 0.046 13.71 *** 0.000 
ln_fexp 
0.629 0.048 13.1 *** 
0.00
0 L1. L1. 
Total number of observations: 541 Total number of observations: 541 
 F(28,482) = 102.19  F(28,482) = 19.44 
R-sq:  within  = 0.8558 R-sq:  within  = 0.5304 
R-sq: between = 0.5755 R-sq: between = 0.3110 
R-sq: overall = 0.5909 R-sq: overall = 0.2028 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2174 corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9739 
Prob>F (F test) = 0.0000 Prob>F (F test) = 0.0000 
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sigma_u = 0.20131233 sigma_u = 0.84942613 
sigma_e = 0.07220304 sigma_e = 0.07555822 
intra-class correlation (rho) = 0.88602348  intra-class correlation (rho) = 0.99214964 
t statistics in parentheses: * 0.1≥p>0.05, ** 0.05≥p>0.01, *** p≤0.01 
Note: The regression results of the fixed effect model is provided in the later part of this 
chapter.  
 
6.5.5 The Hausman test 
As indicated by the Breusch-Pagan LM test, the Random effect regression 
model is a better model than the polled OLS regression model. However, a 
further test is needed because it is unclear whether the fixed effect regression 
model is better than the Random effect regression model.  
 
Regarding the fixed effect model, as Kmenta (1986) states, the fundamental 
question that needs to be considered is whether the sacrifice of the degree of 
freedom by the introduction of the dummy variables is really necessary. In 
other words, there is a possibility that the dummy variables indicate a lack of 
knowledge of failure of capturing relevant explanatory variables that are time-
invariant or time-variant, but maintain the same value in all cross-sectional 
units (Kmenta, 1986, p. 633; Gujarati, 2009).  
 
If this is the case, then the random model, to answer the question whether the 
dummy variables indicate a lack of knowledge by taking a disturbance term 
approach by trading the intercept as a random variable with a mean value, is 
a better fit than the fixed model.  
 
In order to identify which model is the best fit for this study, the Hausman test 
on the fixed effect model against the random effect model for both the tax ratio 
and current revenue ratio has been performed. The testing processes were 
completed in the STATA and the results are listed in Table 6-9 below.  
 
Table 6-9: Hausman test 
Hausman test for fixed effect model 
Null hypothesis: the unique errors are not correlated with the regressors  
(preferred model is random effects) 
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Estimated results of Hausam test for tax 
ratio (Ln_ty) regression 
Estimated results of Hausman test for current 
revenue (Ln_ry) ratio regression 
chi2(15) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) chi2(16) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
Chibar2(15)=66.44 Chibar2(16)=78.75 
Prob>chibar2=0.00 Prob>chibar2=0.00 
 
In both tax and current revenue ratio models, the results of the Hausman tests 
reject the null hypothesis at significance level P<0.00. Hence, it can be said 
that the fixed effect model is more appropriate than the random effect model 
for both tax and current revenue regressions. Thus to summarize, the 
Breusch-Pagan LM test and the Hausman test, the fixed effect regression 
model is used as the best appropriate regression model for both tax ratio 
model and current revenue ratio model in this study.  
 
6.6 Hypotheses testing and regression results summary 
Based on the statistical evidence presented on the Breusch-Pagan test and 
Hausman test, it can be concluded that the fixed effect model is the best fit in 
this study. Before analysing the regression results, the hypotheses are 
presented and tested. 
 
Through the literature review of tax effort and capacity using regression 
approach in chapter two, the author of this study constructed elven testable 
hypothesis. They are:  
 
H1: The stage of development is positively related to the tax revenue 
performance at provincial level in China. 
 
H2: Development in the industrial sector is positively related to the tax 
revenue performance at provincial level in China. 
 
H3: The development of the service sector is positively related to the tax 
revenue performance at provincial level in China. 
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H4: The openness level is positively related to the tax revenue performance at 
provincial level in China. 
 
H5: The population growth rate is negatively related to the tax revenue 
performance at provincial level in China. 
 
H6: The population density is positively related to the tax revenue 
performance at provincial level in China. 
 
H7: The shrinking of agricultural sector activities is positively related to the tax 
revenue performance at provincial level in China. 
 
H8: The resident income inequality is negatively related to the tax revenue 
performance at provincial level in China. 
 
H9: The external grants received by local governments are negatively related 
to the tax revenue performance at provincial level in China. 
 
H10: The anti-corruption effort is positively related to the tax revenue 
performance at provincial level in China. 
 
H11: The government capacity is positively related to the tax revenue 
performance at provincial level in China. 
 
Based on the results from table 6-8, the 11 hypothesis for this study are 
tested. Firstly, the null hypothesis (H0), and alternative hypothesis (H1) of each 
hypothesis in this study are listed in table 6-10 below. 
 
 
Table 6-10: List of null hypothesis and alternative hypothesis of each hypothesis in this study 
Main 
Hypothesis 
of this 
study 
Null and alternative hypotheses 
H1 H0 there is no positive relationship between the stage of development and the tax revenue performance at provincial level in China 
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H1 There is a positive relationship between the stage of development and the tax revenue performance at provincial level in China 
H2 
H0 There is no positive relationship between the development in the industrial sector and the tax revenue performance at provincial level in China. 
H1 There is a positive relationship between the development in the industrial sector and the tax revenue performance at provincial level in China. 
H3 
H0 There is no positive relationship between the development of service sector and the tax revenue performance at provincial level in China. 
H1 There is a positive relationship between the development of service sector and the tax revenue performance at provincial level in China. 
H4 
H0 There is no positive relationship between the openness level and the tax revenue performance at provincial level in China. 
H1 There is a positive relationship between the openness level and the tax revenue performance at provincial level in China. 
H5 
H0 There is no negative relationship between the population growth rate and the tax revenue performance at provincial level in China. 
H1 There is a negative relationship between the population growth rate and the tax revenue performance at provincial level in China. 
H6 
H0 There is no positive relationship between the population density and the tax revenue performance at provincial level in China. 
H1 There is a positive relationship between the population density and the tax revenue performance at provincial level in China. 
H7 
H0 
There is no positive relationship between the shrinking of agricultural 
sector activities and the tax revenue performance at provincial level in 
China. 
H1 There is a positive relationship between the shrinking of agricultural sector activities and the tax revenue performance at provincial level in China. 
H8 
H0 There is no negative relationship between the resident income inequality and the tax revenue performance at provincial level in China. 
H1 There is a negative relationship between the resident income inequality and the tax revenue performance at provincial level in China. 
H9 
H0 
There is no negative relationship between the external grants received by 
the local governments and the tax revenue performance at provincial level 
in China. 
H1 
There is a negative relationship between the external grants received by the 
local governments and the tax revenue performance at provincial level in 
China. 
H10 
H0 There is no positive relationship between the anti-corruption effort and the tax revenue performance at provincial level in China. 
H1 There is a positive relationship between the anti-corruption effort and the tax revenue performance at provincial level in China. 
H11 
H0 There is no positive relationship between the government capacity and the tax revenue performance at provincial level in China. 
H1 There is a positive relationship between the government capacity and the tax revenue performance at provincial level in China. 
 
 
For a better visual analysis, Table 6-11 illustrates the summary of the fixed 
effect regression results for both tax and current revenue ratios, where the 
significance level and signs of all 11 variables are presented.  
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Table 6-11: Signs and significance level of all independent variables 
Variables 
Tax ratio Current revenue ratio 
Sign Significant Significant level sign Significant Significant level 
Per capita GDP + Weakly significant 
0.1≥p>0.05
* + 
Highly 
significant 
p≤0.01 
*** 
Industrial 
sector value-
added to GDP 
+ Highly significant 
p≤0.01 
*** + 
Highly 
significant 
p≤0.01 
*** 
Service sector 
value-added to 
GDP 
+ Not significant p>0.1 + significant 
0.05≥p>0.01 
** 
Openness level + Highly significant 
p≤0.01 
*** + 
Weakly 
significant 
0.1≥p>0.05 
* 
Population 
growth rate ─ significant 
0.05≥p>0.0
1 
** 
─ Highly significant 
p≤0.01 
*** 
Population 
density + 
Not 
significant p>0.1 + 
Highly 
significant 
p≤0.01 
*** 
Non-
agriculture 
population rate 
+ Highly significant 
p≤0.01 
*** + 
Highly 
significant 
p≤0.01 
*** 
Urban-rural 
resident 
income 
disparity 
─ Not significant p>0.1 ─ 
Highly 
significant 
p≤0.01 
*** 
Dependency on 
central 
transfers 
─ Highly significant 
p≤0.01 
*** ─ 
Highly 
significant 
p≤0.01 
*** 
Anti-
corruption 
effort 
+ Not significant p>0.1 + 
Highly 
significant 
p≤0.01 
*** 
Government 
capacity + 
Highly 
significant 
p≤0.01 
*** + 
Highly 
significant 
p≤0.01 
*** 
* 0.1≥p>0.05, ** 0.05≥p>0.01, *** p≤0.01 
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From table 6-11, it can be seen that all the variables have achieved the 
expected signs in both tax ratio model and current revenue ratio model.  
 
In the tax ratio model, except the service sector value-added to GDP, 
population density, urban-rural resident income disparity, and anti-corruption 
effort, all other variables are statistically significant at level p<0.1. Among 
which, the industrial sector value-added to GDP, openness level, Non-
agriculture population rate, dependency on central transfers, and government 
capacity are highly significant at level p<0.01. Hence, H3, H6, H8 and H10 are 
failed to accept in the tax ratio model, and all other hypotheses are accepted 
at significant level of P<0.1. In the current revenue ratio model, however, all 
variables are significant at level p<0.1. In addition, except the service sector 
value-added to GDP and openness level, all other variables are highly 
significant at level p<0.01. Therefore, all hypotheses are accepted in the 
current revenue ratio model.   
 
It is revealed in the hypotheses testing results that some factors are main 
determinants for both tax revenue performance and current revenue 
performance. These factors are: stage of development, development in the 
industrial sector, openness level, population growth rate, shrinking of 
agricultural sector activities, external grants received by the local 
governments, and government capacity. However, four factors, namely 
development in the service sector, population density, resident income 
inequality, and anti-corruption effort, are main determinants in current revenue 
performance, but not for tax revenue performance. Detailed discussions and 
interpretation of the results are presented in section 6.7 and 6.8. 
 
6.7 Evaluation of the tax ratio and current revenue ratio regression 
models  
The aim of this research is to find the key determinants of the variation of the 
tax revenue capacity in China, and to evaluate China’s tax revenue 
performance at provincial level. In this section, the overall fitness of the 
models is evaluated, followed by discussions of the respective variables. 
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Table 6-12 illustrates the summary of fixed effect regression results for both 
tax and current revenue ratios. 
 
Table 6-12: Tax ratio and current revenue ratio fixed effect regression models results 
summary 
fixed effect regression results for tax ratio and current revenue ratio 
tax ratio current revenue ratio 
variables coefficients p>|t| variables coefficients p>|t| 
ln_rpcgdp  
0.1147 0.084* 
ln_rpcgdp  
0.3952 0.000*** 
L1. L1. 
ln_ind 
0.5544 0.000*** 
ln_ind 
0.3599 0.000*** 
L1. L1. 
ln_ser 
0.1507 0.115 
ln_ser 
0.2453 0.014** 
L1. L1. 
ln_trade 
0.0746 0.000*** 
ln_trade 
0.0274 0.084* 
L1. L1. 
ln_grpop 
-0.0188 0.026** 
ln_grpop 
-0.0243 0.006*** 
L1. L1. 
ln_dnpop 
0.1006 0.326 
ln_dnpop 
0.5689 0.000*** 
L1. L1. 
ln_napop 
0.2258 0.000*** 
ln_napop 
0.1316 0.003*** 
L1. L1. 
ln_income 
-0.0160 0.506 
ln_income 
-0.0978 0.000*** 
L1. L1. 
ln_transpc 
-0.2735 0.000*** 
ln_transpc 
-0.2081 0.000*** 
L1. L1. 
ln_corup 
0.0192 0.342 
ln_corup 
0.0548 0.010*** 
L1. L1. 
ln_fexp 
0.6292 0.000*** 
ln_fexp 
0.6293 0.000*** 
L1. L1. 
rho = 0.8860  rho = 0.9921 
Prob>F (F test) = 0.00 Prob>F (F test) = 0.00 
 * 0.1≥p>0.05, ** 0.05≥p>0.01, *** p≤0.01 
 
 
Overall, both the tax ratio and current revenue ratio performed well.  
 
The test of the fixed effect model generated some interesting and important 
results. F test of both tax revenue regression and current revenue regression 
are significant at P<0.05 level as shown in table 6-10. Furthermore, the 
fraction of variance due to individual effects (intra-class correlation) in tax 
224 
 
revenue regression is performing well with an explanatory power of 89%; and 
this figure in the current revenue regression is 99%.  
 
The regression result implies that the tax ratio may not represent the true tax 
revenue performance in China, because some items in non-tax sourced 
revenues are similar to the concept of tax.  
 
As a result, the current revenue ratio, which contains the non-tax sourced 
revenue, fit better than the tax ratio. Variables that are significant in the tax 
ratio model are also significant in the current revenue ratio, with the same 
signs. In addition, two variables, the income inequality variable and corruption, 
have been proven to have significant impact on the tax ratio in a number of 
previous studies. However, these two variables were statistically non-
significant in the tax ratio regression, but statistically highly significant in the 
current revenue ratio regression, with expected signs that support the 
previous studies.  
 
6.8  The determinants of the tax revenue and current revenue capacity 
6.8.1 Real per capita GDP 
The empirical findings of this research show that there is a significant positive 
relationship between the level of economic development and both tax revenue 
capacity and current revenue capacity. Real per capital GDP, as the most 
used proxy for the level of economic development, is one of the traditional tax 
handles to explain tax performance.  
 
It is argued that higher economic developing level is the source of increasing 
public demand and expenditure, and the driving power of the income and tax 
base (Piancastelli, 2001; Teera & Hudson, 2004; Gupta, 2007). This is also 
true in China. The real per capita GDP has a significant impact on both the 
dependent variables. This indicates that the provincial economic development 
level is one of the key determinants for raising tax revenue and current 
revenue.  
 
However, the level of the impact of the real per capita GDP on tax performance 
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is slightly different in the tax ratio regression model and current revenue 
regression model. The per capita GDP in the tax ratio regression is significant 
at level of p<0.1, whereas in the current revenue ratio regression the per capita 
GDP has a much higher significant level of p<0.01. It can be argued that a high 
stage of development of economy would increase the surplus of total income, 
since governments are able to generate tax revenues (Lotz & Morss, 1967; Shin, 
1969; Bahl, 1971; Tanzi & Zee, 2000; Piancastelli, 2001; Bird et al., 2008; 
Pessino & Fenochietto, 2010). However, as explained earlier, at a provincial 
level, local governments are generating more non-tax sourced revenue than 
the tax revenue from other sources. This is why it is argued that the tax 
performance is better examined using the current revenue model.  
 
6.8.2 Industrial sector value-added  
The industrial sector value-added in the GDP, as one of the traditional tax 
handles in the empirical literature, shows its positive influence on both the tax 
revenue ratio and current revenue ratio. It has been argued that the significant 
role that the industrial sector plays in the tax performance might be due to the 
fact that the activities in the industrial sector are normally well-recorded and 
organized (Bahl, 1971; Leuthold, 1991; Fauvelle-Aymar, 1999; Piancastelli, 
2001; Mertens, 2003; Teera & Hudson, 2004).  Furthermore, the industrial 
sector also contributes the most GDP growth in China. (Wong, 1992; Wang et 
al., 2009). 
 
6.8.3 Service sector value-added 
The service sector value-added in GDP has shown a non-significant 
relationship with tax revenue capacity, with p>0.11. In contrast, it shows a 
significant positive relationship with the current revenue capacity at level P< 
0.014. 
 
This distinctive difference may stem from the existence of large scale of 
informal activities in the service sector. As argued in Chapter 5 an expanding 
service sector will raise the total sales and consumption of the citizens.  
China’s local government tax revenue relies heavily on indirect taxes such as 
turnover taxes (Wang, 2004). This directly influences the level of sales and 
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consumption. However, the tax capacity has failed to capture the true 
contribution of the service sector. 
 
The significant relationship between the service sector value-added in GDP 
and the current revenue capacity has added the evidence of large scale of 
informal activities in the service sector, which has enlarged the true tax base.  
As discussed in Chapter 5, after the tax sharing reform in 1994, the local 
government were granted more autonomy in collecting and administering the 
government fees and charges so that these fees and charges have become 
the major component of the off-budgetary revenues and the extra-budgetary 
revenue. The administration on the government’s fees and charges are 
seriously lacking in legal basis and control (Lin, 2000; Ma, 2005; Wong & Bird, 
2008; Shen, 2011; Shen et al., 2012; Tong et al., 2013; Zheng & Wang, 2013). 
The expanding service sector with large scale informal activities has certainly 
provided local government with the opportunities for collecting fees, charges, 
and funds, and which has even become the breeding ground of corruption for 
some government officials.  
 
6.8.4 Foreign trade share in GDP 
The foreign trade sector is similar to the industrial sector - normally well-
organized and easier to manage, in addition has lower administrative costs 
(Ghura, 1998; Gupta, 2007).  
 
It is argued by many scholars that a high level of foreign trade, which indicates 
a higher openness level, indicates a greater performance of the economy, 
hence improving the tax revenue performance (Ghura, 1998; Keen & Simone, 
2004; Baunsgaard & Keen, 2010).  
 
Supporting the literature, a significant positive relationship between the foreign 
trade shares in GDP with the tax revenue capacity in China is found in this 
research, regarding the positive influence of the openness level to the tax 
revenue performance. 
 
The trade share in the GDP in the current revenue regression has also 
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generated a positive sign, which indicates that the openness level also 
increases the current revenue performance. However, the significance level is 
much weaker than that of the tax revenue regression. This is possibly due to 
the relationship between the openness level and the transparency of 
government policy. The current revenue includes not only the tax revenue, but 
also a large percentage of other non-tax sourced revenue. The main 
components of the noticeable amount of non-tax sourced revenue are 
government fees, charges and funds, which are rather complex, but less 
transparent, and lack relevant lawful doctrines. In contrast, the foreign trade 
sectors have  record formal activities under a strict control and administration 
(Ghura, 1998; Gupta, 2007). Hence, it is reasonable to argue that although the 
openness level is represented by the foreign trade share in a GDP boosted local 
economy and has a positive influence on the current revenue performance, its 
influence is much less than the tax revenue because some of the current 
revenue sources are based on informal activities, which are less controlled than 
administered areas. 
 
6.8.5 Population growth rate 
The indicator of population growth rate has shown a negative impact in both 
the tax ratio and current revenue ratio models. 
 
It is worth noting that after the opening up reforms in late 1970s, the Chinese 
government considered strict population control to be one way to improve the 
average family living standards, and the “one child policy” in China was strictly 
enforced (Xing, 2003). Hence, the natural population growth rate decreased 
rapidly, as it is can be illustrated in Figure 6-2 below. 
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Figure 6-2: Natural population growth rate in four main regions 
 
Data source: (N.B.S., 2014)  
 
As illustrated in Figure 6-2 above, the natural population growth rate has been 
restricted by the “one child policy”, and the most affected region is the eastern 
region, with the average natural population growth rate in the region below 1% 
in 2012 and 2013. 
 
As a result, the negative relationship between the population growth rate and 
the tax revenue capacity was found in this study as expected. This is 
consistent with the previous study. It is argued that the rate of population 
growth increases the tax exemption and has a lag effect on tax collection 
(Shin, 1969; Bahl, 2004; Teera & Hudson, 2004). In addition, it is also reveals 
that the “one child policy” has limited the negative impact of natural population 
growth rate on the tax capacity. 
 
6.8.6 Population density 
Population density is one of the most important factors in macroeconomic 
literature due to a close relationship with the economic scales (Teera & 
229 
 
Hudson, 2004). A high level of population density indicates large consumption 
needs and public service requirements. Hence, it is reasonable to consider 
the population density as one of the important tax bases in China. 
 
The relationship between the tax revenue capacity and the population density 
in this study was positive but not significant. This finding is consistent with 
another tax effort index study in China, which was conducted by Wang et al. 
(2009). As Wang, Shen and Zou (2009) argue, the influence of the population 
density on China’s tax capacity could result in two diverging outcomes. On the 
one hand, higher population density may indicate high tax exemptions and  on 
the other, it could also lead to a reduced tax administrative cost (Wang et al., 
2009). In their study, a non-significant relationship between population density 
and the tax ratio was found, which confirmed their early concerns regarding 
the uncertainty of the impact from the population density to China’s tax 
capacity.  
 
Strikingly, the influence of the population density on the current revenue ratio 
is clear. The study shows that it yielded the expected positive sign and a high 
significant level with p < 0.01. Given the existing turnover based tax system, 
which relies highly on consumption and sales taxes (Wang, 2004), this result 
further confirms the failure of the current tax ratio to capture  the true tax base 
in China. 
 
6.8.7 Non-agricultural population rate 
As stated in Chapter 5, the non-agricultural population variable has two 
meanings. On the one hand, it is a good proxy for urbanization, and on the 
other, it is also an indicator of migration.  
 
The measurement of the urbanization level is usually the ratio of urban 
population and total population (Zhang & Song, 2003). Hence, the increase in 
the urbanization level or urban growth could be caused by two factors: the 
natural rise in population of the existing urban population, and the increase in 
immigration from rural to urban areas (Unicef, 2012). Therefore, it is not 
appropriate to measure the urbanization level in China by simply taking the 
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ratio of the urban registered population to the total population. Considering 
that the critical prior condition in defining  “urban” population is that the 
population is  not primarily engaged in agricultural  activities (Unicef, 2012), 
the non-agricultural population rate is also seen as the proxy of the level of 
urbanization in China in this study.  
 
The non-agricultural population factor in both the tax revenue ratio and current 
revenue ratio performances shows positive signs and is highly significant at a 
level of P<0.01.  
 
As Tanzi (1992) argue, most public sector activities are urban-based, hence 
urbanization indicates a wider tax base for the tax revenue. The highly 
significant relationship between the non-agricultural population and the tax 
revenue ratio provides strong evidence for this argument.  
 
Migration is the other aspect which the non-agricultural population rate 
represents. It was stated  in Chapter 5 that from 1995 to 2000, extensive 
migration occurred, in addition to a surge of migration of rural residents 
moving to urban areas, especially coastal areas and metropolitan cities 
(Knight, 2008; Bao et al., 2009; Song, 2009). 
 
The result of this study revealed that migration has a positive impact on both 
tax and current revenue performance at provincial level. The positive 
contribution made by rural-urban migrants is well documented in the literature. 
In the 20 years between 1978 and 1999, there was a total of 174 million rural 
migrant workers in urban areas, which created the largest migration flow in  
human history (Zhang & Song, 2003). In the 21st century, the number of rural 
migrant workers has shown no sign of decreasing. The Chinese rural-urban 
migration comprised around 140.41 million people in 2008 alone. In 2010, this 
figure increased to 153.35 million, and 163.36 million in 2012  (N.B.S., 2013). 
The huge number of migrants  have become the main labour force in urban 
manufacturing sectors, and is one of the main  reasons for  the fast pace of  
economic growth in China (Qu & Zhao, 2014). 
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The migrants mostly work in wholesale and retail, restaurants and hotels, and 
other service-related industries as shown in Figure 6-3. 
 
Figure 6-3. Allocation of migrants in industry: 2002 - 2007 
 
Note:  
1: agriculture, mineral, manufacturing, construction.  
2: electricity, gas, and water and transportation and IT;  
3: wholesale and retail, restaurant, and hotel;  
4: finance, real estate, health and social security, education, arts and media, science and 
technical services;  
5: services. 
6: government and public administration and others. 
Data source: Qu and Zhao (2014) Evolution of the Chinese rural-urban migrant labour market 
from 2002 to 2007 
 
Therefore, there is no doubt that the migrant workers from rural areas boost 
the urbanization level, and the increase in the non-agricultural population has 
helped raise consumption and sales in urban areas, where most of the service 
sector activities are based.  
 
Similar results were found in the relationship between the non-agricultural 
population factor and the current revenue ratio performance, which indicates 
that the non-tax revenue, similar to the tax revenue, is urban based.  
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6.8.8 Per capita central transfer 
It has been  pointed out in previous literature that the central transfers from 
the central government to the local government services as external grants 
has a negative impact on the tax revenue performance due to the 
displacement effect and reverse causality effect (Leuthold, 1991; Ghura, 
1998). The main purpose of the central government transfers are to deal with 
local fiscal difficulties and help balance the fiscal gaps among the provinces.  
 
In this research, both the significant levels in the tax ratio and current revenue 
ratio regression have shown a high significant level of p < 0.01 with the 
expected negative signs. This proved that the central transfers received by 
provincial governments supress the incentives of local governments to explore 
the opportunities of increasing the tax/current revenue. In addition, the 
recentralization reform in 1994 has led to a lower fiscal decentralization at the 
provincial level, hence reducing the local governments’ motivations of 
increasing tax capacity.  
 
6.8.9 Income inequality  
It is argued that a wide income gap can result in a lower level of trust in the 
public regarding the function of the fiscal system on the issue of revenue 
redistribution, social justice and fairness, thus enhancing the exit option for 
paying taxes (Bird et al., 2006; Pessino & Fenochietto, 2010). It is also widely 
accepted that along with fast economic growth, the income gap in China has 
been increasing at a fast pace since the openness reform in 1978 (Cheng, 
2007; Chen et al., 2010; Peng et al., 2013; Xie & Zhou, 2014). Amid the 
increasing resident income gap, the urban-rural resident income gap is also 
expanding at a fast pace. The ratio between urban and rural residents’ income 
was 2.57 in 1978, and this figure reached 3.13 in 2011 (Li, Wang, Zhu, & 
Zhao, 2014). The fast increasing income gaps have becomes the authority’s 
“irritating headache” and a “burning issue” in China (Fan & Sun, 2008; Zhang 
& Bao, 2015).  
 
Previous studies on the relationship between income inequality and 
tax/current revenue ratio are scant, especially in the case study for a single 
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country. Nonetheless, in all the limited cross-country studies on the 
relationship between income inequality and tax/current revenue ratios, 
negative and significant relationships have been found (Bird et al., 2006; 
Pessino & Fenochietto, 2010; Fenochietto & Pessino, 2013). 
 
In this research, however, although an expected negative sign was yielded for 
the income inequality variable in the tax ratio regression model, the result was 
not significant. This is a rather unexpected result, given income inequality is 
such a serious issue in China, and the existence of the regional tax 
performances.                                                                                                                      
 
In the current revenue model, the income inequality variable yields an 
expected negative sign. Differing from the result in the tax revenue model, the 
income inequality variable is highly significant, relating to the current revenue 
capacity at P< 0.01 level. This result is consistent with the previous studies. 
These results may be explained by the following reasons. 
 
Firstly, the current revenue has a wider revenue base than the tax revenue. It 
is proven throughout the literature and the tax revenue regression model that 
the tax base is mostly connected to urban activity related factors, such as 
industrial sectors, foreign trade, and urbanization. 
 
Secondly, the great influence of income inequality, measured by the urban-
rural Theil index, on the current revenue model implies that the current 
revenue base is not only from urban citizens, but also extended to the 
migrants from the rural areas.  For example, the migrants were often charged 
‘education administrative fees’, which was exempted for urban citizens. 
Therefore, a broader revenue base makes the current revenue more sensitive 
to not only economic factors, but also some important social factors, such as 
the rural migrants. 
 
The significant impact of this variable is found in the current revenue model 
and not the tax revenue model, which has further empirically verified the issue 
which stated early in this study - that the tax revenue does not represent the 
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“true” tax revenue by the definition of tax. Instead, the current revenue 
possibly more accurately represents the “true” revenue capacity of tax in 
China.  
 
6.8.10 Anti-corruption effort 
Corruption has been widely proven to be negatively related to tax 
performance in the literature. This is because a higher corruption level 
indicates lower government efficiency and an institution’s credibility is 
adversely affected, hence harming economic activities (Johnson, Kaufmann, 
McMillan, & Woodruff, 2000; Everhart et al., 2009).  
 
Corruption is common in“guanxi”, making corruption in China different. The 
practice of“guanxi” has been a Chinese tradition for a very long time, and the 
development and practice of “guanxi” is so prevalent that it has become one 
of China’s most distinctive features. This has led to China evolving towards to 
a relationship-based “guanxi”-web capitalism rather than market capitalism 
(Boisot & Child, 1996; Lovett et al., 1999; Chenting & Littlefield, 2001; Fan, 
2002). 
 
Due to the common practice of “guanxi”, it is difficult to explain corruption 
solely through personal behaviour, since it is a social and cultural 
phenomenon, which often stems from the practice of “guanxi”.   
 
The empirical studies on the corruption level and the tax/current revenue ratio 
has also been well-documented. Ghura (1998) in his study found a significant 
negative impact of  corruption on the tax ratio in Sub-Saharan Africa 
countries. Fenochietto and Pessino (2013) in their 113 country  tax effort 
index study also found a positive and highly significant relationship between 
the controls of corruption and the tax ratio in both developed and developing 
countries.  
 
The studies presented by Bird et al. (2006) and Le et al. (2012) also yielded 
similar results. It may be noted that differing from their previous studies,  Bird 
et al. (2006) and Le et al. (2012) used the current revenue ratio and fiscal 
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revenue ratio as one of the dependent variables. The current revenue ratio 
and fiscal revenue ratio in their studies share similarities to China’s local 
governments’ current revenue ratios: they all include non-tax sourced 
revenues other than taxes.  
 
In this study, the positive sign of the anti-corruption effort has been achieved, 
both in the tax ratio and current revenue ratio model.  This is similar to the 
results of the income inequality and the anti-corruption effort variable, which 
although not significant in the tax ratio model, is highly significant in the 
current revenue ratio model. 
 
The generation of the expected positive signs in both the tax ratio model and 
current revenue ratio model proved that in a relationship-based capitalist 
economy, the illicit feature of the “guanxi” practice has a negative influence on 
the level of corruption, which, in turn, influences the government tax/current 
revenue performance.  
 
One of the valuable findings from the results is the differences in the 
significant level between the two models. The anti-corruption effort variable in 
the tax ratio model is not significant, whereas in the current revenue ratio 
model, it is highly significant. This significance level differences may be 
explained by two reasons.  
 
One the one hand, this may be caused by the special features of the 
relationship between the central and local tax authorities. Taxes are strictly 
enforced and administered by the central government. Local governments 
have minimal autonomous power over taxes, including deciding tax categories 
and tax rates (Zhan, 2013). Moreover, the utilization of tax revenue is 
supervised by the central government and lawfully enforced (Lin, 2005). 
However, the collection of fees at the local government level is  excessive and 
arbitrary, seriously lacking any legal basis and control (Lin, 2005; Ma, 2005; 
Zhang, 2006; Gao, 2010),  thus leaving difficult negotiations or grey areas in 
the process of fee collection and utilization as the breeding ground for 
corruption (Zhan, 2013). 
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On the other hand, the different significant level of anti-corruption variable in 
the tax ratio and current revenue ratio model may be explained using the 
same reason as the one explaining the income inequality results: the current 
revenue has wider revenue base than the tax revenue, hence it is more 
sensitive to social factors; thus, the revenue in the current revenue ratio model 
truly reflects the scope and magnitude of the tax revenue.   
 
In addition, the highly significant relationship between the anti-corruption effort 
variable and the current revenue ratio also reveals  that there are large 
amounts of informal, even illegal activities within the revenue collection 
system, which lacks legal regulations (Lin, 2005), leaving  room for the 
practice of corruption and “guanxi” arrangements.  
 
This results also provide strong evidence that the study of tax/current revenue 
performance is country-specific. Corruption has a negative impact on 
government efficiency. In China, due to the existence of large scale non-tax 
sourced revenue, the negative impact from corruption is not detected until the 
investigation goes deep into the sub-categories of off-budgetary revenues and 
the extra-budgetary revenues. Hence, it is vital to link country-specific 
characteristics when investigating the role played by corruption in the tax 
effort index studies.  
 
6.8.11 Government fiscal expenditure in GDP 
 Chapter 5 suggests that the main purpose of revenue collection is to enhance 
the government’s capacity in the economy and for it to better perform 
functions through government expenditure; thus, government capacity is an 
important influencing factor for the tax/current revenue capacity and effort. 
This is especially so in China since the expenditure responsibility has been 
highly decentralized and local governments take up the majority of the 
expenditure responsibilities. 
 
According to the findings of the regression results, a high level of provincial 
government capacity, which is proxied by the local government budgetary 
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fiscal expenditure in GDP is significantly positive, related to both the tax ratio 
and current revenue ratio at the significant level of P < 0.01. This finding 
shows that government capacity is also one of the main determinants of the 
tax/current revenue capacities.   
 
6.9   Measuring tax/current revenue capacity and effort 
6.9.1 Introduction  
The aim of this study is to find the key determinants of the variation of the tax 
revenue capacity in China, and to evaluate China’s tax revenue performance 
at provincial level.   
 
Following the empirical studies on the tax capacity and effort, in particular  the 
study by Fauvelle-Aymar (1999) who constructed the current revenue 
capacity/effort, and the study by Bird et al. (2006), who constructed the 
government revenue effort/capacity, this study, for the first time in literature, 
has constructed both the tax capacity/effort, and current revenue 
capacity/effort at the provincial level to examine tax performance in China.  
 
Based on the discussions in Chapter 2, the tax effort index is calculated.   
There are two steps in obtaining the tax effort index. First, an estimated 
tax/current revenue capacity is required, which is generated through the 
regressions, e.g., the fixed effect model. Second, the tax/current revenue 
effort index is calculated by the ratio of actual tax or current revenue ratio and 
estimated tax or current revenue capacity.  
 
The following Equation (6-1) is used for calculating the tax effort index. 
ܶܽݔ ݂݂݁݋ݎݐ ݅݊݀݁ݔ =
ܶ
ܻ
෠ܶ
ܻ
=
ܶ
෠ܶ 
Equation 6-1 
 
Where: 
ܶ = ܽܿݐݑ݈ܽ ݐܽݔ ݎ݁ݒ݁݊ݑ݁ ܿ݋݈݈݁ܿݐ݅݋݊ 
ܻ = ܩܦܲ 
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It is noteworthy that the tax/current revenue capacity and effort generated 
from this study are relative tax capacity and effort, and do not infer the 
feasibility of the extent of the actual tax/current revenue performance by 
absolute value, but indicate the degree of variation of tax/current revenue 
capacity and effort. As argued by Tanzi and Zee (2000)  the tax ratio 
approach indicates the degree of variation of tax effort, and should not be 
used to reflect the optimal taxation (Tanzi & Zee, 2000). More importantly, the 
tax effort index approach is to explain tax effort variances, in other words, 
instead of answering what the tax effort level is, the tax effort index approach 
is an attempt at answering the question of why there are differences between 
the observations in the whole sample (Bahl, 1971). 
 
6.9.2 Tax/current revenue capacity 
Tax capacity is the government’s hypothetical ability to raise tax revenue for 
the purpose of public finance within the existing tax base (Bahl, 1971, 1972; 
Akin, 1973; Wang et al., 2009).  
 
Taking the special characteristic of China’s fiscal system into consideration, in 
addition to the tax revenue, this researcher constructed the provincial current 
revenue capacity. The current revenue not only includes the tax revenue, but 
also includes the extra-budgetary revenue and off-budgetary revenue, but 
excludes SOE-related revenue and expenditure.  
 
The tax capacity of the provincial governments is the hypothetical ability to 
raise revenues from taxes, including local taxes and central-local shared 
taxes; and the current revenue capacity of provincial governments is the 
hypothetical ability to generate revenues from not only tax collection, but also 
various government fees, funds and charges.  
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As aforementioned, even though the tax revenue is the main component in 
the fiscal revenue system in China, it is not sufficient to analyse the tax 
revenue related issues by studying the tax revenue capacity alone due to the 
existence of a large share of non-tax sourced revenue. This has led to a 
situation where the potential revenue capacity of provincial governments 
cannot be simply represented by the tax capacity, otherwise a large 
component of the local government revenue, non-tax sourced revenues, is 
overlooked.  
 
By comparing the relationship between the tax capacity and the current 
revenue capacity, the potential basis of the non-tax sourced revenue can be 
analysed at the provincial level, hence some suggestions regarding the 
administration of the non-tax sourced revenue as well as enhancing the tax 
revenue performance can be made. 
 
6.9.3 Tax/current revenue effort 
Tax effort is another very important term relating to the tax capacity. Generally 
speaking, tax effort is the measure of the extent to which an area or 
government unit utilizes their effort to collect tax revenue under the given 
hypothetical tax capacity. The measurement of tax effort takes the ratio 
between actual tax collection and hypothetical tax capacity.  
 
In this study, following Bird et al. (2006), Tuan Minh et al. (2008), and Le et al. 
(2012), the current revenue effort was constructed and measured in the same 
way as the tax effort. Hence, the current revenue effort is defined in this study 
as the extent to which the provincial government units generate current 
revenue from their given current revenue capacity.  
 
The comparison between the tax effort and current revenue effort in China at 
provincial level has important significance regarding taxation. It is well-known 
that tax revenue plays a crucial role in the government fiscal system in the 
market-oriented economy; however, in order to present a better policy 
implementation, it is vital to see the whole picture of the government’s fiscal 
revenue system. This is especially important to China due to the fundamental 
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difference between the tax revenue and non-tax sourced revenue in local 
government fiscal revenue system.  
 
In order to investigate the regional disparity of tax performance, all 31 
provinces in this study are further categorized into four main regions: the 
eastern, western, central and north-eastern regions. The eastern region 
includes Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, 
Shandong, Guangdong and Hainan;the western region  includes Inner 
Mongolia, Guangxi, Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet, Shaanxi, 
Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang; The central region includes: Shanxi, 
Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei and Hunan; and the north-east region includes 
Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang. The rationale for this classification is based 
on the statistics that China’s National Statistics Bureau publish to capture the 
divergence of the social and economic development in different regions of 
China.  
 
6.9.4 Provincial tax revenue effort vs. tax revenue capacity 
Table 6-13 shows the results of the average tax revenue effort and tax 
revenue capacity of each province between 1996 and 2013.  
 
 
Table 6-13: Average tax effort and tax capacity (1996 - 2013) 
 
province tax effort tax capacity province tax effort tax capacity 
Beijing 1.422 9.736 Hubei 0.863 5.498 
Tianjin 0.808 9.552 Hunan 0.849 4.886 
Hebei 0.803 5.475 Guangdong 0.865 8.752 
Shanxi 1.016 6.432 Guangxi 1.021 5.048 
Inner 
Mongolia 1.232 4.471 Hainan 1.526 5.009 
Liaoning 0.911 7.366 Chongqing 0.956 6.425 
Jilin 0.812 6.116 Sichuan 1.056 5.448 
Heilongjiang 0.847 6.141 Guizhou 1.376 5.349 
Shanghai 0.978 16.309 Yunnan 1.457 5.631 
Jiangsu 0.781 7.872 Tibet 1.171 3.965 
Zhejiang 1.101 6.389 Shaanxi 0.999 6.035 
Anhui 0.949 5.891 Gansu 1.014 5.310 
Fujian 0.916 6.271 Qinghai 1.111 5.059 
Jiangxi 0.952 5.361 Ningxia 1.076 6.069 
Shandong 0.732 6.705 Xinjiang 1.361 4.663 
241 
 
Henan 0.769 5.332 National average 1.024 6.405 
 
Eastern 
region 0.946 8.037 
Westen 
region 1.152 5.290 
Central 
region 0.900 5.567 
North-east 
region 0.857 6.541 
 
 
From table 6-13 above, it can be seen that the tax effort performance at the 
provincial level demonstrates a regional disparity. Tax effort varies from region 
to region, but the tax effort and tax capacity for individual provinces often does 
not follow the same pattern. The national average tax effort level is 1.024. 
However, 11 provinces have higher tax effort performance than the national 
average, and 20 provinces have lower than the national average tax effort 
performance.  
 
Comparing the performance of tax effort with that of tax capacity, there are 
significant regional variations. The most obvious example is the Eastern 
region, which is the most developed region in China and has the highest tax 
capacity at the level of 8.037%, whereas its tax effort is only 0.946, below the 
national average of 1.024 (Table 6-11). A similar phenomenon is found in the 
north-east region, with tax capacity of 6.541%, and tax effort of 0.857 
respectively, which is the lowest among all four regions. Strikingly, the 
western region has the highest tax effort among all regions at 1.152; however, 
its tax capacity is the lowest in all four regions at 5.29%.  
 
The discussion above reveals an interesting phenomenon in China - that the 
regions with higher tax capacity tend to have lower tax effort, and vice versa. 
This may be because less developed regions lack tax resources, but due to 
the expenditure in decentralization, local governments  face  great fiscal 
stress, hence a higher tax effort is detected  (Shen, 2011; Shen et al., 2012; 
Wu, Feng, & Li, 2015).. In contrast, the more developed regions are relatively 
abundant in tax resources, thus the lower tax effort appears.  The average tax 
effort and tax capacity at the provincial level are depicted in the scatter chart 
in Figure 6-4.  
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Figure 6-4: The scatter chart of average tax effort and tax capacity of each province 
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Shanghai shows a very high tax capacity compared to the other provinces due 
to its special economic and political position and its high level of economic 
development. However, its tax effort is much lower than the national average.  
 
Shanghai is located in the middle of China’s eastern coastline with easy 
access to the Yangtze River – this golden waterway links to the eastern China 
Sea, and the foundation of the Yangtze River Delta area, the most populated 
and economically developed area in China. (Yang, Luo, & Ji, 2016) Since the 
opening up policy and the trade liberalization, China has been recognized as 
the “workshop of the world”, and Shanghai has become the undeniable main 
gate of this workshop.  (Dobrescu & Dobre, 2015) 
 
Shanghai also takes great advantages from the central policies for its 
dramatic social and economic development (Yang, 2002). In particular, during 
the period between 1993 and 2003 when Jiang Zemin served as the 
President of the People’s Republic of China and during 1998 and 2003 when 
Zhu Rongji served as the Premier of the People’s Republic of China. What 
these two central leaders had in common was that they both served as former 
Mayors of Shanghai. As a result, Shanghai has experienced its rapid 
renovation and development by taking great central policy advantages from 
these two former central government leaders like no one else. (Dobrescu & 
Dobre, 2015) Hence the great geographical and political advantages may be 
the reason why Shanghai is such an extreme case in terms of tax capacity in 
this study. 
 
Apart from the extreme case of Shanghai, the diagram above shows that 
there is a negative relationship between the tax effort and the tax capacity. 
Provinces with higher tax capacity tend to have a lower tax effort, and vice-
versa. This discrepancy may indicate low efficiency in the taxation 
performance at provincial level. It is expected that if there is an efficient 
government, a higher tax capacity should result in a higher tax effort. 
However, in China, there are very few provinces that have high tax capacity 
and at the same time, a high tax effort.  
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Tianjin, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Liaoning and Shandong are typical provinces 
that have high tax capacity but low tax effort. Increasing the tax collection and 
enforcement by the tax administration should result in a better taxation 
performance.  
 
In contrast, Hainan, Yunnan, Guizhou, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, and Tibet 
show a different pattern. They all have high tax effort but low tax capacity. In 
other words, these provinces are generating tax revenues through heavy tax 
effort from a relatively narrow tax capacity. Fiscal deficit is possibly the 
reason, and greater attention from the central government to help these local 
governments may be needed.  
 
The remaining provinces suffer from low tax capacity and low tax effort by 
different degrees. These provinces are facing a double challenge. On the one 
hand, the local government needs to develop a greater tax base potential and 
on the other hand, local governments also need to enforce their tax 
administration to raise their tax effort.    
 
6.9.5 Provincial government current revenue effort and current revenue 
capacity 
Table 6-14 shows the results of the average current revenue effort and current 
revenue capacity of each province between 1996 and 2013.  
 
Table 6-14: Average current revenue effort and current revenue capacity (1996 - 2013) 
Province 
current 
revenue 
effort 
current 
revenue 
capacity 
province 
current 
revenue 
effort 
current 
revenue 
capacity 
Beijing 0.379 45.968 Hubei 0.726 11.608 
Tianjin 0.286 39.695 Hunan 0.897 10.123 
Hebei 0.589 12.591 Guangdong 0.505 21.891 
Shanxi 1.134 10.758 Guangxi 1.215 8.133 
Inner 
mongolia 3.024 2.898 Hainan 1.093 10.339 
Liaoning 0.634 17.382 Chongqing 0.785 13.035 
Jilin 0.898 9.562 Sichuan 1.258 8.085 
Heilongjiang 1.150 7.272 Guizhou 1.632 7.738 
Shanghai 0.143 126.596 Yunnan 1.831 6.842 
Jiangsu 0.381 25.878 Tibet 8.167 0.930 
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Zhejiang 0.591 18.479 Shaanxi 1.181 8.947 
Anhui 0.709 13.434 Gansu 2.140 4.539 
Fujian 0.758 13.470 Qinghai 4.843 1.813 
Jiangxi 1.020 9.656 Ningxia 1.639 6.640 
Shandong 0.427 18.986 Xinjiang 4.164 2.489 
Henan 0.536 13.992 National average 1.443 16.444 
 
Eastern 
region 0.530 31.992 
Westen 
region 2.657 6.007 
Central region 0.837 11.595 North-east region 0.894 11.405 
 
The regional disparity in terms of current revenue effort reveals a different 
picture compared to the tax effort regional disparity.  
 
The tax revenue effort of the western region is ranked as the highest among 
all four regions at 2.657. A similar result has also been revealed in the current 
revenue analysis. However, its current revenue capacity is 6.007%, which is 
ranked as the second highest among all four regions, compared to the highest 
tax revenue capacity. 
 
The eastern region is an example of unbalanced current revenue effort and 
current revenue capacity. The current revenue capacity of the eastern region 
is 31.992%, which is the highest among all four regions, whereas the current 
revenue effort is 0.53, which is the lowest in all four regions. Its current 
revenue effort lags behind the other three regions.  
 
The current revenue capacity and current revenue effort in the north-east 
region and the inland central region show the same pattern as in the tax 
capacity – tax effort analysis – despite the current revenue effort being greater 
than the current revenue capacity for the central region.   
 
Two extreme cases are found in the above chart: Shanghai and Tibet. 
Shanghai appears as having the highest current revenue capacity; however, 
its current revenue effort is the lowest among all provinces. In contrast, Tibet 
has the lowest current revenue capacity at 0.930%, whereas its current 
revenue effort is 8.167, which is ranked as the highest of all provinces.  
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Geographically, Shanghai is an eastern coastal city, one of the centres of the 
open-door policy frontline, whereas Tibet is the most remote province in 
China, and has suffered from political instability for a very long time.  
 
As mentioned before, Shanghai is both geographically and politically more 
advanced than other areas in China, whereas Tibet is one of the poorest 
provinces in China. It is conjecturable that Shanghai has a great hypothetical 
current revenue capacity, but has not utilized its effort to collect them. 
However, in Tibet, the fiscal stress has forced the local government to push 
hard on the effort to collect revenues even though the hypothetical capacity is 
very low, possibly caused by its geographical disadvantages and both social 
and political problems (Xu, 1998; Davies, 2009; Crowe, 2013; Tuttle, 2015). 
Figure 6-5 illustrates the current revenue capacity and current revenue effort 
in all 29 provinces. Shanghai and Tibet are not included due to their extreme 
values.  
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Figure 6-5: Scatter chart of average current revenue capacity and current revenue effort (1996-2013) 
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It was found that from the tax effort – tax capacity analysis that provinces with 
higher tax capacity tend to have lower tax effort. This phenomenon also exists 
in the current revenue analysis. Provinces which have higher current revenue 
capacity also tend to have lower current revenue effort. Jiangsu, Guangdong 
and Shandong are three provinces with the highest current revenue capacity, 
but with the lowest current revenue effort. In contrast, Qinghai, Xinjiang and 
inner-Mongolia are three provinces that have the lowest current revenue 
capacity, but their current revenue efforts are the highest among all provinces 
in this study. 
 
6.10 Summary  
In this chapter, the process of statistical analysis, the empirical results, and 
the discussion on the results are presented.  
 
The dataset in this research contains a total of 31 provinces and covers a 19-
year period, from 1995 to 2013. Through the descriptive statistics of raw data, 
it is revealed the existence of significant regional disparities in terms of 
economic and social conditions, especially in terms of stage of development, 
population density, openness level, and current revenue ratio.   
 
Before proceed to regression analysis, all independent variables are tested for 
multicollinearity using the Variance Inflation Factor and the Condition Number. 
A rough role for VIF is that it should not be greater than ten, and the condition 
number is less than 100 (Bizeti, Carvalho, Souza, & Destro, 2004; Tattar, 
Ramaiah, & Manjunath, 2016). Since the test result of all independent 
variables’ VIF is less than 10 and the condition number is less than 100, the 
degree of multicollinearity is not an issue for the later regression process.  
 
In order to identifying the best appropriate regression model among the 
pooled OLS, random effect, and the fixed effect regression model, all three 
regressions are ran, discussed and tested by the Breusch-pagan LM test and 
Hausman test. Based on the statistical evidence presented on the Breusch-
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Pagan test and Hausman test, it can be concluded that the fixed effect model 
is the best fit for both tax ratio and current revenue ratio in this study. 
 
As the outcome of the literature reviewed, the author of this study constructed 
elven testable hypothesis. Based on the significance level obtained from the 
regression results, all 11 hypothesis are tested. The hypothesis testing result 
is briefly summarized in the table 6-15 below.  
 
Table 6-15: Brief summary of main hypothesis testing result 
Main hypothesis Tax ratio 
Current 
revenue 
ratio 
H1: The stage of development is significantly related to the 
tax revenue performance at provincial level in China. Accepted Accepted 
H2: Development in the industrial sector is significantly 
related to the tax revenue performance at provincial level in 
China. 
Accepted Accepted 
H3: The development of the service sector is significantly 
related to the tax revenue performance at provincial level in 
China. 
Failed to 
accept Accepted 
H4: The openness level is significantly related to the tax 
revenue performance at provincial level in China. Accepted Accepted 
H5: The population growth rate is significantly related to the 
tax revenue performance at provincial level in China. Accepted Accepted 
H6: The population density is significantly related to the tax 
revenue performance at provincial level in China. 
Failed to 
accept Accepted 
H7: The shrinking of agricultural sector activities is 
significantly related to the tax revenue performance at 
provincial level in China. 
Accepted Accepted 
H8: The resident income inequality is significantly related to 
the tax revenue performance at provincial level in China. 
Failed to 
accept Accepted 
H9: The external grants received by local governments are 
significantly related to the tax revenue performance at 
provincial level in China. 
Accepted Accepted 
H10: The anti-corruption effort is significantly related to the 
tax revenue performance at provincial level in China. 
Failed to 
accept Accepted 
H11: The government capacity is significantly related to the 
tax revenue performance at provincial level in China. Accepted Accepted 
 
The test of the fixed effect model generated some interesting and important 
results. The current revenue ratio, which contains the non-tax sourced 
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revenue, fit better than the tax ratio with evidence from a higher explanatory 
power. In addition, two variables, the income inequality variable and 
corruption that have been proven to have significant impact on the tax ratio in 
a number of previous studies, were statistically non-significant in the tax ratio 
regression, but statistically highly significant in the current revenue ratio 
regression, with expected signs that support the previous studies. The 
regression result implies that the tax ratio may not represent the true tax 
revenue performance in China, because some items in non-tax sourced 
revenues are similar to the concept of tax.  
 
All independent variables are yield expected signs in both tax and current 
revenue ratio regression models, but with different level of significance. Based 
on the regression results, it is clear that the stage of development, 
development in the industrial sector, openness level, population growth rate, 
shrinking of agricultural sector activities, external grants received by the local 
governments, and government capacity are all the main determinants for both 
tax and current revenue capacity. However, four factors, namely development 
in the service sector, population density, resident income inequality, and anti-
corruption effort, are main determinants in current revenue performance, but 
not for tax revenue performance. Furthermore, all independent variables are 
discussed in each of their own section to discover the meaning of their own 
results.   
 
Through the regression results, the estimated tax/current revenue capacity for 
each of 31 provinces in China were generated. Following the tax effort index 
equation which was discussed in Chapter 2, the tax effort index was 
calculated for each of 31 provinces. Hence, the tax effort, tax capacity, current 
revenue effort, and current revenue capacity were discussed and compared. 
This study revealed that serious regional disparities are existing in both tax 
capacity and tax effort. In addition, it is also revealed a negative relationship 
between provincial tax revenue capacity and tax effort: the regions with higher 
tax capacity tend to have lower tax effort, and vice versa. The similar result 
was also found in the current revenue capacity and effort.  
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7 Chapter seven: Conclusions and recommendations of this study 
7.1   Introduction 
The research aim of this study is to find the key determinants of the variation 
of the tax revenue capacity in China, and to evaluate China’s tax revenue 
performance at provincial level. The primary purpose of this study is to seek 
answers to the following questions: 
 
1. What are the key determinants affecting the tax capacity in China at 
provincial level? 
2. How did the tax revenue perform in China at provincial level? 
3. Is there any regional variation of tax performance at the provincial level? 
4. What policies may be suggested to improve the tax revenue 
performance in China? 
 
Based on the outcomes of the literature reviewed, and with the research aim 
of this study, the following hypotheses have been put forward: 
 
H1: The stage of development is positively related to the tax revenue 
performance at provincial level in China. 
 
H2: Development in the industrial sector is positively related to the tax 
revenue performance at provincial level in China. 
 
H3: The development of the service sector is positively related to the tax 
revenue performance at provincial level in China. 
 
H4: The openness level is positively related to the tax revenue performance at 
provincial level in China. 
 
H5: The population growth rate is negatively related to the tax revenue 
performance at provincial level in China. 
 
H6: The population density is positively related to the tax revenue 
performance at provincial level in China. 
 
H7: The shrinking of agricultural sector activities is positively related to the tax 
revenue performance at provincial level in China. 
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H8:  Resident income inequality is negatively related to the tax revenue 
performance at provincial level in China. 
 
H9: The external grants received by local governments are negatively related 
to the tax revenue performance at provincial level in China. 
 
H10: The anti-corruption effort is positively related to the tax revenue 
performance at provincial level in China. 
 
H11: The government capacity is positively related to the tax revenue 
performance at provincial level in China. 
 
In order to answer research question one, the above hypotheses are tested and 
the econometric quantitative method is applied for these purposes.  
Furthermore, the data used in this study covers the period between 1995 and 
2013 on 31 provinces, autonomous or municipal cities directly under the control 
of the central government. The guide-lines and procedures of how the research 
questions have been answered and how the research aim has been achieved 
are briefly summarized below. 
 
Firstly, through a detailed investigation into the taxation system and 
government revenues in China, this study found a more accurate indicator for 
tax performance in China. Specifically, the existence of non-tax sourced 
revenue is the most significant characteristic in China’s government fiscal 
revenue system, especially at local government level where the government 
fees, charges and funds are collected as non-tax sourced revenue although 
often without a legal basis. It is argued in this study that this non-taxed 
sourced revenue in essence bears the nature of taxes.  Therefore, the author 
stresses that China’s current revenue, which includes both tax revenue and 
non-tax sourced revenue, may more appropriately represent the magnitude 
and scope of the tax performance in China. 
 
Secondly, based on the salient feature of China’s fiscal revenue system 
discussed above, and the 11 hypotheses formulated based on the literature 
reviewed, two regression-based tax effort index models were constructed, 
namely the tax revenue ratio model, and the current revenue ratio model. The 
same 11 explanatory variables are used in these two models. The purpose of 
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building the two regression models are to obtain the estimated tax and current 
revenue capacity and to find the determinants of tax revenue performance.  
 
As a result of these regressions, all 31 provinces’ tax and current revenue 
capacities are calculated, which are used for further calculation of the tax and 
current revenue effort indices. Since both the tax capacity indices and tax effort 
indices are the measurement of tax performance, research question two and 
three are answered.  
 
Finally, based on all the results and outcomes mentioned above, the author is 
able to provide suggestions for policy makers to improve the tax revenue 
performance in China, thus, research question four is answered.  
 
The remainder of this chapter provides more detailed analysis of the regression 
results, which is followed by the contributions of this research. Finally the 
limitations and further studies are also provided.  
  
 
7.2   The main findings from the regression results 
7.2.1 Model building process 
Based on the salient feature of China’s fiscal revenue system, along with the 
conventional tax revenue ratio as one of the dependent variables, the author 
constructed the current revenue ratio as the second dependent variable to 
represent the true tax-like revenue performance in China.  
 
The tax ratio is measured as the ratio of actual tax collection in GDP, and the 
current revenue ratio is measured as the ratio of actual current revenue 
collection in GDP, where the current revenue is the sum of tax revenue and 
non-tax sourced revenue, which excludes State Owned Enterprise revenues 
and planned subsidies to loss-suffering of SOEs (PSL). The reason for 
excluding State Owned Enterprise revenues and PSL is that according to PSL 
properties and classification by the UN, PSL is a subsidized fiscal expenditure 
in principle. Inclusion of the PSL in the off-budgetary revenue might cause 
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data bias for some provinces. In addition, the revenue from SOEs is highly 
related to the PSL as both reflect the activities of SOEs. 
 
In terms of the independent variables, 11 variables which fit with six 
categories were selected. These six categories were: the traditional tax 
handles, GDP decomposition, population factors, income inequality, 
corruption, and governmental factors. The independent variables included in 
this research are selected economic and social factors based on the 
hypotheses generated from the literature reviewed, which are the expected 
determinants of tax revenue performance. 
 
In order to identify the best fit regression model, three regression models were 
built and run for both the tax revenue ratio and current revenue ratio, the 
pooled OLS model, random effect and fixed effect regression models. Having 
performed the Breusch-Pagan LM test and the Hausman test, the fixed effect 
model was revealed to be the more appropriate regression model for this 
study.  
 
7.2.2 The fitness of the model 
Overall, the F test of both tax revenue regression and current revenue 
regression are significant at P<0.05 level. The fraction of variance due to the 
individual effects (intra-class correlation) in the tax revenue regression 
performs well with the explanatory power of 89% and this figure in the current 
revenue regression is 99%. 
 
Therefore, the regression results of both the tax ratio model and the current 
revenue ratio confirms the fitness of the models. Within the tax ratio 
regression model, seven explanatory variables were found to be significantly 
related to the tax ratio. In contrast, in the current revenue ratio regression, all 
the variables are statistically significant. This further demonstrates the 
appropriateness of introducing the current revenue as a more comprehensive 
yet accurate indicator of China’s tax performance. 
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7.2.3 The comparison between the tax ratio model and the current 
revenue model 
Comparing the tax ratio model with the current revenue ratio model, it is 
apparent that the current revenue ratio model is a more appropriate model to 
explain the tax performance in China. This is proved by the regression results 
which obtained some variables such as service sector value-added in GDP, 
population density, income inequality, and the level of corruption, all of which 
were not significant in the tax ratio model, but highly significant in the current 
revenue model. These results demonstrate that China’s provincial level tax 
revenue performance has been underestimated by the existence of non-tax 
sourced revenue. Therefore, the author believes that the current revenue 
model should be used when examining China’s tax performance at the 
provincial level. 
 
7.3   Analysis of the regression results 
7.3.1 The key determinants affecting the tax capacity in China at 
provincial level 
Based on the regression results provided in Chapter 6, the key determinants 
affecting the tax capacity in China at provincial level are presented below. 
 
7.3.1.1 The economic factors and the tax handle 
The results of this study confirms that the tax capacity in China at provincial 
level is  considerably affected by economic factors such as the stage of 
development, development of the industrial sector and service sector, and 
openness level. Provinces with a higher stage of development and industrial 
sector development were all found to significantly affect the tax capacity 
positively. The openness level and development of the service sector are also 
positively affecting the tax capacity but its level of significance is lower than 
that of the stage of development and industrial sector development.  
 
7.3.1.2  Population factors 
The natural rate of population growth, the population density and non-
agricultural population rate are the population factors included in this study as 
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the explanatory variables to explain the tax performance. It is observed that 
due to the implementation of the one child policy and the subsequent 
enforced birth control, the natural rate of population growth has not been so 
high during the period covered in this study. A negative relationship between 
the natural population growth rate and the tax revenue performance in this 
study is assumed and confirmed by the regression result. This is consistent 
with the previous study that the natural rate of population growth had a lagged 
effect of capturing taxpayers in tax collection (Bahl, 2004). 
 
The other two independent variables, the population density and the non-
agricultural population rate, have all shown a positive impact on both tax and 
current revenue performance. It should be noted that the share of the non-
agricultural population is used as a proxy for the urbanization and migration 
since these two are interrelated. The high level of urbanization is often found 
in the developed areas which attract rural workers. While the rural workers 
raise the level of urbanization, they also generate a higher demand for public 
goods and commodities, thus bringing increased sales and consumption in 
the urban area. 
 
7.3.1.3 Governmental factors 
Another variable relating to the relationship between the central and local 
government, is the central transfers, which have been found to have a 
negative impact on the provincial tax capacity. This to say that the greater the 
central transfer that local governments received, the lower tax capacity it had. 
This finding is also consistent with the previous literature, which indicated a 
displacement effect and reverse causality of external finance to the domestic 
tax revenues. (Lotz & Morss, 1970; Leuthold, 1991; Ghura, 1998; Chaudhry & 
Munir, 2010).  
 
Government capacity in this study is proxied by the government’s fiscal 
expenditure in GDP and found to be one of the main determinants of the local 
tax capacity. This finding is consistent with the theoretical assumption that a 
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higher level of government capacity could increase the surplus for taxation 
(Huossain, 2014).  
 
7.3.1.4 Income inequality and anti-corruption effort 
In terms of the other two social variables of income inequality and corruption, 
the expected signs have been achieved but are not statistically significant in 
the tax capacity model. However, in the current revenue model, they are both 
significant with the expected positive signs. The author conjectures that this 
may be because the tax ratio cannot fully represent the true tax revenue 
performance in China. This is because the author argues that the current 
revenue ratio has been proved to more accurately reflect the true tax revenue 
than the tax ratio, hence the income inequality and the anti-corruption effort 
are considered as two of the main determinants of tax capacity.  
 
7.3.2  Tax performance and its regional variation at the provincial level 
Using the conventional regression approach, the author calculated the tax 
capacity and tax effort indices. Both of them demonstrates the existence of 
regional disparity, as the main characteristic of China’s regional tax revenue 
performance. The highest tax capacity appears in the eastern region, which 
also has the highest level of economic development represented by the real 
per capita GDP. In contrast, the western region has the lowest real per capita 
GDP level, and also has the lowest tax capacity. 
 
 When the detailed investigation was conducted for the individual provinces, a 
striking pattern is observed: there is a negative relationship between tax 
capacity and tax effort for some provinces; they have high tax capacity but low 
tax effort, and vice-versa. For example, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Guangdong and 
Shandong are four provinces or municipality cities under the direct control of 
the central government, with the highest current revenue capacity. However, 
their current revenue effort indices are the lowest among all provinces.   
 
This regional disparity of tax performance possibly indicates poor efficiency in 
tax collection and management at provincial level. In an efficient government 
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governed society, a high tax effort often goes hand-in-hand with high tax 
capacity since an  efficient government is more likely to fully utilise the tax 
capacity (Fauvelle-Aymar, 1999; Bird et al., 2006). It seems that the 
efficiencies of China’s local governments vary significantly leading to the 
existence of regional disparity in tax performance. 
 
7.4    Policy implications 
Government fiscal revenue  plays  a key role in the economic reforms and 
development in China (Lin, 2000) . China’s local governments’ fiscal revenues 
mainly consist of tax revenue, off-budgetary revenue, and extra-budgetary 
revenue. The results of this study have revealed that China’s tax revenue is 
mainly determined by economic factors. However, when the current revenue 
was used as the indicator of tax performance, the result showed that not only 
economic factors but social factors are also equally important. In addition, 
from the regional tax revenue performance aspect, the study clearly confirms 
the existence of the regional disparity of tax or current revenue capacity and 
the mismatch between the tax/current revenue capacity and lower tax/current 
revenue effort in some provinces. 
 
As Bird et al. (2006) stated that for developing countries with poor tax revenue 
performance, it would not help much by telling them to “find oil” or “rearrange 
nature’s bounty” (Bird et al., 2006, p. 4). By the same token, it would be not 
much help to address the regional disparities of tax/current revenue effort by 
suggesting the central government use its political power to narrow the gap. 
Nonetheless, some policy recommendation may be made.  
 
7.4.1 Regulation of the informal activities in the service sector 
It was found that the service sector is statistically non-significant in relation to 
the tax ratio but highly significant in the current revenue ratio model. This 
implies that large scale informal activities in the service sector and tax evasion 
may exist. China’s tax system mostly relies on the turnover taxes that are 
collected mainly from sales and consumption in the service sector. By 
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regulating the informal activities in the service sector, the government is able 
to tackle tax evasion and increase the tax base.  
 
7.4.2 Adjustment or reform on turnover taxes to capture a larger 
population tax base 
The regression results in the tax revenue ratio model reveal a positive but not 
significant relationship between the population density and the tax capacity; 
however, in the current revenue ratio model regression results, the 
relationship was positive and highly significant. Through the discussion on 
China’s taxation system, it is clear that it is mainly turnover tax based, which 
relies highly on consumption and sales tax. Based on these facts, the failure 
of the current formal tax system to capture the true tax base in China can be 
confirmed.  
 
7.4.3 Adjustment on the strategy of the central transfer system for 
greater incentives of tax collection by local government and 
balancing regional disparities in tax revenue 
As revealed in Chapter 4, the main purpose of the central transfers are to deal 
with local fiscal difficulties and help balance the fiscal gaps among the 
provinces. However, based on the regression and hypothesis testing results 
from this study, central transfers significantly suppress the incentive of local 
governments to explore the opportunities to increase the tax/current revenue. 
In addition, the recentralization reform in 1994 has reduced local government 
motivation to increase tax capacity. Furthermore, through the analysis of 
provincial governments’ tax/current revenue capacity and effort indices, there 
are large regional disparities among provinces in terms of tax/current revenue 
capacity and effort. Therefore, the author suggests that the strategy of using a 
central transfer system should be adjusted to reduce the negative impact on 
local government incentives and motivation to explore tax capacity by their 
own effort, but also to balance the regional disparities in terms of tax revenue 
performance.  
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7.4.4 Control of urban-rural resident income disparity  
As discussed in the earlier chapters, a wide resident income gap can result in 
a lower level of trust in the public regarding the function of the fiscal system on 
the issue of revenue redistribution, social justice and fairness, thus enhancing 
the exit option for paying taxes (Bird et al., 2006; Pessino & Fenochietto, 
2010). It is also revealed that the resident income disparity in China has been 
increasing at a fast pace. Based on the results from this study, the urban-rural 
resident income disparity has a negative influence on both tax capacity and 
current revenue capacity. In addition, its influence on the current revenue 
capacity is highly significant.  
 
7.4.5 Strengthen the anti-corruption campaign 
Through the findings in the literature reviewed, corruption has been widely 
proven to be negatively related to tax performance. This argument is also 
proven in this study by the regression results and hypothesis testing. The 
positive sign of the anti-corruption effort has been achieved in both the tax 
ratio and current revenue ratio regression model, and the positive influence of 
the anti-corruption effort to current revenue capacity has been proven to be 
highly significant. Based on the above discussion, it is suggested in this study 
that the authorities should strengthen the anti-corruption campaign for the 
purpose of higher government efficiency and institution credibility, thus 
improving the tax revenue performance at provincial level in China. 
 
7.4.6 Legislation and regulation of the non-tax sourced revenue  
It is revealed in chapter four that a large proportion of fees, charges and funds 
have become  important sources of local government revenue and the 
collection of these non-tax sourced revenues largely lack the legal bases and  
control from the central government. In addition, it is argued that this large 
portion of non-tax sourced revenue in China matches the content of taxes in 
concept. This is further proven by the results of this study. Compared to the 
tax ratio regression model, the current revenue ratio regression model (which 
contains both tax revenue and selected non-tax sourced revenue) fits better in 
the tax effort index model. it may be stressed that China’s tax authority should 
261 
 
 
consider reclassifying the majority of tax-like non-tax sourced revenues into 
tax revenue, or regulate the non-tax sourced revenue for the purpose of a 
more legalized and controllable revenue system.  
 
7.5   Contribution of this study 
This section highlights the merits and main contribution of this study to the 
literature.  
 
In the existing literature of tax revenue performance studies, there are few 
studies that use the tax effort index regression approach within a Chinese 
context. Nonetheless, researchers have been mainly focused on economic 
factors such as the stage of development, GDP decomposition and the 
openness level. It is widely acknowledged in the literature of inter-country tax 
effort index studies that the tax revenue performance is not only determined 
by economic factors, but also the social and political factors. However, the 
salient feature of China’s fiscal revenue system, i.e. the non-tax sourced 
revenue that arguably bears the nature of tax revenue in concept, have been 
widely ignored. In addition, a wide range of social and political factors that 
might also be determinants of China’s tax revenue performance were also 
missing from the literature. Against this background, a gap in the literature has 
clearly grown, which is the lack of a holistic and comprehensive inner-country 
tax effort index regression approach study on the tax performance in China. 
 
Therefore, the main contribution of this study is that it is the first of its kind 
where a holistic and comprehensive tax effort index study has been 
undertaken and contextualised in China at provincial level, taking into 
consideration China’s fiscal, economic and social salient features. 
 
Listed below are more detailed discussions of the specific contributions made 
in this study. 
 
Firstly, for the first time the author has constructed the current revenue ratio 
as the second dependent variable to represent the broader fiscal revenue and 
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true tax-like revenue performance for studying the tax effort index in China. 
Following the previous studies of Fauvelle-Aymar (1999), Bird et al. (2006), 
Tuan Minh et al. (2008), and Le et al. (2012), this study has used the 
conventional tax ratio as the first dependent variable, and the current revenue 
ratio as the second dependent variable, which is a  broader fiscal revenue 
indicator trying to capture the more true tax-like revenue performance in 
China’s tax system. The current revenue ratio is measured as the ratio of the 
sum of tax revenue and non-tax sourced revenue to GDP. However, it must 
be noted that the composition of the current revenue ratio in China is very 
different from the revenue variable used by the scholars in the previous 
studies.  
 
Secondly, this study has used the rural-urban income disparity Theil index as 
one of the explanatory variables in the tax revenue and current revenue 
models for China’s tax performance study. The resident income inequality is 
cited in the tax effort index studies as one of the important social factors 
related to the tax revenue performance (Bird et al., 2006; Fenochietto & 
Pessino, 2013). The rural-urban income gap in China has been widening 
since the open door reform in1978, and the income disparity has become a 
serious issue and a primary concern to the Chinese authorities. (Chen et al., 
2010; Peng et al., 2013; Zhang & Bao, 2015). However, there is no relevant 
study on the relationship between income inequality and tax/current revenue 
performance in China. This study fills this gap in the literature by constructing 
the Theil index of urban-rural income inequality in both the tax revenue ratio 
model and current revenue ratio model.  
 
 
Thirdly, for the first time in the tax effort index literature, the author has 
constructed a new variable of anti-corruption in a single country tax effort 
index model within the China context.  Studies regarding the relationship 
between corruption and tax revenue performance are scant. In the limited 
cross country studies, the data on the corruption level or anti-corruption effort 
are normally from international organizations such as the corruption in 
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government index from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) from Transparency International (TI), and 
the Index of Control of Corruption from the Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(WGI) published by the World Bank. According to the researcher’s best 
knowledge, no one had previously used a country specific corruption data 
directly for the tax performance study.   
 
Following the studies undertaken by Fisman and Gatti (2002) and Glaeser 
and Saks (2006), this study has constructed the variable of anti-corruption 
effort, which is measured by the total number of registered legal cases of 
acceptance of bribes and embezzlement in every 1,000,000 people. The 
introduction of this variable into the single country panel data tax effort index 
study yielded significant results.  
 
 
Overall, the main contributions of this study are twofold. First, by constructing 
and using three new variables (the current revenue ratio as the dependent 
variable, and anti-corruption effort and urban-rural income inequality Theil 
index as two of the explanatory variables), this study has improved the tax 
effort index model. Second, by including variables capturing China’s salient 
economic and social features, the author has enriched the study on tax 
performance in China.  
 
 
7.6 The limitations of this study  
This study presents a comprehensive tax effort index study in China, and the 
research aims have been accomplished. However, there are some limitations 
in this study that need future scholars to investigate.   
 
Firstly, because no researcher has ever constructed a broader fiscal revenue 
and true tax-like revenue performance for studying the tax effort index in 
China, this research used the sum of the tax revenue and selected categories 
of non-tax revenues to represent the current revenue. However, theoretically, 
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the true tax-like revenue can be further broken down and more accurately 
calculated using more disaggregated data sources, for instance the fee 
collection related statistics data.  
 
Secondly, in this study, the author has used a quantitative approach to 
construct the anti-corruption effort, which is measured by the total number of 
registered legal cases of acceptance of bribes and embezzlement per 
1,000,000 people. However, throughout the literature, there are traditional 
measurements and approaches to directly measure the corruption level using 
qualitative data or both. The lack of detailed corruption data at provincial level 
makes the use of the traditional approach impossible. This may prevent the 
reader from seeing a clearer picture of the relationship between the corruption 
and tax revenue performance, and may also make international comparison 
difficult.   
 
Thirdly, primary data could be used in analysing China’s tax revenue 
performance to further strengthen the validity and reliability of the data and 
possibly obtain more accurate results. All the data used in this research are 
secondary data collected from statistical yearbooks and reports published by 
the Chinese government authorised organizations, and no primary data was 
obtained and used in this study. Secondary data has its advantages such as 
ease of access, time saving, less expensive to obtain, and it provides the 
feasibility of regional comparison (Ghauri, 2005). These advantages are 
especially important for this study due to the fact that this study requires a 
large amount of data, which was very difficult to obtain by the author. In 
addition, comparison between provinces is a vital part in this study. However, 
compared with primary data, the disadvantages are also clear. Firstly, 
secondary data may provide a vast amount of information, but this may not 
always be the most appropriate data for a particular research study. However, 
primary data may be more appropriate because it is collected specially for the 
purpose of one particular study (Denscombe, 2014). Secondly, because 
secondary data are collected through a third party, there is also a lack of 
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control over data quality compared to primary data that is collected by the 
researcher (Saunders, 2011).  
 
 
7.7 Suggestions for further studies  
Firstly, this research has examined the relationship between China’s 
provincial level tax revenue performance and certain economic and social 
factors. The data set covers 31 provinces and 19 years. For future research, it 
is suggested that more data covering a longer time period could be applied for 
a more comprehensive study.   
 
Secondly, this study has only examined the tax performance and its 
determinants at the provincial level. In the future, an attempt could be made to 
conduct similar research at the national level using aggregate data. This 
would allow the comparison made between China and other countries in 
terms of tax performance.  
 
Thirdly, an alternative approach to the measurement of resident income 
inequality in China may be used in future studies. Currently, the most used 
statistical indicators in the field of income inequality are the Gini coefficient 
and the Theil index. Each of these indices has its advantages and 
disadvantages as discussed in Chapter Five. This study used the Theil index 
to represent the rural-urban residents’ income inequality due to the availability 
of the data. It would be interesting to see an alternative approach: the use of 
Gini coefficient to be used as the indicator of income inequality and linking it 
with the tax performance.   
 
And finally, it is the salient feature in China’s fiscal revenue system, i.e. the 
existence of non-tax revenues and its likeness to taxes in concept, which 
leads this study to use the current revenue ratio as one of the indicators of the 
tax capacity in the tax effort index model. However, as aforementioned in the 
literature review, issues regarding the non-tax revenues commonly exist 
among developing countries. Hence, it will be interesting to see the results 
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from a comparison study between China and other emerging countries using 
similar indicators.  
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9 Endnotes 
1 The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations was a United States’ organization 
that established in 1959, the main purpose of this organization was to provide consultancy 
service regarding to intergovernmental co-operation and efficiency. This organization was 
replaced by the American Council on Intergovernmental Relations in 1996. 
 
2The nature of the socialist transformation is to establish socialist public ownership of the 
means of production. In terms of details, there were three major aspects of this 
transformation, namely “the three major transformations”, and they are first, socialist 
transformation in agriculture; second, socialist transformation in handicrafts and capitalistic 
industry; and third, socialist transformation in commerce. The socialist transformation was 
started in 1953 and by the end of 1956, it was almost finished in the national level. (Wang, 
1984) 
 
3 The political purpose of The Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) was to rapidly transfer China 
into a socialist society through fast industrialization and agricultural collectivization. This 
political upheaval was widely recognized by scholars as a great disaster not only to the 
national economy, but also to the nation as a whole, and in many ways contributed to the 
Great Famine during the year of 1959 and 1961, which was one of the most tragic events in 
history. (Bachman, 2006; Houser, Sands, & Xiao, 2009; Yueh, 2010; Song, 2013)  
 
4 The Cultural Revolution, which was started in 1966 and ended in 1976, was a political 
upheaval in which Chairman Mao was trying to regain political control after he lost ground at 
the end of the great Leap Forward. (Yueh, 2010) 
 
5The “two declines” is the same as the “two ratios”, or the “declines of the two ratios”. 
 
                                                          
